bug#27437: Source downloader accepts X.509 certificate for incorrect domain

[Leo Famulari <leo@famulari.name>]

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On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 11:33:31AM -0400, Mark H Weaver wrote:
> ludo@gnu.org (Ludovic Courtès) writes:
> > IOW, since we’re checking the integrity of the tarball anyway, and we
> > assume developers checked its authenticity when writing the recipe, then
> > who cares whether downloads.xiph.org has a valid certificate?
> >
> > Conversely, ‘guix download’ always checks certificates by default.
> >
> > Does it make sense?
> 
> Yes, and I agree with this behavior.  However, it should be noted that
> this will reduce the security of a bad practice that I suspect is
> sometimes used by people when updating packages, namely to update the
> version number, try building it, and then copy the hash from the error
> message to the package.

Yeah, that's a bad habit and I warn people against it whenever it comes
up :/

> FWIW, I always check digital signatures when they're available, and I
> hope that others will as well, but in practice we are putting our faith
> in a large number of contributors, some of whom might not be so careful.
> 
> Also, sadly, many packages are distributed without digital signatures at
> all.  One glaring example is NSS.

Do we have any contacts at Mozilla we can talk to about this? I imagine
it's a long shot, with many bureaucratic hurdles, but it's worth asking
for.

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