[PATCH 1/4] util/crypto: _notmuch_message_crypto: tracks message-wide crypto state

[Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>]

E-mail encryption and signatures reported by notmuch are at the MIME
part level.  This makes sense in the dirty details, but for users we
need to have a per-message conception of the cryptographic state of
the e-mail.  (see
https://dkg.fifthhorseman.net/blog/e-mail-cryptography.html for more
discussion of why this is important).

The object created in this patch is a useful for tracking the
cryptographic state of the underlying message as a whole, based on a
depth-first search of the message's MIME structure.

This object stores a signature list of the message, but we don't
handle it yet.  Further patches in this series will make use of the
signature list.
---
 util/crypto.c | 89 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 util/crypto.h | 65 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 154 insertions(+)

diff --git a/util/crypto.c b/util/crypto.c
index 9d3b6dad..9512fd67 100644
--- a/util/crypto.c
+++ b/util/crypto.c
@@ -219,3 +219,92 @@ _notmuch_crypto_decrypt (bool *attempted,
 #endif
     return ret;
 }
+
+
+static int
+_notmuch_message_crypto_cleanup (_notmuch_message_crypto_t *msg_crypto)
+{
+    if (!msg_crypto)
+	return 0;
+    if (msg_crypto->sig_list)
+	g_object_unref (msg_crypto->sig_list);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+_notmuch_message_crypto_t *
+_notmuch_message_crypto_new (void *ctx)
+{
+    _notmuch_message_crypto_t *ret = talloc_zero (ctx, _notmuch_message_crypto_t);
+    talloc_set_destructor (ret, _notmuch_message_crypto_cleanup);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+
+notmuch_status_t
+_notmuch_message_crypto_potential_sig_list (_notmuch_message_crypto_t *msg_crypto, GMimeSignatureList *sigs)
+{
+    if (!msg_crypto)
+	return NOTMUCH_STATUS_NULL_POINTER;
+
+    /* Signatures that arrive after a payload part during DFS are not
+     * part of the cryptographic envelope: */
+    if (msg_crypto->payload_encountered)
+	return NOTMUCH_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+
+    if (msg_crypto->sig_list)
+	g_object_unref (msg_crypto->sig_list);
+
+    msg_crypto->sig_list = sigs;
+    if (sigs)
+	g_object_ref (sigs);
+
+    if (msg_crypto->decryption_status == NOTMUCH_MESSAGE_DECRYPTED_FULL)
+	msg_crypto->signature_encrypted = true;
+
+    return NOTMUCH_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+
+notmuch_status_t
+_notmuch_message_crypto_potential_payload (_notmuch_message_crypto_t *msg_crypto, GMimeObject *payload, GMimeObject *parent, int childnum)
+{
+    if (!msg_crypto || !payload)
+	return NOTMUCH_STATUS_NULL_POINTER;
+
+    /* only fire on the first payload part encountered */
+    if (msg_crypto->payload_encountered)
+	return NOTMUCH_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+
+    /* the first child of multipart/encrypted that matches the
+     * encryption protocol should be "control information" metadata,
+     * not payload.  So we skip it. (see
+     * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1847#page-8) */
+    if (parent && GMIME_IS_MULTIPART_ENCRYPTED (parent) && childnum == GMIME_MULTIPART_ENCRYPTED_VERSION) {
+	const char *enc_type = g_mime_object_get_content_type_parameter (parent, "protocol");
+	GMimeContentType *ct = g_mime_object_get_content_type (payload);
+	if (ct && enc_type) {
+	    const char *part_type = g_mime_content_type_to_string (ct);
+	    if (part_type && strcmp (part_type, enc_type) == 0)
+		return NOTMUCH_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+	}
+    }
+
+    msg_crypto->payload_encountered = true;
+
+    return NOTMUCH_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+
+notmuch_status_t
+_notmuch_message_crypto_successful_decryption (_notmuch_message_crypto_t *msg_crypto)
+{
+    if (!msg_crypto)
+	return NOTMUCH_STATUS_NULL_POINTER;
+
+    if (!msg_crypto->payload_encountered)
+	msg_crypto->decryption_status = NOTMUCH_MESSAGE_DECRYPTED_FULL;
+    else if (msg_crypto->decryption_status == NOTMUCH_MESSAGE_DECRYPTED_NONE)
+	msg_crypto->decryption_status = NOTMUCH_MESSAGE_DECRYPTED_PARTIAL;
+
+    return NOTMUCH_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+}
diff --git a/util/crypto.h b/util/crypto.h
index 1a90f0e0..c09c136e 100644
--- a/util/crypto.h
+++ b/util/crypto.h
@@ -38,6 +38,71 @@ _notmuch_crypto_get_gmime_ctx_for_protocol (_notmuch_crypto_t *crypto,
 void
 _notmuch_crypto_cleanup (_notmuch_crypto_t *crypto);
 
+/* The user probably wants to know if the entire message was in the
+ * clear.  When replying, the MUA probably wants to know whether there
+ * was any part decrypted in the message.  And when displaying to the
+ * user, we probably only want to display "encrypted message" if the
+ * entire message was covered by encryption. */
+typedef enum {
+    NOTMUCH_MESSAGE_DECRYPTED_NONE = 0,
+    NOTMUCH_MESSAGE_DECRYPTED_PARTIAL,
+    NOTMUCH_MESSAGE_DECRYPTED_FULL,
+} _notmuch_message_decryption_status_t;
+
+/* description of the cryptographic state of a given message overall;
+ * for use by simple user agents.
+ */
+typedef struct _notmuch_message_crypto {
+    /* encryption status: partial, full, none */
+    _notmuch_message_decryption_status_t decryption_status;
+    /* FIXME: can we show what key(s) a fully-encrypted message was
+     * encrypted to? This data is not necessarily cryptographically
+     * reliable; even when we decrypt, we might not know which public
+     * key was used (e.g. if we're using a session key). */
+
+    /* signature status of the whole message (either the whole message
+     * is signed, or it is not) -- this means that partially-signed
+     * messages will get no signature status. */
+    GMimeSignatureList * sig_list;
+    /* if part of the message was signed, and the MUA is clever, it
+     * can determine on its own exactly which part and try to make
+     * more sense of it. */
+
+    /* mark this flag once we encounter a payload (i.e. something that
+     * is not part of the cryptographic envelope) */
+    bool payload_encountered;
+
+    /* if both signed and encrypted, was the signature encrypted? */
+    bool signature_encrypted;
+} _notmuch_message_crypto_t;
+
+
+/* _notmuch_message_crypto_t objects should be released with
+ * talloc_free (), or they will be released along with their parent
+ * context.
+ */
+_notmuch_message_crypto_t *
+_notmuch_message_crypto_new (void *ctx);
+
+/* call potential_sig_list during a depth-first-search on a message to
+ * consider a particular signature as relevant for the message.
+ */
+notmuch_status_t
+_notmuch_message_crypto_potential_sig_list (_notmuch_message_crypto_t *msg_crypto, GMimeSignatureList *sigs);
+
+/* call successful_decryption during a depth-first-search on a message
+ * to indicate that a part was successfully decrypted.
+ */
+notmuch_status_t
+_notmuch_message_crypto_successful_decryption (_notmuch_message_crypto_t *msg_crypto);
+
+/* call potential_payload during a depth-first-search on a message
+ * when encountering a message part that is not part of the envelope.
+ */
+notmuch_status_t
+_notmuch_message_crypto_potential_payload (_notmuch_message_crypto_t *msg_crypto, GMimeObject *payload, GMimeObject *parent, int childnum);
+
+
 #ifdef __cplusplus
 }
 #endif
-- 
2.20.1