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* [PATCH] Add SELinux policy for guix-daemon.
@ 2018-01-25 16:17 Ricardo Wurmus
  2018-01-25 17:14 ` Ludovic Courtès
                   ` (4 more replies)
  0 siblings, 5 replies; 18+ messages in thread
From: Ricardo Wurmus @ 2018-01-25 16:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: guix-devel

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 5639 bytes --]

Hi Guix,

attached is a patch that adds an SELinux policy for the guix-daemon.
The policy defines the guix_daemon_t domain and specifies what labels
may be accessed and how by processes running in that domain.

These file labels are defined:

* guix_daemon_conf_t
  for Guix configuration files (in localstatedir and sysconfdir)
* guix_daemon_exec_t
  for executables spawned by the daemon (which are allowed to run in the
  guix_daemon_t domain)
* guix_daemon_socket_t
  for the daemon socket file
* guix_profiles_t
  for the contents of the profiles directory

The “filecon” statements near the bottom of the file specify which
labels are to be used for what file names.

I tested this with “guix build --no-grafts --check hello”, “guix build
samtools”, “guix gc -C 1k”, and “guix package -p ~/foo -i hello”;
no operations were blocked by SELinux.

If you want to test this on Fedora, set SELinux to permissive, and make
sure to configure Guix properly (i.e. set localstatedir, prefix, and
sysconfdir).  Then install the policy with “sudo semodule -i
etc/guix-daemon.cil”.  Then relabel the filesystem (at least /gnu,
$localstatedir, $sysconfdir, and $prefix) with something like this:

    sudo restorecon -R /gnu $localstatedir $sysconfdir $prefix

This will take a very long time (a couple of hours).

Restart the daemon.  Check that it now runs in the guix_daemon_t
context:

    ps -Zax | grep /bin/guix-daemon

This should return something like this

   system_u:system_r:guix_daemon.guix_daemon_t:s0 14886 ? Ss   0:00 /root/.guix-profile/bin/guix-daemon --build-users-group=guix-builder

Check the audit log for violations:

   sudo tail -f /var/log/audit/audit.log | grep x-daemon

And then use Guix:

   guix build --no-grafts --check hello

The audit log shouldn’t show you any complaints.  At this point you
could probably switch to enforcing mode, but I haven’t tested this
myself for no particular reason.

Open issues:

* guix_daemon_socket_t isn’t actually used.  All of the socket
  operations that I observed involve contexts that don’t have anything
  to do with guix_daemon_socket_t.  It doesn’t hurt to have this unused
  label, but I would have preferred to define socket rules for only this
  label.  Oh well.

* “guix gc” cannot access arbitrary links to profiles.  By design, the
  file label of the destination of a symlink is independent of the file
  label of the link itself.  Although all profiles under $localstatedir
  are labelled, the links to these profiles inherit the label of the
  directory they are in.  For links in the user’s home directory this
  will be “user_home_t” (for which I’ve added a rule).  But for links
  from root’s home directory, or /tmp, or the HTTP server’s working
  directory … this won’t work.  “guix gc” would be prevented from
  reading and following these links.

* I don’t know if the daemon’s TCP listen feature still works.  I didn’t
  test it and assume that it would require extra rules, because SELinux
  treats network sockets differently from files.

* Is this all correct?  I don’t know!  I only just learned about the
  SELinux Common Intermediate Language (CIL), and the documentation is
  very sparse, so I have no idea if I did something stupid.  It seems
  fine to me, but I must admit that I find it a bit uncomfortable to see
  so many access types in the rules.

* I allowed type transitions from init_t to guix_daemon_t via
  guix_daemon_exec_t, but also from guix_store_content_t to
  guix_daemon_t via guix_daemon_exec_t.  Type transitions are necessary
  to get from an allowed entry point to a domain.  On Fedora “init_t” is
  the domain in which processes are that are spawned by the init
  system.  With the first type transition I permit these processes to
  transition to the guix_daemon_t domain when the executables are
  labeled as guix_daemon_exec_t (such as the daemon executable itself,
  and all the helpers it spawns).

  This much is obvious.  But the second type transition is less obvious.
  It is needed to make sure that we can enter the guix_daemon_t domain
  even when running the daemon from an executable in the store (which
  will be running in the “guix_store_content_t” domain).  Thinking of
  this, I wonder if maybe that’s actually a mistake and shouldn’t be
  permitted.

* A possible problem is that I assign all files with a name matching
  “/gnu/store/.+-(guix-.+|profile)/bin/guix-daemon” the label
  “guix_daemon_exec_t”; this means that *any* file with that name in any
  profile would be permitted to run in the guix_daemon_t domain.  This
  is not ideal.  An attacker could build a package that provides this
  executable and convince a user to install and run it, which lifts it
  into the guix_daemon_t domain.  At that point SELinux could not
  prevent it from accessing files that are allowed for processes in that
  domain (such as the actual daemon).

  This makes me wonder if we could do better by generating a much more
  restrictive policy at installation time, so that only the *exact* file
  name of the currently installed guix-daemon executable would be
  labelled with guix_daemon_exec_t, instead of using a regular
  expression like that.  This means that root would have to
  install/upgrade the policy at installation time whenever the Guix
  package that provides the effectively running guix-daemon executable
  is upgraded.  Food for thought.

Without further ado, here’s the patch:


[-- Attachment #2: 0001-etc-Add-SELinux-policy-for-the-daemon.patch --]
[-- Type: text/x-patch, Size: 11369 bytes --]

From d20bae0953d5d0a6bf1c06ab44505af6dea4df4d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ricardo Wurmus <ricardo.wurmus@mdc-berlin.de>
Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 15:21:07 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] etc: Add SELinux policy for the daemon.

* etc/guix-daemon.cil.in: New file.
* Makefile.am: Add dist_selinux_policy_DATA.
* configure.ac: Handle --with-selinux-policy-dir.
---
 Makefile.am            |   3 +
 configure.ac           |  10 +-
 etc/guix-daemon.cil.in | 281 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 293 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 etc/guix-daemon.cil.in

diff --git a/Makefile.am b/Makefile.am
index aebd3b1eb..8f8ca0059 100644
--- a/Makefile.am
+++ b/Makefile.am
@@ -431,6 +431,9 @@ dist_zshcompletion_DATA = etc/completion/zsh/_guix
 # Fish completion file.
 dist_fishcompletion_DATA = etc/completion/fish/guix.fish
 
+# SELinux policy
+dist_selinux_policy_DATA = etc/guix-daemon.cil
+
 EXTRA_DIST =						\
   HACKING						\
   ROADMAP						\
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 1e3912248..de86bfdd3 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -54,6 +54,13 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([fish-completion-dir],
   [fishcompletiondir='${datadir}/fish/vendor_completions.d'])
 AC_SUBST([fishcompletiondir])
 
+AC_ARG_WITH([selinux-policy-dir],
+  AC_HELP_STRING([--with-selinux-policy-dir=DIR],
+    [name of the SELinux policy directory]),
+  [selinux_policydir="$withval"],
+  [selinux_policydir='${datadir}/selinux/'])
+AC_SUBST([selinux_policydir])
+
 dnl Better be verbose.
 AC_MSG_CHECKING([for the store directory])
 AC_MSG_RESULT([$storedir])
@@ -270,7 +277,8 @@ esac
 AC_CONFIG_FILES([Makefile
                  po/guix/Makefile.in
                  po/packages/Makefile.in
-		 guix/config.scm])
+                 etc/guix-daemon.cil
+                 guix/config.scm])
 
 AC_CONFIG_FILES([scripts/guix], [chmod +x scripts/guix])
 AC_CONFIG_FILES([test-env:build-aux/test-env.in], [chmod +x test-env])
diff --git a/etc/guix-daemon.cil.in b/etc/guix-daemon.cil.in
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..825c12712
--- /dev/null
+++ b/etc/guix-daemon.cil.in
@@ -0,0 +1,281 @@
+; -*- lisp -*-
+;;; GNU Guix --- Functional package management for GNU
+;;; Copyright © 2018 Ricardo Wurmus <rekado@elephly.net>
+;;;
+;;; This file is part of GNU Guix.
+;;;
+;;; GNU Guix is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+;;; under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+;;; the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or (at
+;;; your option) any later version.
+;;;
+;;; GNU Guix is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+;;; WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+;;; MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+;;; GNU General Public License for more details.
+;;;
+;;; You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+;;; along with GNU Guix.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+(block guix_daemon
+  ;; Require existing types
+  (typeattributeset cil_gen_require init_t)
+  (typeattributeset cil_gen_require tmp_t)
+  (typeattributeset cil_gen_require nscd_var_run_t)
+  (typeattributeset cil_gen_require var_log_t)
+  (typeattributeset cil_gen_require domain)
+
+  ;; Declare own types
+  (type guix_daemon_t)
+  (roletype object_r guix_daemon_t)
+  (type guix_daemon_conf_t)
+  (roletype object_r guix_daemon_conf_t)
+  (type guix_daemon_exec_t)
+  (roletype object_r guix_daemon_exec_t)
+  (type guix_daemon_socket_t)
+  (roletype object_r guix_daemon_socket_t)
+  (type guix_store_content_t)
+  (roletype object_r guix_store_content_t)
+  (type guix_profiles_t)
+  (roletype object_r guix_profiles_t)
+
+  ;; These types are domains, thereby allowing process rules
+  (typeattributeset domain (guix_daemon_t guix_daemon_exec_t))
+
+  (level low (s0))
+
+  ;; When a process in init_t or guix_store_content_t spawns a
+  ;; guix_daemon_exec_t process, let it run in the guix_daemon_t context
+  (typetransition init_t guix_daemon_exec_t
+                  process guix_daemon_t)
+  (typetransition guix_store_content_t guix_daemon_exec_t
+                  process guix_daemon_t)
+
+  ;; Permit communication with NSCD
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         nscd_var_run_t
+         (file (map read)))
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         nscd_var_run_t
+         (dir (search)))
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         nscd_var_run_t
+         (sock_file (write)))
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         nscd_t
+         (fd (use)))
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         nscd_t
+         (unix_stream_socket (connectto)))
+
+  ;; Permit logging and temp file access
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         tmp_t
+         (lnk_file (setattr unlink)))
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         tmp_t
+         (dir (create
+               rmdir
+               add_name remove_name
+               open read write
+               getattr setattr
+               search)))
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         var_log_t
+         (file (create getattr open write)))
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         var_log_t
+         (dir (getattr write add_name)))
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         var_run_t
+         (lnk_file (read)))
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         var_run_t
+         (dir (search)))
+
+  ;; Spawning processes, execute helpers
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         self
+         (process (fork)))
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         guix_daemon_exec_t
+         (file (execute execute_no_trans read open)))
+
+  ;; TODO: unknown
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         root_t
+         (dir (mounton)))
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         fs_t
+         (filesystem (getattr)))
+  (allow guix_daemon_conf_t
+         fs_t
+         (filesystem (associate)))
+
+  ;; Build isolation
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         guix_store_content_t
+         (file (mounton)))
+  (allow guix_store_content_t
+         fs_t
+         (filesystem (associate)))
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         guix_store_content_t
+         (dir (mounton)))
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         guix_daemon_t
+         (capability (net_admin
+                      fsetid fowner
+                      chown setuid setgid
+                      dac_override dac_read_search
+                      sys_chroot)))
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         fs_t
+         (filesystem (unmount)))
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         devpts_t
+         (filesystem (mount)))
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         devpts_t
+         (chr_file (setattr getattr)))
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         tmpfs_t
+         (filesystem (mount)))
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         tmpfs_t
+         (dir (getattr)))
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         proc_t
+         (filesystem (mount)))
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         null_device_t
+         (chr_file (getattr open read write)))
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         kvm_device_t
+         (chr_file (getattr)))
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         zero_device_t
+         (chr_file (getattr)))
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         urandom_device_t
+         (chr_file (getattr)))
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         random_device_t
+         (chr_file (getattr)))
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         devtty_t
+         (chr_file (getattr)))
+
+  ;; Access to store items
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         guix_store_content_t
+         (dir (reparent
+               create
+               getattr setattr
+               search rename
+               add_name remove_name
+               open write
+               rmdir)))
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         guix_store_content_t
+         (file (create
+                lock
+                setattr getattr
+                execute execute_no_trans
+                link unlink
+                map
+                rename
+                open read write)))
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         guix_store_content_t
+         (lnk_file (create
+                    getattr setattr
+                    link unlink
+                    read
+                    rename)))
+
+  ;; Access to configuration files and directories
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         guix_daemon_conf_t
+         (dir (search
+               setattr getattr
+               add_name remove_name
+               open read write)))
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         guix_daemon_conf_t
+         (file (create
+                lock
+                map
+                getattr setattr
+                unlink
+                open read write)))
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         guix_daemon_conf_t
+         (lnk_file (create getattr rename unlink)))
+
+  ;; Access to profiles
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         guix_profiles_t
+         (dir (getattr setattr read open)))
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         guix_profiles_t
+         (lnk_file (read getattr)))
+
+  ;; Access to profile links in the home directory
+  ;; TODO: allow access to profile links *anywhere* on the filesystem
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         user_home_t
+         (lnk_file (read getattr)))
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         user_home_t
+         (dir (search)))
+
+  ;; Socket operations
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         init_t
+         (fd (use)))
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         init_t
+         (unix_stream_socket (write)))
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         guix_daemon_conf_t
+         (unix_stream_socket (listen)))
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         guix_daemon_conf_t
+         (sock_file (create unlink)))
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         self
+         (unix_stream_socket (create
+                              read write
+                              connect bind accept
+                              getopt setopt)))
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         self
+         (fifo_file (write read)))
+  (allow guix_daemon_t
+         self
+         (udp_socket (ioctl create)))
+
+  ;; Label file system
+  (filecon "@guix_sysconfdir@/guix(/.*)?"
+           any (system_u object_r guix_daemon_conf_t (low low)))
+  (filecon "@guix_localstatedir@/guix(/.*)?"
+           any (system_u object_r guix_daemon_conf_t (low low)))
+  (filecon "@guix_localstatedir@/guix/profiles(/.*)?"
+           any (system_u object_r guix_profiles_t (low low)))
+  (filecon "/gnu"
+           dir (unconfined_u object_r guix_store_content_t (low low)))
+  (filecon "@storedir@(/.+)?"
+           any (unconfined_u object_r guix_store_content_t (low low)))
+  (filecon "@storedir@/[^/]+/.+"
+           any (unconfined_u object_r guix_store_content_t (low low)))
+  (filecon "@prefix@/bin/guix-daemon"
+           file (system_u object_r guix_daemon_exec_t (low low)))
+  (filecon "@storedir@/.+-(guix-.+|profile)/bin/guix-daemon"
+           file (system_u object_r guix_daemon_exec_t (low low)))
+  (filecon "@storedir@/.+-(guix-.+|profile)/libexec/guix-authenticate"
+           file (system_u object_r guix_daemon_exec_t (low low)))
+  (filecon "@storedir@/.+-(guix-.+|profile)/libexec/guix/(.*)?"
+           any (system_u object_r guix_daemon_exec_t (low low)))
+  (filecon "@guix_localstatedir@/guix/daemon-socket/socket"
+           any (system_u object_r guix_daemon_socket_t (low low))))
-- 
2.15.1


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--
Ricardo

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2018-02-16 16:01 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 18+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2018-01-25 16:17 [PATCH] Add SELinux policy for guix-daemon Ricardo Wurmus
2018-01-25 17:14 ` Ludovic Courtès
2018-01-26 11:18 ` Catonano
2018-01-26 14:47   ` Ricardo Wurmus
2018-02-11 12:39 ` Catonano
2018-02-11 13:40   ` Ricardo Wurmus
2018-02-15 14:00     ` Alex Vong
2018-02-15 15:32       ` Ricardo Wurmus
2018-02-16  6:50         ` Gábor Boskovits
2018-02-16  7:46           ` Alex Vong
2018-02-16  7:49         ` Alex Vong
2018-02-16 12:54           ` Gábor Boskovits
2018-02-16 15:58             ` Ricardo Wurmus
2018-02-16 16:00           ` Ricardo Wurmus
2018-02-13 15:30 ` Catonano
2018-02-13 16:29   ` Ricardo Wurmus
2018-02-13 19:46 ` Efraim Flashner
2018-02-13 19:53   ` Leo Famulari

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