From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Christopher Lemmer Webber Subject: Re: Suggest another way of importing GNU Guix GPG key Date: Sat, 29 Jun 2019 17:57:27 -0400 Message-ID: <87d0iwkqbc.fsf@dustycloud.org> References: <2d61cb3fffbc88860c192735f4bd31a0@free.fr> <86mui02hpq.fsf@gmail.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Return-path: Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::10]:50469) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.86_2) (envelope-from ) id 1hhLLh-0007PA-To for guix-devel@gnu.org; Sat, 29 Jun 2019 17:57:35 -0400 Received: from Debian-exim by eggs.gnu.org with spam-scanned (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1hhLLg-0003bf-14 for guix-devel@gnu.org; Sat, 29 Jun 2019 17:57:33 -0400 Received: from dustycloud.org ([50.116.34.160]:35072) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.0:DHE_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA1:32) (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1hhLLe-0003b7-4d for guix-devel@gnu.org; Sat, 29 Jun 2019 17:57:31 -0400 Received: from jasmine (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by dustycloud.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 68D7926655 for ; Sat, 29 Jun 2019 17:57:27 -0400 (EDT) In-reply-to: <86mui02hpq.fsf@gmail.com> List-Id: "Development of GNU Guix and the GNU System distribution." List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: guix-devel-bounces+gcggd-guix-devel=m.gmane.org@gnu.org Sender: "Guix-devel" To: guix-devel@gnu.org That's probably the right way to do it for now. Alex Vong writes: > Hello, > > One solution would be to download the keyring from > and verify the signature in > the following way: > > $ gpg --keyring ./gnu-keyring.gpg --verify guix-1.0.1.tar.gz.sig guix-1.0.1.tar.gz > > Cheers, > Alex > > dftxbs3e@free.fr writes: > >> Hello, >> >> SKS keyservers are currently under attack >> (https://gist.github.com/rjhansen/67ab921ffb4084c865b3618d6955275f) - >> the attack can cause a GPG client to freeze completely and mess the >> GPG installation completely. >> >> I suggest GNU Guix proposes another way of importing the GPG keys so >> that users will not suffer from this problem. >> >> There's another, newer, keyserver, proposed in this gist, that is run >> by new software that doesnt suffer from this attack. See: >> https://keys.openpgp.org/about/news#2019-06-12-launch >> >> However, that keyserver is not replicated. You could either use that >> one or simply offer a download of the key over TLS with verification >> against installed CAs, as secure as this can get. >> >> Regards