From: Tobias Geerinckx-Rice <me@tobias.gr>
To: Guix-devel <guix-devel@gnu.org>
Subject: Critical opensmtpd vulnerability
Date: Wed, 29 Jan 2020 19:11:09 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87a7666sle.fsf@nckx> (raw)
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Fellow Guix running opensmtpd mail servers,
As you probably know by now, a serious remote code execution bug
was recently found and fixed in OpenSMTPd[0].
TL;DR: You should probably stop your opensmtpd daemon until you've
checked that our regular opensmtpd package (6.0.3p1) is not
vulnerable. If possible, switch to opensmtpd-next and adapt your
configuration syntax:
(service opensmtpd-service-type
(opensmtpd-configuration
(package opensmtpd-next)
(config-file (plain-file "smtpd.conf"
"include
\"/etc/guix/mail/my-new-smtpd.conf\"\n"))))
Here some stuff I typed before I ran out of time and got on a bus…
now.
~~~
The issue has been fixed in opensmtpd 6.6.2p1. I updated our
‘opensmtpd-next’ package last night (about 18 hours ago, or 1 hour
after the vulnerability was announced). If you use opensmtpd-next
and haven't updated yet, now is the time to do so, as well as the
time to subscribe to misc at opensmtpd.org.
However! Guix's opensmtpd-service-type still uses the much older
‘opensmtpd’ package, which is still at 6.0.x, because
opensmtpd-next introduced a new and incompatible smtpd.conf
grammar change.
According to [0], the bug was introduced together with this new
grammar[1]. It's possible that opensmtpd 6.0.x is not affected.
However, I had a quick look at the 6.0.3p1 sources and
smtpd/smtp_session.c's
if (!valid_localpart(maddr->user) ||
!valid_domainpart(maddr->domain)) {
/* accept empty return-path in MAIL FROM, required for
bounces */
if (mailfrom && maddr->user[0] == '\0' && maddr->domain[0]
== '\0')
return (1);
/* no user-part, reject */
if (maddr->user[0] == '\0')
return (0);
/* no domain, local user */
if (maddr->domain[0] == '\0') {
(void)strlcpy(maddr->domain, domain,
sizeof(maddr->domain));
return (1);
}
return (0);
}
return (1);
looks pretty damn similar to the logic described here[0].
Kind regards,
T G-R
[0]: https://seclists.org/oss-sec/2020/q1/40
[1]:
https://www.pf4sh.eu/git/openbsd/src/commit/a8e222352fecfb8aeaf32faf9d0df59b96a447d0
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next reply other threads:[~2020-01-29 18:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-01-29 18:11 Tobias Geerinckx-Rice [this message]
2020-01-31 5:14 ` Critical opensmtpd vulnerability 宋文武
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