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From: "Ludovic Courtès" <ludo@gnu.org>
To: Ricardo Wurmus <rekado@elephly.net>
Cc: 22883@debbugs.gnu.org
Subject: bug#22883: Authenticating a Git checkout
Date: Fri, 01 May 2020 19:20:38 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87y2qbefmh.fsf@gnu.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87bln9oupo.fsf@gnu.org> ("Ludovic \=\?utf-8\?Q\?Court\=C3\=A8s\=22'\?\= \=\?utf-8\?Q\?s\?\= message of "Thu, 30 Apr 2020 17:32:19 +0200")

Ludovic Courtès <ludo@gnu.org> skribis:

>   • Generalize that to channels.

As I see it, the generalization would be made by adding the
authentication parameters to the ‘.guix-channel’ file, along these
lines:

  (channel
    (version 0)
    (keyring-reference "my-keyring-branch")
    (historical-authorizations ".guix-authorizations.old"))

where:

  • ‘keyring-reference’ specifies the branch where to look for *.key
    files that constitute the keyring.  It can be ‘master’ and have the
    key mixed up with other files if that’s OK for the channel.  By
    default, it could be the current branch.

  • ‘historical-authorizations’ specifies a file to load in this branch
    and that contains a ‘.guix-authorizations’-formatted list of
    fingerprints for commits that lack a ‘.guix-authorizations’ file.
    By default, we could ignore historical commits—more specifically,
    commits whose parent(s) lack(s) ‘.guix-authorizations’.  It does
    mean that if an authorized commit removes ‘.guix-authorizations’,
    then we’re back to unauthenticated commits.

‘guix pull’ would error out before attempting to build anything if
authentication fails.  It could display a warning when pulling a commit
whose parent(s) lack(s) ‘.guix-authorizations’.

Thoughts?

In terms of code, everything is already there, so it’d be mostly about
moving code around and double-checking the new data formats since
they’ll be hard to change.

In terms of processes, it’ll be tricky: if we committers make a mistake
(sign with the wrong key, forget to add a new committer’s key, etc.),
nobody is able to pull.  In such a case, we’ll probably have to do a
hard-reset of the affected branch.

It would be best if we had a server-side hook to perform all these
checks, so that we don’t encounter such problems.  That would mean
running some of this code on Savannah, I don’t know if it’ll be
possible.  If it’s not, we can set up our own Git repo elsewhere and
make Savannah a mirror.

More thoughts?  :-)

Ludo’.




  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-05-01 17:22 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 78+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-03-02 18:03 bug#22883: Trustable "guix pull" Christopher Allan Webber
2016-03-02 19:26 ` Leo Famulari
2016-03-02 21:07   ` Christopher Allan Webber
2016-04-25 22:25 ` Ludovic Courtès
2016-04-26  0:13   ` Leo Famulari
2016-04-26  0:17     ` Thompson, David
2016-04-26  7:12       ` Ludovic Courtès
2016-04-30  4:43     ` Mike Gerwitz
2016-06-03 16:12       ` bug#22883: Authenticating a Git checkout Ludovic Courtès
2016-06-03 20:17         ` Leo Famulari
2016-06-04 11:04           ` Ludovic Courtès
2016-06-04  4:24         ` Mike Gerwitz
2016-06-04 11:17           ` Ludovic Courtès
2016-06-04 12:45             ` ng0
2016-06-06 12:20               ` ng0
2016-06-04 16:14             ` Mike Gerwitz
2016-06-05 20:39             ` Christopher Allan Webber
2016-06-05 21:15               ` Leo Famulari
2016-06-06  2:41               ` Mike Gerwitz
2016-06-06  7:01                 ` Ludovic Courtès
2016-07-22  8:22         ` Ludovic Courtès
2016-07-22 12:58           ` Thompson, David
2016-07-22 13:58             ` Ludovic Courtès
2017-10-24 23:30           ` Ludovic Courtès
2019-12-27 19:48             ` Ricardo Wurmus
2019-12-28 14:47               ` Ludovic Courtès
2019-12-28 16:05                 ` Ricardo Wurmus
2019-12-28 17:45                   ` Ludovic Courtès
2020-04-30 15:32                 ` Ludovic Courtès
2020-05-01 15:46                   ` Justus Winter
2020-05-01 16:50                     ` Ludovic Courtès
2020-05-01 17:04                   ` Ludovic Courtès
2020-05-19 20:23                     ` Ludovic Courtès
2020-06-01 14:07                       ` bug#22883: Channel introductions Ludovic Courtès
2020-06-02 23:45                         ` zimoun
2020-06-03  9:50                           ` Ludovic Courtès
2020-06-03 16:20                             ` zimoun
2020-06-04  9:55                               ` Ludovic Courtès
2020-05-01 17:20                   ` Ludovic Courtès [this message]
2020-05-02 22:02                   ` bug#22883: Authenticating a Git checkout Ludovic Courtès
2020-05-04  8:03                     ` Ludovic Courtès
2016-06-01 16:47   ` bug#22883: Discussion of TUF in the context of Git checkout authentication Ludovic Courtès
2016-05-15 12:40 ` bug#22883: Trustable "guix pull" fluxboks
2016-05-16 17:55   ` Thompson, David
2016-05-17 21:19   ` Ludovic Courtès
2016-06-04 16:19 ` Werner Koch
2016-06-04 22:27   ` Ludovic Courtès
2016-06-05  7:51     ` Werner Koch
2016-06-06 21:01       ` Leo Famulari
2016-06-07  8:08         ` bug#22883: gpg2 vs. gpg Ludovic Courtès
2016-06-07 11:25           ` Werner Koch
2016-06-07 12:58             ` ng0
2016-06-05  1:43   ` bug#22883: Trustable "guix pull" Mike Gerwitz
2018-08-28 19:56 ` Vagrant Cascadian
2018-09-02 16:05   ` Ludovic Courtès
2018-09-02 17:15     ` Vagrant Cascadian
2018-09-02 20:07       ` Ludovic Courtès
2019-12-20 22:11         ` bug#22883: Authenticating Git checkouts: step #1 Ludovic Courtès
     [not found]         ` <87mubmodfb.fsf_-_@gnu.org>
2019-12-21  1:33           ` zimoun
2019-12-27 12:58           ` Ludovic Courtès
     [not found]           ` <87eewqgc1v.fsf@gnu.org>
2019-12-27 20:47             ` Ricardo Wurmus
     [not found]             ` <87o8vto5rl.fsf@elephly.net>
2019-12-29  2:45               ` Vagrant Cascadian
     [not found]               ` <87a77bzw6p.fsf@yucca>
2019-12-29  7:34                 ` Efraim Flashner
2019-12-30 21:29                 ` Ludovic Courtès
2019-12-31 19:16 ` Jakub Kądziołka
2020-01-08 13:30   ` Ludovic Courtès
2020-06-02 13:49 ` bug#22883: Authenticating a Git checkout John Soo
2020-06-03  9:33   ` Ludovic Courtès
2020-06-08 21:54 ` bug#22883: [PATCH 1/9] git-authenticate: Cache takes a key parameter Ludovic Courtès
2020-06-08 21:54   ` bug#22883: [PATCH 2/9] git-authenticate: 'authenticate-commits' takes a #:keyring parameter Ludovic Courtès
2020-06-08 21:54   ` bug#22883: [PATCH 3/9] tests: Move OpenPGP helpers to (guix tests gnupg) Ludovic Courtès
2020-06-08 21:54   ` bug#22883: [PATCH 4/9] channels: 'latest-channel-instance' authenticates Git checkouts Ludovic Courtès
2020-06-08 21:54   ` bug#22883: [PATCH 5/9] channels: Make 'validate-pull' call right after clone/pull Ludovic Courtès
2020-06-08 21:54   ` bug#22883: [PATCH 6/9] .guix-channel: Add 'keyring-reference' Ludovic Courtès
2020-06-08 21:54   ` bug#22883: [PATCH 7/9] channels: Automatically add introduction for the official 'guix' channel Ludovic Courtès
2020-06-08 21:54   ` bug#22883: [PATCH 8/9] pull: Add '--disable-authentication' Ludovic Courtès
2020-06-08 21:54   ` bug#22883: [PATCH 9/9] DROP? channels: Add prehistorical authorizations to <channel-introduction> Ludovic Courtès
2020-06-08 22:04   ` bug#22883: [PATCH 1/9] git-authenticate: Cache takes a key parameter Ludovic Courtès

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