From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by olra.theworths.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7773A429E3B for ; Mon, 16 Jan 2012 19:47:28 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at olra.theworths.org X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -0.7 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.7 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7] autolearn=disabled Received: from olra.theworths.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (olra.theworths.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id gK9ZU-KeuhpI for ; Mon, 16 Jan 2012 19:47:27 -0800 (PST) Received: from dmz-mailsec-scanner-5.mit.edu (DMZ-MAILSEC-SCANNER-5.MIT.EDU [18.7.68.34]) by olra.theworths.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EC37B429E35 for ; Mon, 16 Jan 2012 19:47:26 -0800 (PST) X-AuditID: 12074422-b7fd66d0000008f9-9a-4f14ef4e02aa Received: from mailhub-auth-3.mit.edu ( [18.9.21.43]) by dmz-mailsec-scanner-5.mit.edu (Symantec Messaging Gateway) with SMTP id 1C.76.02297.E4FE41F4; Mon, 16 Jan 2012 22:47:26 -0500 (EST) Received: from outgoing.mit.edu (OUTGOING-AUTH.MIT.EDU [18.7.22.103]) by mailhub-auth-3.mit.edu (8.13.8/8.9.2) with ESMTP id q0H3lPp9030664; Mon, 16 Jan 2012 22:47:26 -0500 Received: from awakening.csail.mit.edu (awakening.csail.mit.edu [18.26.4.91]) (authenticated bits=0) (User authenticated as amdragon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU) by outgoing.mit.edu (8.13.6/8.12.4) with ESMTP id q0H3lNoV017356 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NOT); Mon, 16 Jan 2012 22:47:25 -0500 (EST) Received: from amthrax by awakening.csail.mit.edu with local (Exim 4.77) (envelope-from ) id 1Rn00w-0006Qw-Dq; Mon, 16 Jan 2012 22:47:14 -0500 Date: Mon, 16 Jan 2012 22:47:14 -0500 From: Austin Clements To: Thomas Jost Subject: Re: [PATCH] Add pseudo-compatibility with gmime 2.6 Message-ID: <20120117034714.GG16740@mit.edu> References: <8762gbtd6p.fsf@schnouki.net> <1326758199-18058-1-git-send-email-schnouki@schnouki.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <1326758199-18058-1-git-send-email-schnouki@schnouki.net> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) X-Brightmail-Tracker: H4sIAAAAAAAAA+NgFmpmleLIzCtJLcpLzFFi42IR4hTV1vV7L+Jv0DBJ1uL6zZnMFvv6/R2Y PJ6tusXsMWXWXPYApigum5TUnMyy1CJ9uwSujE33d7MX9NRXfPh6lK2BsSOli5GTQ0LARKL1 0kdWCFtM4sK99WxdjFwcQgL7GCUuXP/JDuFsYJTYPvk+VOYkk8Su13NZIZwljBK/J+xkBuln EVCVePL3PBuIzSagIbFt/3JGEFtEQF2iYf5usDizgLTEt9/NTCC2sICNxLEZT8B28wroSJz6 /Q+sRkggVeL6k28sEHFBiZMzn7BA9GpJ3Pj3EqiXA2zO8n8cIGFOATeJBU+2g60SFVCRmHJy G9sERqFZSLpnIemehdC9gJF5FaNsSm6Vbm5iZk5xarJucXJiXl5qka6pXm5miV5qSukmRlBY s7so7WD8eVDpEKMAB6MSD+9NbxF/IdbEsuLK3EOMkhxMSqK8U14DhfiS8lMqMxKLM+KLSnNS iw8xSnAwK4nwCvoA5XhTEiurUovyYVLSHCxK4rzqWu/8hATSE0tSs1NTC1KLYLIyHBxKErx3 3gE1ChalpqdWpGXmlCCkmTg4QYbzAA2PB6nhLS5IzC3OTIfIn2JUlBLnfQOSEABJZJTmwfXC 0s4rRnGgV4R5E0GqeIApC677FdBgJqDBOa1CIINLEhFSUg2MBjz2cjeYfTZuLE9Zs7Fd6HiR 7fx+VTmT2QGXl78XC/yqGHUp9cGsV8t3PdPrbjpzZ56dRVnGB+lTTGccmjLU9spHZKUIfJWr yW5bf6Lnac9p5WXH5ab5/GlIXm6Vd/6T05OIN1NkjvT22GTNPKOzwOihn4eD/2PbAw8k9r6/ 6Fe2T2wz5x8uJZbijERDLeai4kQAJq1maBYDAAA= Cc: notmuch@notmuchmail.org X-BeenThere: notmuch@notmuchmail.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.13 Precedence: list List-Id: "Use and development of the notmuch mail system." List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 17 Jan 2012 03:47:28 -0000 Quoth Thomas Jost on Jan 17 at 12:56 am: > There are lots of API changes in gmime 2.6 crypto handling. By adding > preprocessor directives, it is however possible to add gmime 2.6 compatibility > while preserving compatibility with gmime 2.4 too. Awesome. Comments inline below. > This is mostly based on id:"8762i8hrb9.fsf@bookbinder.fernseed.info". > > This was tested against both gmime 2.6.4 and 2.4.31. With gmime 2.4.31, the > crypto tests all work fine (as expected). With gmime 2.6.4, one crypto test > fails (signature verification with signer key unavailable) but this will be hard > to fix since the new API does not report the reason why a signature verification > fails (other than the human-readable error message). What is the result of this failing test? > --- > mime-node.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > notmuch-client.h | 27 ++++++++++++++- > notmuch-reply.c | 7 ++++ > notmuch-show.c | 97 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > show-message.c | 4 ++ > 5 files changed, 181 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/mime-node.c b/mime-node.c > index d26bb44..ae2473d 100644 > --- a/mime-node.c > +++ b/mime-node.c > @@ -33,7 +33,11 @@ typedef struct mime_node_context { > GMimeMessage *mime_message; > > /* Context provided by the caller. */ > +#ifdef GMIME_26 > + GMimeCryptoContext *cryptoctx; > +#else > GMimeCipherContext *cryptoctx; > +#endif > notmuch_bool_t decrypt; > } mime_node_context_t; > > @@ -57,8 +61,12 @@ _mime_node_context_free (mime_node_context_t *res) > > notmuch_status_t > mime_node_open (const void *ctx, notmuch_message_t *message, > - GMimeCipherContext *cryptoctx, notmuch_bool_t decrypt, > - mime_node_t **root_out) > +#ifdef GMIME_26 > + GMimeCryptoContext *cryptoctx, > +#else > + GMimeCipherContext *cryptoctx, > +#endif > + notmuch_bool_t decrypt, mime_node_t **root_out) > { > const char *filename = notmuch_message_get_filename (message); > mime_node_context_t *mctx; > @@ -112,12 +120,21 @@ DONE: > return status; > } > > +#ifdef GMIME_26 > +static int > +_signature_list_free (GMimeSignatureList **proxy) > +{ > + g_object_unref (*proxy); > + return 0; > +} > +#else > static int > _signature_validity_free (GMimeSignatureValidity **proxy) > { > g_mime_signature_validity_free (*proxy); > return 0; > } > +#endif > > static mime_node_t * > _mime_node_create (const mime_node_t *parent, GMimeObject *part) > @@ -165,11 +182,23 @@ _mime_node_create (const mime_node_t *parent, GMimeObject *part) > GMimeMultipartEncrypted *encrypteddata = > GMIME_MULTIPART_ENCRYPTED (part); > node->decrypt_attempted = TRUE; > +#ifdef GMIME_26 > + GMimeDecryptResult *decrypt_result = g_mime_decrypt_result_new (); I think g_mime_multipart_encrypted_decrypt allocates the GMimeDecryptResult for you, so this will just leak memory. > + node->decrypted_child = g_mime_multipart_encrypted_decrypt > + (encrypteddata, node->ctx->cryptoctx, &decrypt_result, &err); > + if (node->decrypted_child) { > + node->decrypt_success = node->verify_attempted = TRUE; > + node->sig_list = g_mime_decrypt_result_get_signatures (decrypt_result); > + if (!node->sig_list) > + fprintf (stderr, "Failed to get signatures: %s\n", > + (err ? err->message : "no error explanation given")); My understanding is that g_mime_decrypt_result_get_signatures returns NULL if there are no signatures and that this isn't an error. This differs from 2.4, which would return an empty but non-NULL list. Also, I believe you have to free the sig_list in both branches now, which means the talloc_set_destructor can be moved to common logic outside of the if decrypted/signed. > +#else > node->decrypted_child = g_mime_multipart_encrypted_decrypt > (encrypteddata, node->ctx->cryptoctx, &err); > if (node->decrypted_child) { > node->decrypt_success = node->verify_attempted = TRUE; > node->sig_validity = g_mime_multipart_encrypted_get_signature_validity (encrypteddata); > +#endif It's confusing to have the open braces in the #ifdef'd region with a matching close brace outside of it (and I imagine this confuses editors and uncrustify, too). You could either copy the else part in both branches of the #ifdef or avoid duplicated code with something like #ifdef GMIME_26 .. node->decrypted_child = .. #else .. node->decrypted_child = .. #endif if (node->decrypted_child) { node->decrypt_success = node->verify_attempted = TRUE; #ifdef GMIME_26 node->sig_list = .. #else node->sig_validity = .. #endif } else { fprintf (stderr, ..); } > } else { > fprintf (stderr, "Failed to decrypt part: %s\n", > (err ? err->message : "no error explanation given")); > @@ -182,6 +211,18 @@ _mime_node_create (const mime_node_t *parent, GMimeObject *part) > "(must be exactly 2)\n", > node->nchildren); > } else { > +#ifdef GMIME_26 > + GMimeSignatureList *sig_list = g_mime_multipart_signed_verify > + (GMIME_MULTIPART_SIGNED (part), node->ctx->cryptoctx, &err); > + node->verify_attempted = TRUE; > + node->sig_list = sig_list; > + if (sig_list) { > + GMimeSignatureList **proxy = > + talloc (node, GMimeSignatureList *); > + *proxy = sig_list; > + talloc_set_destructor (proxy, _signature_list_free); > + } > +#else > /* For some reason the GMimeSignatureValidity returned > * here is not a const (inconsistent with that > * returned by > @@ -200,10 +241,15 @@ _mime_node_create (const mime_node_t *parent, GMimeObject *part) > *proxy = sig_validity; > talloc_set_destructor (proxy, _signature_validity_free); > } > +#endif > } > } > > +#ifdef GMIME_26 > + if (node->verify_attempted && !node->sig_list) Hmm. This is correct for signed parts, but will incorrectly trigger for an encrypted part with no signatures. For 2.6, I think this error checking may have to move into the branches of the if encrypted/signed since for encrypted parts you have to check if g_mime_multipart_encrypted_decrypt returned NULL. > +#else > if (node->verify_attempted && !node->sig_validity) > +#endif > fprintf (stderr, "Failed to verify signed part: %s\n", > (err ? err->message : "no error explanation given")); > > diff --git a/notmuch-client.h b/notmuch-client.h > index 517c010..e85f882 100644 > --- a/notmuch-client.h > +++ b/notmuch-client.h > @@ -30,6 +30,12 @@ > > #include > > +/* GMIME_CHECK_VERSION is only available in gmime >= 2.5. But so are > + * GMIME_MAJOR_VERSION and friends. */ Hah. > +#ifdef GMIME_MAJOR_VERSION > +#define GMIME_26 > +#endif > + > #include "notmuch.h" > > /* This is separate from notmuch-private.h because we're trying to > @@ -69,7 +75,11 @@ typedef struct notmuch_show_format { > void (*part_start) (GMimeObject *part, > int *part_count); > void (*part_encstatus) (int status); > +#ifdef GMIME_26 > + void (*part_sigstatus) (GMimeSignatureList* siglist); > +#else > void (*part_sigstatus) (const GMimeSignatureValidity* validity); > +#endif > void (*part_content) (GMimeObject *part); > void (*part_end) (GMimeObject *part); > const char *part_sep; > @@ -83,7 +93,11 @@ typedef struct notmuch_show_params { > int entire_thread; > int raw; > int part; > +#ifdef GMIME_26 > + GMimeCryptoContext* cryptoctx; > +#else > GMimeCipherContext* cryptoctx; > +#endif > int decrypt; > } notmuch_show_params_t; > > @@ -286,7 +300,12 @@ typedef struct mime_node { > * signature. May be NULL if signature verification failed. If > * there are simply no signatures, this will be non-NULL with an > * empty signers list. */ > +#ifdef GMIME_26 > + /* TODO: update the above comment... */ Since this behaves very differently in 2.6, I think documenting it is important (and being very careful about the differences). Maybe /* The list of signatures for signed or encrypted containers. If * there are no signatures, this will be NULL. */ > + GMimeSignatureList* sig_list; > +#else > const GMimeSignatureValidity *sig_validity; > +#endif > > /* Internal: Context inherited from the root iterator. */ > struct mime_node_context *ctx; > @@ -311,8 +330,12 @@ typedef struct mime_node { > */ > notmuch_status_t > mime_node_open (const void *ctx, notmuch_message_t *message, > - GMimeCipherContext *cryptoctx, notmuch_bool_t decrypt, > - mime_node_t **node_out); > +#ifdef GMIME_26 > + GMimeCryptoContext *cryptoctx, > +#else > + GMimeCipherContext *cryptoctx, > +#endif > + notmuch_bool_t decrypt, mime_node_t **node_out); > > /* Return a new MIME node for the requested child part of parent. > * parent will be used as the talloc context for the returned child > diff --git a/notmuch-reply.c b/notmuch-reply.c > index da3acce..dc37c51 100644 > --- a/notmuch-reply.c > +++ b/notmuch-reply.c > @@ -688,15 +688,22 @@ notmuch_reply_command (void *ctx, int argc, char *argv[]) > reply_format_func = notmuch_reply_format_default; > > if (decrypt) { > +#ifdef GMIME_26 > + /* TODO: GMimePasswordRequestFunc */ > + params.cryptoctx = g_mime_gpg_context_new (NULL, "gpg"); > +#else > GMimeSession* session = g_object_new (g_mime_session_get_type(), NULL); > params.cryptoctx = g_mime_gpg_context_new (session, "gpg"); > +#endif > if (params.cryptoctx) { > g_mime_gpg_context_set_always_trust ((GMimeGpgContext*) params.cryptoctx, FALSE); > params.decrypt = TRUE; > } else { > fprintf (stderr, "Failed to construct gpg context.\n"); > } > +#ifndef GMIME_26 > g_object_unref (session); > +#endif > } > > config = notmuch_config_open (ctx, NULL, NULL); > diff --git a/notmuch-show.c b/notmuch-show.c > index d14dac9..263ab72 100644 > --- a/notmuch-show.c > +++ b/notmuch-show.c > @@ -76,7 +76,11 @@ static void > format_part_encstatus_json (int status); > > static void > +#ifdef GMIME_26 > +format_part_sigstatus_json (GMimeSignatureList* siglist); > +#else > format_part_sigstatus_json (const GMimeSignatureValidity* validity); > +#endif > > static void > format_part_content_json (GMimeObject *part); > @@ -486,6 +490,21 @@ show_text_part_content (GMimeObject *part, GMimeStream *stream_out) > g_object_unref(stream_filter); > } > > +#ifdef GMIME_26 > +static const char* > +signature_status_to_string (GMimeSignatureStatus x) > +{ > + switch (x) { > + case GMIME_SIGNATURE_STATUS_GOOD: > + return "good"; > + case GMIME_SIGNATURE_STATUS_BAD: > + return "bad"; > + case GMIME_SIGNATURE_STATUS_ERROR: > + return "error"; > + } > + return "unknown"; > +} > +#else > static const char* > signer_status_to_string (GMimeSignerStatus x) > { > @@ -501,6 +520,7 @@ signer_status_to_string (GMimeSignerStatus x) > } > return "unknown"; > } > +#endif > > static void > format_part_start_text (GMimeObject *part, int *part_count) > @@ -592,6 +612,75 @@ format_part_encstatus_json (int status) > printf ("}]"); > } > > +#ifdef GMIME_26 > +static void > +format_part_sigstatus_json (GMimeSignatureList *siglist) > +{ > + printf (", \"sigstatus\": ["); > + > + if (!siglist) { > + printf ("]"); > + return; > + } > + > + void *ctx_quote = talloc_new (NULL); > + int i; > + for (i = 0; i < g_mime_signature_list_length (siglist); ++i) { Style nit: notmuch uses i++. > + GMimeSignature *signature = g_mime_signature_list_get_signature (siglist, i); > + > + if (i > 0) > + printf (", "); > + > + printf ("{"); > + > + /* status */ > + GMimeSignatureStatus status = g_mime_signature_get_status (signature); > + printf ("\"status\": %s", > + json_quote_str (ctx_quote, > + signature_status_to_string (status))); > + > + GMimeCertificate *certificate = g_mime_signature_get_certificate (signature); > + if (status == GMIME_SIGNATURE_STATUS_GOOD) > + { Style nit: break after brace. (Presumably this is copied from the existing format_part_sigstatus_json, but since it's technically new code there's no reason not to fix these up.) > + if (certificate) > + printf (", \"fingerprint\": %s", json_quote_str (ctx_quote, g_mime_certificate_get_fingerprint (certificate))); > + /* these dates are seconds since the epoch; should we > + * provide a more human-readable format string? */ > + time_t created = g_mime_signature_get_created (signature); > + if (created != -1) > + printf (", \"created\": %d", (int) created); > + time_t expires = g_mime_signature_get_expires (signature); > + if (expires > 0) > + printf (", \"expires\": %d", (int) expires); Is it intentional that the two above checks are different? I would think the second should be expires != -1. > + /* output user id only if validity is FULL or ULTIMATE. */ > + /* note that gmime is using the term "trust" here, which > + * is WRONG. It's actually user id "validity". */ > + if (certificate) > + { Break after brace. > + const char *name = g_mime_certificate_get_name (certificate); > + GMimeCertificateTrust trust = g_mime_certificate_get_trust (certificate); > + if (name && (trust == GMIME_CERTIFICATE_TRUST_FULLY || trust == GMIME_CERTIFICATE_TRUST_ULTIMATE)) > + printf (", \"userid\": %s", json_quote_str (ctx_quote, name)); > + } > + } else if (certificate) { > + const char *key_id = g_mime_certificate_get_key_id (certificate); > + if (key_id) > + printf (", \"keyid\": %s", json_quote_str (ctx_quote, key_id)); > + } > + > + GMimeSignatureError errors = g_mime_signature_get_errors (signature); > + if (errors != GMIME_SIGNATURE_ERROR_NONE) { > + printf (", \"errors\": %x", errors); This should be %d (I would say 0x%x, but JSON doesn't support hex literals). I see this bug came from the original format_part_sigstatus_json. Maybe there should be a quick patch before this one that fixes the source of the bug? > + } > + > + printf ("}"); > + } > + > + printf ("]"); > + > + talloc_free (ctx_quote); > +} > +#else > static void > format_part_sigstatus_json (const GMimeSignatureValidity* validity) > { > @@ -652,6 +741,7 @@ format_part_sigstatus_json (const GMimeSignatureValidity* validity) > > talloc_free (ctx_quote); > } > +#endif > > static void > format_part_content_json (GMimeObject *part) > @@ -990,13 +1080,20 @@ notmuch_show_command (void *ctx, unused (int argc), unused (char *argv[])) > } else if ((STRNCMP_LITERAL (argv[i], "--verify") == 0) || > (STRNCMP_LITERAL (argv[i], "--decrypt") == 0)) { > if (params.cryptoctx == NULL) { > +#ifdef GMIME_26 > + /* TODO: GMimePasswordRequestFunc */ > + if (NULL == (params.cryptoctx = g_mime_gpg_context_new(NULL, "gpg"))) > +#else > GMimeSession* session = g_object_new(g_mime_session_get_type(), NULL); > if (NULL == (params.cryptoctx = g_mime_gpg_context_new(session, "gpg"))) > +#endif > fprintf (stderr, "Failed to construct gpg context.\n"); > else > g_mime_gpg_context_set_always_trust((GMimeGpgContext*)params.cryptoctx, FALSE); > +#ifndef GMIME_26 > g_object_unref (session); > session = NULL; > +#endif > } > if (STRNCMP_LITERAL (argv[i], "--decrypt") == 0) > params.decrypt = 1; > diff --git a/show-message.c b/show-message.c > index 8768889..65269fd 100644 > --- a/show-message.c > +++ b/show-message.c > @@ -48,7 +48,11 @@ show_message_part (mime_node_t *node, > format->part_encstatus (node->decrypt_success); > > if (node->verify_attempted && format->part_sigstatus) > +#ifdef GMIME_26 > + format->part_sigstatus (node->sig_list); > +#else > format->part_sigstatus (node->sig_validity); > +#endif > > format->part_content (part); >