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From: Pierre Neidhardt <mail@ambrevar.xyz>
To: help-guix@gnu.org
Subject: Re: How to present Guix to a wider audience
Date: Tue, 14 Jan 2020 12:23:37 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <874kwyp9hi.fsf@ambrevar.xyz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <878smq41kg.fsf@ambrevar.xyz>


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I just wrote a short draft which hopefully should explain in layman
terms why Guix matters.

I tried to keep short (< 1000 words) and to stick to non-technical vocabulary.

Let me know what you think!

-- 
Pierre Neidhardt
https://ambrevar.xyz/

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#+TITLE: Why Guix matters

Have you ever installed an application on a computer, a smartphone or your
favourite smart device?  Can you trust that it does its job instead of doing the
opposite of what it displays on screen or, worse, compromise your data and your
private life?

How can you know?  You might think "Let's use free and open source software!"
The bad news: it's far, very far from being enough.

This is a hard and yet very real problem that hits our everyday life constantly.
Consider this: the digital pictures of our loved ones, banking operations, the
(political?) news feed that we read, our contacts and the communication with our
friends and colleagues; all of it happens through applications.

How can we protect ourselves from deceit?  How can we guarantee trust in the
machines that we use?

First, we need to understand how applications are made.

* The assembly line of software

Applications are /written/ in the form of /source code/, which is a series of
instructions for the computer stored as text files.  But the machine cannot read
theses files directly: it must first be /compiled/ into /machine code/.  The
resulting /compiled application/ can then be run by the user.

While source code access gives you a pretty high level of transparency and
allows you to inspect what the program will do, compiled programs are a
practically unreadable sequence of 1 and 0.  They are effectively /black boxes/.

* Open source is not enough

We might be tempted to think that free open source software gives us
transparency about what's in the application.  While the compiled application we
download from the Internet is a black box, we could just compile the source code
ourselves and compare the result with the downloaded application, right?  If it's
identical, then we are good.

So why is free, open source software not trustworthy then?  Because when you
compile the source code twice, chances are that you'll get slightly /different
black boxes/.

In practice this means that it's almost always impossible to /reproduce/ the
exact same compiled application that is offered for download.

It's enough that merely one 0 or 1 got flipped for the behaviour
of the application to change completely.  In other words, if two applications
are not identical to the bit, everything can happen and all trust vanishes.

This lack of reliability in the compilation of applications comes from the
"chaos" in the machine environment: slightly different software used for
compilation (e.g. different versions), different hardware, different date...
The slightest difference in the compilation environment is susceptible to flip a
bit.

This is called the /reproduciblity/ problem.

* Software is made with software

The compiler is also an application that must be compiled, by another compiler,
from some source code.  The same applies to this other compiler, and so on.  It
seems to be a chicken and egg problem: can we ever trust any compiler then?

It is actually possible: if we go up the chain of compilers far enough, we reach
a level where have a trivial "machine level" compiler that can build a simple compiler.
This machine-readable file is small enough that it is no longer a black box and
can be inspected by humans.  The simpler compiler can in turn build a more
complex compiler, etc., until we get today's compilers.

This is called the /bootstrappability/ problem.

* Trust all the way

To sum up, we need the following properties in order to be able to trust
computer software:

- Free and open source software.
- Reproducibility.
- Bootstrappability.

This is only useful it the entire software running on your machine obeys these
principles.  A single black box on your machine can wreck havoc.  In other
words, the entire /operating system/ itself must be free and open source
software, reproducible and bootstrappable.

This is precisely [[https://guix.gnu.org][Guix]]' stated goal: Offer a strong guarantee of reliability and
trust.

- Reliability: It just works, and more importantly, it will always work.  No
  more unexpected, random behaviour; no more "software erosion."

- Trust: Work is in progress to fully /bootstrap/ the software assembly line,
  which means everything will soon be fully transparent..

What's even more interesting with Guix is the that this novel approach to
operating systems gives it great usability benefits:

- Unbreakable system and time travel: Have you ever updated a system only to
  restart it broken or less functional?  (Say there was a power cut during the
  upgrade.)  With Guix you keep a history of all previous /states/ of the
  system, even when you change the configuration manually.  If something breaks,
  you can always go back in time.  No more fear of updates or tinkering around
  with the settings!

- Separate multi-user application collections: on a multi-user system, every
  user can install their favourite applications independently.  Applications
  don't "pollute" the other user sessions.

- Multiple versions: Sometimes you'll need an older version of a program (for
  instance to support an old format or a feature that's gone in a newer version).
  Guix allows to install multiple versions of the same program in parallel.

* Can everyone use Guix?

Guix is currently (January 2020) actively developed by a community of
programmers from all over the world.  It is stable and can be used in a number
of settings, from laptop and desktop computers to servers and scientific
computing.

More work needs to be done in terms of accessibility and easy of use so that the
less technically-minded among us can also enjoy Guix some day.  Then, hopefully,
we will find Guix preinstalled on computers, ready for everyone to use.

If you'd like to contribute in some way, feel free to [[https://guix.gnu.org/contact/][reach out to us!]]

* References

- https://guix.gnu.org: The home page of Guix with blog articles, documentation,
  videos and more.

- https://nixos.org/: The other operating system that targets similar goals.
  Nix was an inspiration for Guix.

- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_(computing)#Compiler_backdoors:
  Compilers can be malicious and create malicious compilers in turn.  This is
  commonly known as the "Thompson attack," as first mentioned in the speech
  "Reflections on Trusting Trust" by Ken Thompson.

- https://reproducible-builds.org/: Technical information on reproducibility.

- https://bootstrappable.org/: Technical information on bootstrappability.

- https://www.gnu.org/software/mes/: GNU Mes is a project that aims at
  bootstrapping the main compilers until stage0.

- https://savannah.nongnu.org/projects/stage0: The "machine-level" compiler that
  both readable by machines and humans.

  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-01-14 11:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-01-02 10:03 How to present Guix to a wider audience Pierre Neidhardt
2020-01-02 18:18 ` zimoun
2020-01-08 15:33   ` Pierre Neidhardt
2020-01-08 16:32     ` Ricardo Wurmus
2020-01-08 20:18     ` zimoun
     [not found]       ` <24DdUL_0dCHlf-Jsotb_z0Mxz7kuUpI_FeBoRrbgJUypYRxvic9u3GhPfBwAiz5ZGjRxITivscu59w_-BPA2cIY_wSbypis89M7Jb8AglBM=@protonmail.com>
     [not found]         ` <CAJ3okZ1CQ1zvbHnFT6EmB+yYFwcAszZ0baroyj03LzTK7AhBXw@mail.gmail.com>
2020-01-10  9:52           ` wisdomlight--- via
2020-01-10 12:19             ` Pierre Neidhardt
2020-01-02 19:20 ` Ricardo Wurmus
2020-01-08 15:26   ` Pierre Neidhardt
2020-01-14 11:23 ` Pierre Neidhardt [this message]
2020-01-14 15:58   ` Jack Hill
2020-01-14 17:00     ` Pierre Neidhardt
2020-01-14 21:01       ` Jack Hill
2020-01-14 23:44   ` Dimakakos Dimos
2020-01-15  0:07   ` Vagrant Cascadian
2020-01-15  8:52     ` Pierre Neidhardt
2020-01-15  0:20   ` Josh
2020-01-15  8:57     ` Pierre Neidhardt
2020-01-15  5:59   ` Arun Isaac
2020-01-15  8:53     ` Pierre Neidhardt
2020-01-15  8:59   ` Pierre Neidhardt
2020-01-15 17:44     ` sirgazil
2020-01-19 11:03       ` Todor Kondić
2020-01-19 15:57         ` wisdomlight
2020-01-21 21:49   ` ndre
2020-01-22 11:00     ` Pierre Neidhardt
2020-01-22 17:35       ` Pierre Neidhardt
2020-01-23 14:44         ` Kelsang Sherab
2020-01-23 21:25           ` Pierre Neidhardt
2020-02-11  7:45   ` Pierre Neidhardt
2020-02-11 17:38     ` Josh Marshall

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