From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:4830:134:3::10]:39633) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1gWWr1-0006dA-S6 for guix-patches@gnu.org; Mon, 10 Dec 2018 20:28:58 -0500 Received: from Debian-exim by eggs.gnu.org with spam-scanned (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1gWWdm-0001J0-Hf for guix-patches@gnu.org; Mon, 10 Dec 2018 20:15:17 -0500 Received: from debbugs.gnu.org ([208.118.235.43]:38246) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.0:RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA1:16) (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1gWWdm-0001Is-Co for guix-patches@gnu.org; Mon, 10 Dec 2018 20:15:14 -0500 Received: from Debian-debbugs by debbugs.gnu.org with local (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from ) id 1gWWdm-0001SC-7q for guix-patches@gnu.org; Mon, 10 Dec 2018 20:15:14 -0500 Subject: [bug#33701] [PATCH staging 17/23] gnu: cyrus-sasl: Update to 2.1.27. Resent-Message-ID: From: Marius Bakke Date: Tue, 11 Dec 2018 02:14:10 +0100 Message-Id: <20181211011416.15902-17-mbakke@fastmail.com> In-Reply-To: <20181211011416.15902-1-mbakke@fastmail.com> References: <20181211011416.15902-1-mbakke@fastmail.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: guix-patches-bounces+kyle=kyleam.com@gnu.org Sender: "Guix-patches" To: 33701@debbugs.gnu.org * gnu/packages/patches/cyrus-sasl-CVE-2013-4122.patch: Delete file. * gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Remove it. * gnu/packages/cyrus-sasl.scm (cyrus-sasl): Update to 2.1.27. [source](patches): Remove. [inputs]: Move MIT-KRB5 from here ... [propagated-inputs]: ... to here. New field. --- gnu/local.mk | 1 - gnu/packages/cyrus-sasl.scm | 9 +- .../patches/cyrus-sasl-CVE-2013-4122.patch | 130 ------------------ 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 135 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 gnu/packages/patches/cyrus-sasl-CVE-2013-4122.patch diff --git a/gnu/local.mk b/gnu/local.mk index 45d8effc11..0d279e55eb 100644 --- a/gnu/local.mk +++ b/gnu/local.mk @@ -649,7 +649,6 @@ dist_patch_DATA = \ %D%/packages/patches/cube-nocheck.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/cursynth-wave-rand.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/cvs-2017-12836.patch \ - %D%/packages/patches/cyrus-sasl-CVE-2013-4122.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/datamash-arm-tests.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/dbus-helper-search-path.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/deja-dup-use-ref-keyword-for-iter.patch \ diff --git a/gnu/packages/cyrus-sasl.scm b/gnu/packages/cyrus-sasl.scm index 60c1e0ef94..0a5e464719 100644 --- a/gnu/packages/cyrus-sasl.scm +++ b/gnu/packages/cyrus-sasl.scm @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ (define-public cyrus-sasl (package (name "cyrus-sasl") - (version "2.1.26") + (version "2.1.27") (source (origin (method url-fetch) (uri (list (string-append @@ -40,13 +40,14 @@ (string-append "ftp://ftp.cyrusimap.org/cyrus-sasl/cyrus-sasl-" version ".tar.gz"))) - (patches (search-patches "cyrus-sasl-CVE-2013-4122.patch")) (sha256 (base32 - "1hvvbcsg21nlncbgs0cgn3iwlnb3vannzwsp6rwvnn9ba4v53g4g")))) + "1m85zcpgfdhm43cavpdkhb1s2zq1b31472hq1w1gs3xh94anp1i6")))) (build-system gnu-build-system) (inputs `(("gdbm" ,gdbm) - ("mit-krb5" ,mit-krb5) ("openssl" ,openssl))) + (propagated-inputs + `(;; cyrus-sasl.pc refers to -lkrb5, so propagate it. + ("mit-krb5" ,mit-krb5))) (arguments '(#:configure-flags (list (string-append "--with-plugindir=" (assoc-ref %outputs "out") diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/cyrus-sasl-CVE-2013-4122.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/cyrus-sasl-CVE-2013-4122.patch deleted file mode 100644 index fc72e42e03..0000000000 --- a/gnu/packages/patches/cyrus-sasl-CVE-2013-4122.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,130 +0,0 @@ -Fix CVE-2013-4122. - -https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-4122 - -Patch copied from upstream source repository: -https://github.com/cyrusimap/cyrus-sasl/commit/dedad73e5e7a75d01a5f3d5a6702ab8ccd2ff40d - -From dedad73e5e7a75d01a5f3d5a6702ab8ccd2ff40d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: mancha -Date: Thu, 11 Jul 2013 10:08:07 +0100 -Subject: Handle NULL returns from glibc 2.17+ crypt() - -Starting with glibc 2.17 (eglibc 2.17), crypt() fails with EINVAL -(w/ NULL return) if the salt violates specifications. Additionally, -on FIPS-140 enabled Linux systems, DES/MD5-encrypted passwords -passed to crypt() fail with EPERM (w/ NULL return). - -When using glibc's crypt(), check return value to avoid a possible -NULL pointer dereference. - -Patch by mancha1@hush.com. ---- - pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c | 3 ++- - pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c | 4 +++- - saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c | 4 +++- - saslauthd/auth_shadow.c | 8 +++----- - 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c b/pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c -index 4b34222..400289c 100644 ---- a/pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c -+++ b/pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c -@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ char *userid; - char *password; - { - char* r; -+ char* crpt_passwd; - struct passwd *pwd; - - pwd = getpwnam(userid); -@@ -41,7 +42,7 @@ char *password; - else if (pwd->pw_passwd[0] == '*') { - r = "Account disabled"; - } -- else if (strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, crypt(password, pwd->pw_passwd)) != 0) { -+ else if (!(crpt_passwd = crypt(password, pwd->pw_passwd)) || strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, (const char *)crpt_passwd) != 0) { - r = "Incorrect password"; - } - else { -diff --git a/pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c b/pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c -index 2b11286..6d607bb 100644 ---- a/pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c -+++ b/pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c -@@ -32,13 +32,15 @@ char *userid; - char *password; - { - struct spwd *pwd; -+ char *crpt_passwd; - - pwd = getspnam(userid); - if (!pwd) { - return "Userid not found"; - } - -- if (strcmp(pwd->sp_pwdp, crypt(password, pwd->sp_pwdp)) != 0) { -+ crpt_passwd = crypt(password, pwd->sp_pwdp); -+ if (!crpt_passwd || strcmp(pwd->sp_pwdp, (const char *)crpt_passwd) != 0) { - return "Incorrect password"; - } - else { -diff --git a/saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c b/saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c -index fc8029d..d4ebe54 100644 ---- a/saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c -+++ b/saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c -@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ auth_getpwent ( - { - /* VARIABLES */ - struct passwd *pw; /* pointer to passwd file entry */ -+ char *crpt_passwd; /* encrypted password */ - int errnum; - /* END VARIABLES */ - -@@ -105,7 +106,8 @@ auth_getpwent ( - } - } - -- if (strcmp(pw->pw_passwd, (const char *)crypt(password, pw->pw_passwd))) { -+ crpt_passwd = crypt(password, pw->pw_passwd); -+ if (!crpt_passwd || strcmp(pw->pw_passwd, (const char *)crpt_passwd)) { - if (flags & VERBOSE) { - syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "DEBUG: auth_getpwent: %s: invalid password", login); - } -diff --git a/saslauthd/auth_shadow.c b/saslauthd/auth_shadow.c -index 677131b..1988afd 100644 ---- a/saslauthd/auth_shadow.c -+++ b/saslauthd/auth_shadow.c -@@ -210,8 +210,8 @@ auth_shadow ( - RETURN("NO Insufficient permission to access NIS authentication database (saslauthd)"); - } - -- cpw = strdup((const char *)crypt(password, sp->sp_pwdp)); -- if (strcmp(sp->sp_pwdp, cpw)) { -+ cpw = crypt(password, sp->sp_pwdp); -+ if (!cpw || strcmp(sp->sp_pwdp, (const char *)cpw)) { - if (flags & VERBOSE) { - /* - * This _should_ reveal the SHADOW_PW_LOCKED prefix to an -@@ -221,10 +221,8 @@ auth_shadow ( - syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "DEBUG: auth_shadow: pw mismatch: '%s' != '%s'", - sp->sp_pwdp, cpw); - } -- free(cpw); - RETURN("NO Incorrect password"); - } -- free(cpw); - - /* - * The following fields will be set to -1 if: -@@ -286,7 +284,7 @@ auth_shadow ( - RETURN("NO Invalid username"); - } - -- if (strcmp(upw->upw_passwd, crypt(password, upw->upw_passwd)) != 0) { -+ if (!(cpw = crypt(password, upw->upw_passwd)) || (strcmp(upw->upw_passwd, (const char *)cpw) != 0)) { - if (flags & VERBOSE) { - syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "auth_shadow: pw mismatch: %s != %s", - password, upw->upw_passwd); --- -cgit v0.12 - -- 2.20.0