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From: "Ludovic Courtès" <ludo@gnu.org>
To: zimoun <zimon.toutoune@gmail.com>
Cc: 22883@debbugs.gnu.org
Subject: bug#22883: Channel introductions
Date: Wed, 03 Jun 2020 11:50:13 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <875zc8pjfu.fsf@gnu.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAJ3okZ197ip5HG8P66tVhtNiTcxBv63yfWk7LMeYy=A-Vx2d-Q@mail.gmail.com> (zimoun's message of "Wed, 3 Jun 2020 01:45:13 +0200")

Hi,

zimoun <zimon.toutoune@gmail.com> skribis:

> On Mon, 1 Jun 2020 at 16:08, Ludovic Courtès <ludo@gnu.org> wrote:
>
>> I think we need a way to “introduce” a channel to its users that goes
>> beyond a mere URL.
>
> Just to be sure to well understand, will the good ol'
> ~/.config/guix/channels.scm
>
>      ;; Tell 'guix pull' to use my own repo.
>      (list (channel
>              (name 'guix)
>              (url "https://example.org/my-guix.git")
>              (branch "super-hacks")))
>
> still work as it is now? i.e., using the current "unauthorized"
> mechanism.  Or will a new keyword be added to this channel description
> to say "this channel does not use authorized machinery but it is
> fine"?

Yeah, we have to keep it working.  So I guess in that case it would just
emit a warning saying this channel is not authenticated, and that’s it.

>>      If that information were stored in ‘.guix-channel’, it would be
>>      trivial for an attacker to fork the project (or push a new commit)
>>      and pretend the authentication process must not take previous
>>      commits into account.
>
> What will happen to recursive '.guix-channel'?  The '.guix-channel' of
> channel A contains the reference to the channel B where the
> '.guix-channel' contains the reference to the channel C, etc.

I’m not sure I understand.  (The sentence above is about *not* storing
info in ‘.guix-channel’.)

>>   4. When publishing a fork of a channel, one emits a new channel
>>      introduction.  Users switching to the fork have to explicitly allow
>>      that new channel via its introduction; flipping the URL won’t be
>>      enough because ‘guix pull’ would report unauthorized commits.
>
> I am a bit afraid by this... and I hope that a fork of a channel will
> still work without emitting a new channel introduction.

No, when publishing a fork of an authenticated channel, you’ll have to
publish its introduction alongside its URL.

I think it’s unavoidable: we want to be able to distinguish between a
mirror that has been tampered with and a fork.

>>   5. The channel URL is not included in the introduction.  However, the
>>      official URL is an important piece of information: it tells users
>>      this is where they’ll get the latest updates.  It should be
>>      possible to create mirrors, but by default users should go to the
>>      official URL.  They should be aware that mirrors can be outdated.
>
> I do not understand this paragraph.  The aim of mirrors is to avoid
> the users to go to the official URL, isn't it?  And the mirrors do not
> have by design the latest updates (time to propagate, etc.).
>
>
>>      I think the official URL can be stored in ‘.guix-channel’ in the
>>      repo (which is subject to the authentication machinery).  That way,
>>      ‘guix pull’ can let the user know if they’re talking to a mirror
>>      rather than to the official channel.
>
> Why does it matter?  The user should authenticate the downloaded
> content whatever the URL serving it, isn't it?
> And can 'guix pull' already let the users know to who they are talking?

You’re right: ideally the URL wouldn’t matter at all.  However, from a
security perspective, we not only want to make sure users get genuine
commits, we also want to know they’re not talking to a possibly outdated
mirror.

Since there’s no way to answer the question “is this the latest commit?”
in a general way, the best we can do, I think, is to detect whether
we’re talking to the “official” Git repo.

Thanks for your feedback!

Ludo’.




  reply	other threads:[~2020-06-03  9:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 78+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-03-02 18:03 bug#22883: Trustable "guix pull" Christopher Allan Webber
2016-03-02 19:26 ` Leo Famulari
2016-03-02 21:07   ` Christopher Allan Webber
2016-04-25 22:25 ` Ludovic Courtès
2016-04-26  0:13   ` Leo Famulari
2016-04-26  0:17     ` Thompson, David
2016-04-26  7:12       ` Ludovic Courtès
2016-04-30  4:43     ` Mike Gerwitz
2016-06-03 16:12       ` bug#22883: Authenticating a Git checkout Ludovic Courtès
2016-06-03 20:17         ` Leo Famulari
2016-06-04 11:04           ` Ludovic Courtès
2016-06-04  4:24         ` Mike Gerwitz
2016-06-04 11:17           ` Ludovic Courtès
2016-06-04 12:45             ` ng0
2016-06-06 12:20               ` ng0
2016-06-04 16:14             ` Mike Gerwitz
2016-06-05 20:39             ` Christopher Allan Webber
2016-06-05 21:15               ` Leo Famulari
2016-06-06  2:41               ` Mike Gerwitz
2016-06-06  7:01                 ` Ludovic Courtès
2016-07-22  8:22         ` Ludovic Courtès
2016-07-22 12:58           ` Thompson, David
2016-07-22 13:58             ` Ludovic Courtès
2017-10-24 23:30           ` Ludovic Courtès
2019-12-27 19:48             ` Ricardo Wurmus
2019-12-28 14:47               ` Ludovic Courtès
2019-12-28 16:05                 ` Ricardo Wurmus
2019-12-28 17:45                   ` Ludovic Courtès
2020-04-30 15:32                 ` Ludovic Courtès
2020-05-01 15:46                   ` Justus Winter
2020-05-01 16:50                     ` Ludovic Courtès
2020-05-01 17:04                   ` Ludovic Courtès
2020-05-19 20:23                     ` Ludovic Courtès
2020-06-01 14:07                       ` bug#22883: Channel introductions Ludovic Courtès
2020-06-02 23:45                         ` zimoun
2020-06-03  9:50                           ` Ludovic Courtès [this message]
2020-06-03 16:20                             ` zimoun
2020-06-04  9:55                               ` Ludovic Courtès
2020-05-01 17:20                   ` bug#22883: Authenticating a Git checkout Ludovic Courtès
2020-05-02 22:02                   ` Ludovic Courtès
2020-05-04  8:03                     ` Ludovic Courtès
2016-06-01 16:47   ` bug#22883: Discussion of TUF in the context of Git checkout authentication Ludovic Courtès
2016-05-15 12:40 ` bug#22883: Trustable "guix pull" fluxboks
2016-05-16 17:55   ` Thompson, David
2016-05-17 21:19   ` Ludovic Courtès
2016-06-04 16:19 ` Werner Koch
2016-06-04 22:27   ` Ludovic Courtès
2016-06-05  7:51     ` Werner Koch
2016-06-06 21:01       ` Leo Famulari
2016-06-07  8:08         ` bug#22883: gpg2 vs. gpg Ludovic Courtès
2016-06-07 11:25           ` Werner Koch
2016-06-07 12:58             ` ng0
2016-06-05  1:43   ` bug#22883: Trustable "guix pull" Mike Gerwitz
2018-08-28 19:56 ` Vagrant Cascadian
2018-09-02 16:05   ` Ludovic Courtès
2018-09-02 17:15     ` Vagrant Cascadian
2018-09-02 20:07       ` Ludovic Courtès
2019-12-20 22:11         ` bug#22883: Authenticating Git checkouts: step #1 Ludovic Courtès
     [not found]         ` <87mubmodfb.fsf_-_@gnu.org>
2019-12-21  1:33           ` zimoun
2019-12-27 12:58           ` Ludovic Courtès
     [not found]           ` <87eewqgc1v.fsf@gnu.org>
2019-12-27 20:47             ` Ricardo Wurmus
     [not found]             ` <87o8vto5rl.fsf@elephly.net>
2019-12-29  2:45               ` Vagrant Cascadian
     [not found]               ` <87a77bzw6p.fsf@yucca>
2019-12-29  7:34                 ` Efraim Flashner
2019-12-30 21:29                 ` Ludovic Courtès
2019-12-31 19:16 ` Jakub Kądziołka
2020-01-08 13:30   ` Ludovic Courtès
2020-06-02 13:49 ` bug#22883: Authenticating a Git checkout John Soo
2020-06-03  9:33   ` Ludovic Courtès
2020-06-08 21:54 ` bug#22883: [PATCH 1/9] git-authenticate: Cache takes a key parameter Ludovic Courtès
2020-06-08 21:54   ` bug#22883: [PATCH 2/9] git-authenticate: 'authenticate-commits' takes a #:keyring parameter Ludovic Courtès
2020-06-08 21:54   ` bug#22883: [PATCH 3/9] tests: Move OpenPGP helpers to (guix tests gnupg) Ludovic Courtès
2020-06-08 21:54   ` bug#22883: [PATCH 4/9] channels: 'latest-channel-instance' authenticates Git checkouts Ludovic Courtès
2020-06-08 21:54   ` bug#22883: [PATCH 5/9] channels: Make 'validate-pull' call right after clone/pull Ludovic Courtès
2020-06-08 21:54   ` bug#22883: [PATCH 6/9] .guix-channel: Add 'keyring-reference' Ludovic Courtès
2020-06-08 21:54   ` bug#22883: [PATCH 7/9] channels: Automatically add introduction for the official 'guix' channel Ludovic Courtès
2020-06-08 21:54   ` bug#22883: [PATCH 8/9] pull: Add '--disable-authentication' Ludovic Courtès
2020-06-08 21:54   ` bug#22883: [PATCH 9/9] DROP? channels: Add prehistorical authorizations to <channel-introduction> Ludovic Courtès
2020-06-08 22:04   ` bug#22883: [PATCH 1/9] git-authenticate: Cache takes a key parameter Ludovic Courtès

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