bug#51327: 28.0.60; emacsclient warns about XDG_RUNTIME_DIR when starting daemon on demand

[Jim Porter <jporterbugs@gmail.com>]

(Cc'ing Paul Eggert, who can probably answer more confidently than me.)

On 11/5/2021 11:05 AM, Ulrich Mueller wrote:
> Can someone please explain to me how an exploit on the _client_ side
> would look like?
> 
> When starting the server, I can believe that there may be some surface
> for a symlink attack. But once the daemon is running? What is the
> security issue for the client checking TMPDIR?

I'm not an expert on this kind of attack, but my understanding is that 
it could go something like this:

  1. Attacker runs `evil-daemon' which puts its socket in /tmp/evil
  2. Attacker runs `ln -s /tmp/evil /tmp/emacs1000/server'
  3. User runs `emacsclient --alternate-editor=""'
  4. emacsclient doesn't see a socket in XDG_RUNTIME_DIR, checks TMPDIR
  5. emacsclient connects to evil-daemon

The evil-daemon probably can't get access to the user's files, but might 
be able to trick a user into entering some secret. I'll let others chime 
in too though, since like I said, I'm not an expert.

If I'm wrong and this isn't an a problem, then I agree that all we need 
to do here is silence the warning.