bug#47584: Race condition in ‘copy-account-skeletons’: possible privilege escalation.

["Ludovic Courtès" <ludo@gnu.org>]

Maxime Devos <maximedevos@telenet.be> skribis:

> +The attack consists of the user being logged in after the account
> +skeletons have been copied to the home directory, but before the
> +owner of the account skeletons have been set.  The user then deletes
> +a copied account skeleton (e.g. `$HOME/.gdbinit`) and replaces
> +it with a symbolic link to a file not owned by the user, such as
> +`/etc/shadow`.

Also…  in this paragraph, it’s not entirely clear which user we’re
talking about it.  In news.scm, I reworded it like so:

  The attack can happen when @command{guix system reconfigure} is running.
  Running @command{guix system reconfigure} can trigger the creation of new user
  accounts if the configuration specifies new accounts.  If a user whose account
  is being created manages to log in after the account has been created but
  before ``skeleton files'' copied to its home directory have the right
  ownership, they may, by creating an appropriately-named symbolic link in the
  home directory pointing to a sensitive file, such as @file{/etc/shadow}, get
  root privileges.

It may also be worth mentioning that the user is likely unable to log in
at all at that point, as I wrote here:

  https://issues.guix.gnu.org/47584#6

WDYT?

Ludo’.