On Sun, Feb 10 2019, David Bremner wrote:
> Adam Majer <amajer@suse.de> writes:
>> The releases are signed in a funny way. The .asc file are not detached
>> signatures of the checksum, but actually contain it inside the .asc file.
>>
>> # gpg -v --verify notmuch-0.28.1.tar.gz.sha256.asc
>> ...
>> gpg: binary signature, digest algorithm SHA256, key algorithm rsa3072
>> gpg: WARNING: not a detached signature; file
>> 'notmuch-0.28.1.tar.gz.sha256' was NOT verified!
>>
>> A much better way of signing this would have been as a detached
>> signature of the tarball itself. Why sign a hash of a hash? ;)
>
> I'm not sure why Carl did it that way 10 years ago. Perhaps Carl
> remembers?  Offhand, I don't see any reason not to go with a more
> standard detached signature, other than it needs someone to do the
> relevant work.

If I did something non-standard here it certainly wasn't intentional.

I certainly would not oppose moving to a more standard (and obvious to
us) means of signing the releases.

-Carl