[bug#33701] [PATCH staging 17/23] gnu: cyrus-sasl: Update to 2.1.27.

[Marius Bakke <mbakke@fastmail.com>]

* gnu/packages/patches/cyrus-sasl-CVE-2013-4122.patch: Delete file.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Remove it.
* gnu/packages/cyrus-sasl.scm (cyrus-sasl): Update to 2.1.27.
[source](patches): Remove.
[inputs]: Move MIT-KRB5 from here ...
[propagated-inputs]: ... to here.  New field.
---
 gnu/local.mk                                  |   1 -
 gnu/packages/cyrus-sasl.scm                   |   9 +-
 .../patches/cyrus-sasl-CVE-2013-4122.patch    | 130 ------------------
 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 135 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100644 gnu/packages/patches/cyrus-sasl-CVE-2013-4122.patch

diff --git a/gnu/local.mk b/gnu/local.mk
index 45d8effc11..0d279e55eb 100644
--- a/gnu/local.mk
+++ b/gnu/local.mk
@@ -649,7 +649,6 @@ dist_patch_DATA =						\
   %D%/packages/patches/cube-nocheck.patch			\
   %D%/packages/patches/cursynth-wave-rand.patch			\
   %D%/packages/patches/cvs-2017-12836.patch			\
-  %D%/packages/patches/cyrus-sasl-CVE-2013-4122.patch		\
   %D%/packages/patches/datamash-arm-tests.patch			\
   %D%/packages/patches/dbus-helper-search-path.patch		\
   %D%/packages/patches/deja-dup-use-ref-keyword-for-iter.patch	\
diff --git a/gnu/packages/cyrus-sasl.scm b/gnu/packages/cyrus-sasl.scm
index 60c1e0ef94..0a5e464719 100644
--- a/gnu/packages/cyrus-sasl.scm
+++ b/gnu/packages/cyrus-sasl.scm
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
 (define-public cyrus-sasl
   (package
    (name "cyrus-sasl")
-   (version "2.1.26")
+   (version "2.1.27")
    (source (origin
             (method url-fetch)
             (uri (list (string-append
@@ -40,13 +40,14 @@
                        (string-append
                         "ftp://ftp.cyrusimap.org/cyrus-sasl/cyrus-sasl-"
                         version ".tar.gz")))
-            (patches (search-patches "cyrus-sasl-CVE-2013-4122.patch"))
             (sha256 (base32
-                     "1hvvbcsg21nlncbgs0cgn3iwlnb3vannzwsp6rwvnn9ba4v53g4g"))))
+                     "1m85zcpgfdhm43cavpdkhb1s2zq1b31472hq1w1gs3xh94anp1i6"))))
    (build-system gnu-build-system)
    (inputs `(("gdbm" ,gdbm)
-             ("mit-krb5" ,mit-krb5)
              ("openssl" ,openssl)))
+   (propagated-inputs
+    `(;; cyrus-sasl.pc refers to -lkrb5, so propagate it.
+      ("mit-krb5" ,mit-krb5)))
    (arguments
     '(#:configure-flags (list (string-append "--with-plugindir="
                                              (assoc-ref %outputs "out")
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/cyrus-sasl-CVE-2013-4122.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/cyrus-sasl-CVE-2013-4122.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index fc72e42e03..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/cyrus-sasl-CVE-2013-4122.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,130 +0,0 @@
-Fix CVE-2013-4122.
-
-https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-4122
-
-Patch copied from upstream source repository:
-https://github.com/cyrusimap/cyrus-sasl/commit/dedad73e5e7a75d01a5f3d5a6702ab8ccd2ff40d
-
-From dedad73e5e7a75d01a5f3d5a6702ab8ccd2ff40d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: mancha <mancha1@hush.com>
-Date: Thu, 11 Jul 2013 10:08:07 +0100
-Subject: Handle NULL returns from glibc 2.17+ crypt()
-
-Starting with glibc 2.17 (eglibc 2.17), crypt() fails with EINVAL
-(w/ NULL return) if the salt violates specifications. Additionally,
-on FIPS-140 enabled Linux systems, DES/MD5-encrypted passwords
-passed to crypt() fail with EPERM (w/ NULL return).
-
-When using glibc's crypt(), check return value to avoid a possible
-NULL pointer dereference.
-
-Patch by mancha1@hush.com.
----
- pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c | 3 ++-
- pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c | 4 +++-
- saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c  | 4 +++-
- saslauthd/auth_shadow.c    | 8 +++-----
- 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c b/pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c
-index 4b34222..400289c 100644
---- a/pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c
-+++ b/pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c
-@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ char *userid;
- char *password;
- {
-     char* r;
-+    char* crpt_passwd;
-     struct passwd *pwd;
- 
-     pwd = getpwnam(userid);
-@@ -41,7 +42,7 @@ char *password;
-     else if (pwd->pw_passwd[0] == '*') {
- 	r = "Account disabled";
-     }
--    else if (strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, crypt(password, pwd->pw_passwd)) != 0) {
-+    else if (!(crpt_passwd = crypt(password, pwd->pw_passwd)) || strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, (const char *)crpt_passwd) != 0) {
- 	r = "Incorrect password";
-     }
-     else {
-diff --git a/pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c b/pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c
-index 2b11286..6d607bb 100644
---- a/pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c
-+++ b/pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c
-@@ -32,13 +32,15 @@ char *userid;
- char *password;
- {
-     struct spwd *pwd;
-+    char *crpt_passwd;
- 
-     pwd = getspnam(userid);
-     if (!pwd) {
- 	return "Userid not found";
-     }
-     
--    if (strcmp(pwd->sp_pwdp, crypt(password, pwd->sp_pwdp)) != 0) {
-+    crpt_passwd = crypt(password, pwd->sp_pwdp);
-+    if (!crpt_passwd || strcmp(pwd->sp_pwdp, (const char *)crpt_passwd) != 0) {
- 	return "Incorrect password";
-     }
-     else {
-diff --git a/saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c b/saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c
-index fc8029d..d4ebe54 100644
---- a/saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c
-+++ b/saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c
-@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ auth_getpwent (
- {
-     /* VARIABLES */
-     struct passwd *pw;			/* pointer to passwd file entry */
-+    char *crpt_passwd;			/* encrypted password */
-     int errnum;
-     /* END VARIABLES */
-   
-@@ -105,7 +106,8 @@ auth_getpwent (
- 	}
-     }
- 
--    if (strcmp(pw->pw_passwd, (const char *)crypt(password, pw->pw_passwd))) {
-+    crpt_passwd = crypt(password, pw->pw_passwd);
-+    if (!crpt_passwd || strcmp(pw->pw_passwd, (const char *)crpt_passwd)) {
- 	if (flags & VERBOSE) {
- 	    syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "DEBUG: auth_getpwent: %s: invalid password", login);
- 	}
-diff --git a/saslauthd/auth_shadow.c b/saslauthd/auth_shadow.c
-index 677131b..1988afd 100644
---- a/saslauthd/auth_shadow.c
-+++ b/saslauthd/auth_shadow.c
-@@ -210,8 +210,8 @@ auth_shadow (
- 	RETURN("NO Insufficient permission to access NIS authentication database (saslauthd)");
-     }
- 
--    cpw = strdup((const char *)crypt(password, sp->sp_pwdp));
--    if (strcmp(sp->sp_pwdp, cpw)) {
-+    cpw = crypt(password, sp->sp_pwdp);
-+    if (!cpw || strcmp(sp->sp_pwdp, (const char *)cpw)) {
- 	if (flags & VERBOSE) {
- 	    /*
- 	     * This _should_ reveal the SHADOW_PW_LOCKED prefix to an
-@@ -221,10 +221,8 @@ auth_shadow (
- 	    syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "DEBUG: auth_shadow: pw mismatch: '%s' != '%s'",
- 		   sp->sp_pwdp, cpw);
- 	}
--	free(cpw);
- 	RETURN("NO Incorrect password");
-     }
--    free(cpw);
- 
-     /*
-      * The following fields will be set to -1 if:
-@@ -286,7 +284,7 @@ auth_shadow (
- 	RETURN("NO Invalid username");
-     }
-   
--    if (strcmp(upw->upw_passwd, crypt(password, upw->upw_passwd)) != 0) {
-+    if (!(cpw = crypt(password, upw->upw_passwd)) || (strcmp(upw->upw_passwd, (const char *)cpw) != 0)) {
- 	if (flags & VERBOSE) {
- 	    syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "auth_shadow: pw mismatch: %s != %s",
- 		   password, upw->upw_passwd);
--- 
-cgit v0.12
-
-- 
2.20.0