bug#53011: Possible to Update qtbase-5 to v5.15.8?

bug#53011: Possible to Update qtbase-5 to v5.15.8?

[Jaft via Bug reports for GNU Guix]

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Partially because it's the latest version but primarily because there's a bug in the current version for QTwebengine.
As detailed at r/qutebrowser - Comment by u/The-Compiler on ”WebGL blacklisted on Guix”, most text gets broken (https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1164975); I haven't tried other browsers but I've experienced this with Qutebrowser, currently.
It seems the issue was addressed in QT v5.15.7 so an update to, at least, that would, theoretically, solve the problem.


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r/qutebrowser - Comment by u/The-Compiler on ”WebGL blacklisted on Guix”

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bug#53011: Possible to Update qtbase-5 to v5.15.8?

[Leo Famulari]

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On Tue, Jan 04, 2022 at 05:35:54PM +0000, Jaft via Bug reports for GNU Guix wrote:
> As detailed at r/qutebrowser - Comment by u/The-Compiler on ”WebGL blacklisted on Guix”

I'm copying this report here:

------
I have installed Qutebrowser on Guix but when I open pages like Github
the page does not render some of It's elements (this happens with alot
of other pages aswell) so I lunched qutebrowser from the terminal to see
anything suspicious and found these error messages:

Error Messages

The error messages of WebGL being blacklisted come up exactly when I
launch pages like Github.

BTW: no config was used. However, the error also happens with my config.

I am running the latest version of Qutebrowser BTW.
------

And the "Error Messages" are unfortunately an image, which I've
attached.

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bug#53011: Possible to Update qtbase-5 to v5.15.8?

[Leo Famulari]

On Tue, Jan 04, 2022 at 05:35:54PM +0000, Jaft via Bug reports for GNU Guix wrote:
> Partially because it's the latest version but primarily because there's a bug in the current version for QTwebengine.
> As detailed at r/qutebrowser - Comment by u/The-Compiler on ”WebGL blacklisted on Guix”, most text gets broken (https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1164975); I haven't tried other browsers but I've experienced this with Qutebrowser, currently.
> It seems the issue was addressed in QT v5.15.7 so an update to, at least, that would, theoretically, solve the problem.

I wonder if this is related to <https://issues.guix.gnu.org/52993>
("There is a problem with text rendering in the anki").

bug#53011: Possible to Update qtbase-5 to v5.15.8?

[Florian Bruhin]

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Hey,

qutebrowser upstream here.

On Tue, Jan 04, 2022 at 05:35:54PM +0000, Jaft wrote:
> Partially because it's the latest version but primarily because there's a bug in the current version for QTwebengine.

Note that qtbase releases after 5.15.2 are commercial-only
unfortunately:

https://www.qt.io/blog/qt-offering-changes-2020
https://www.qt.io/blog/commercial-lts-qt-5.15.3-released

However, QtWebEngine source releases are exempt from that, due to
containing third-party LGPL code, so its source for newer releases is
publicly available:
https://code.qt.io/cgit/qt/qtwebengine.git/refs/tags

Most distributions I'm aware of are still keeping updated with those
releases, as they should work just fine against an older qtbase.

Alternatively, to fix the issues with missing text, backporting this
patch should suffice:
https://codereview.qt-project.org/c/qt/qtwebengine-chromium/+/374232

However, newer QtWebEngine releases come with a variety of security
fixes and even a Chromium upgrade (from 83 to 87), so I'd highly
recommend keeping it up to date.

Florian

-- 
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bug#53011: Possible to Update qtbase-5 to v5.15.8?

[Florian Bruhin]

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As for qutebrowser, this can be considered a duplicate of:
https://issues.guix.gnu.org/52672 ("qutebrowser 2.4.0 text rendering
broken").

The Anki bug could indeed be the same. If I remember correctly, Anki
does use QtWebEngine.

-- 
            me@the-compiler.org | https://www.qutebrowser.org 
       https://bruhin.software/ | https://github.com/sponsors/The-Compiler/
       GPG: 916E B0C8 FD55 A072 | https://the-compiler.org/pubkey.asc
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bug#53011: Possible to Update qtbase-5 to v5.15.8?

[Philip McGrath]

Hi,

On 1/4/22 13:04, Florian Bruhin wrote:
> Hey,
> 
> qutebrowser upstream here.
> 
> On Tue, Jan 04, 2022 at 05:35:54PM +0000, Jaft wrote:
>> Partially because it's the latest version but primarily because there's a bug in the current version for QTwebengine.
> 
> Note that qtbase releases after 5.15.2 are commercial-only
> unfortunately:
> 
> https://www.qt.io/blog/qt-offering-changes-2020
> https://www.qt.io/blog/commercial-lts-qt-5.15.3-released
> 
> However, QtWebEngine source releases are exempt from that, due to
> containing third-party LGPL code, so its source for newer releases is
> publicly available:
> https://code.qt.io/cgit/qt/qtwebengine.git/refs/tags
> 
> Most distributions I'm aware of are still keeping updated with those
> releases, as they should work just fine against an older qtbase.
> 
> Alternatively, to fix the issues with missing text, backporting this
> patch should suffice:
> https://codereview.qt-project.org/c/qt/qtwebengine-chromium/+/374232
> 
> However, newer QtWebEngine releases come with a variety of security
> fixes and even a Chromium upgrade (from 83 to 87), so I'd highly
> recommend keeping it up to date.
> 
> Florian
> 

As some of you may know, KDE maintains a carefully curated patch 
collection for Qt 5 consisting strictly of backports from the current 
(QT6-based) development branch of Qt and fixes for removed 
functionality. (They do not increment the Qt version number, to avoid 
any further confusion.) AIUI, this is the same way The Qt Company 
creates their non-public releases for customers using non-free licenses 
(or at least it's what they say they do), though the KDE developers, 
quite reasonably, only backport patches of interest to free software.

Announcement: 
https://dot.kde.org/2021/04/06/announcing-kdes-qt-5-patch-collection
FAQ: https://community.kde.org/Qt5PatchCollection

Using these patches should be as easy as pointing the origin of the 
relevant Guix packages to the kde/5.15 branches of the corresponding 
repositories, e.g. <https://invent.kde.org/qt/qt/qtbase/-/tree/kde/5.15>.

I think this would be the best way to update Guix's qtbase-5 and other 
packages in general. But, as Florian explains, the situation with 
QtWebEngine is even less complicated.

-Philip

bug#53011: Possible to Update qtbase-5 to v5.15.8?

[Leo Famulari]

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On Tue, Jan 04, 2022 at 07:04:57PM +0100, Florian Bruhin wrote:
> Alternatively, to fix the issues with missing text, backporting this
> patch should suffice:
> https://codereview.qt-project.org/c/qt/qtwebengine-chromium/+/374232

I'm testing this now.

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bug#53011: Possible to Update qtbase-5 to v5.15.8?

[Leo Famulari]

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On Wed, Jan 05, 2022 at 02:08:08PM -0500, Leo Famulari wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 04, 2022 at 07:04:57PM +0100, Florian Bruhin wrote:
> > Alternatively, to fix the issues with missing text, backporting this
> > patch should suffice:
> > https://codereview.qt-project.org/c/qt/qtwebengine-chromium/+/374232
> 
> I'm testing this now.

Oh, the patch does not apply to the source code of our qtwebengine
package. So, I hope that somebody else will take a look and try to fix
this bug.

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bug#53011: [PATCH] gnu: Fix text rendering in QtWebEngine.

[Leo Famulari]

NOTE: The patch does not apply to our qtwebengine source.

* gnu/packages/patches/qtwebengine-fix-text-rendering.patch: New file.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Add it.
* gnu/packages/qt.scm (qtwebengine)[source]: Use it.
---
 gnu/local.mk                                  |   1 +
 .../qtwebengine-fix-text-rendering.patch      | 348 ++++++++++++++++++
 gnu/packages/qt.scm                           |   1 +
 3 files changed, 350 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 gnu/packages/patches/qtwebengine-fix-text-rendering.patch

diff --git a/gnu/local.mk b/gnu/local.mk
index be185a0abf..c94d1bc125 100644
--- a/gnu/local.mk
+++ b/gnu/local.mk
@@ -1725,6 +1725,7 @@ dist_patch_DATA =						\
   %D%/packages/patches/quagga-reproducible-build.patch          \
   %D%/packages/patches/quassel-qt-514-compat.patch		\
   %D%/packages/patches/quickswitch-fix-dmenu-check.patch	\
+  %D%/packages/patches/qtwebengine-fix-text-rendering.patch	\
   %D%/packages/patches/qtwebkit-pbutils-include.patch		\
   %D%/packages/patches/qtwebkit-fix-building-with-bison-3.7.patch \
   %D%/packages/patches/qtwebkit-fix-building-with-python-3.9.patch	\
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/qtwebengine-fix-text-rendering.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/qtwebengine-fix-text-rendering.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b432a440f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/qtwebengine-fix-text-rendering.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,348 @@
+Fix text rendering in QtWebEngine:
+
+https://issues.guix.gnu.org/52672
+
+Patch copied from upstream:
+
+https://codereview.qt-project.org/c/qt/qtwebengine-chromium/+/374232
+
+From be0320febb694d850b76396346ef7ba5b45b7f0d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Allan Sandfeld Jensen <allan.jensen@qt.io>
+Date: Thu, 16 Sep 2021 13:17:58 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] [Backport] Linux sandbox: fix fstatat() crash
+
+This is a reland of https://crrev.com/c/2801873.
+
+Glibc has started rewriting fstat(fd, stat_buf) to
+fstatat(fd, "", stat_buf, AT_EMPTY_PATH). This works because when
+AT_EMPTY_PATH is specified, and the second argument is an empty string,
+then fstatat just performs an fstat on fd like normal.
+
+Unfortunately, fstatat() also allows stat-ing arbitrary pathnames like
+with fstatat(AT_FDCWD, "/i/am/a/file", stat_buf, 0);
+The baseline policy needs to prevent this usage of fstatat() since it
+doesn't allow access to arbitrary pathnames.
+
+Sadly, if the second argument is not an empty string, AT_EMPTY_PATH is
+simply ignored by current kernels.
+
+This means fstatat() is completely unsandboxable with seccomp, since
+we *need* to verify that the second argument is the empty string, but
+we can't dereference pointers in seccomp (due to limitations of BPF,
+and the difficulty of addressing these limitations due to TOCTOU
+issues).
+
+So, this CL Traps (raises a SIGSYS via seccomp) on any fstatat syscall.
+The signal handler, which runs in the sandboxed process, checks for
+AT_EMPTY_PATH and the empty string, and then rewrites any applicable
+fstatat() back into the old-style fstat().
+
+Bug: 1164975
+Change-Id: I3df6c04c0d781eb1f181d707ccaaead779337291
+Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
+Commit-Queue: Matthew Denton <mpdenton@chromium.org>
+Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#903873}
+Reviewed-by: Peter Varga <pvarga@inf.u-szeged.hu>
+---
+
+diff --git a/chromium/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/baseline_policy.cc b/chromium/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/baseline_policy.cc
+index 3c67b12..ca19290 100644
+--- a/chromium/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/baseline_policy.cc
++++ b/chromium/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/baseline_policy.cc
+@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
+ #include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.h"
+ #include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/sandbox_bpf.h"
+ #include "sandbox/linux/services/syscall_wrappers.h"
++#include "sandbox/linux/system_headers/linux_stat.h"
+ #include "sandbox/linux/system_headers/linux_syscalls.h"
+ 
+ #if !defined(SO_PEEK_OFF)
+@@ -257,6 +258,13 @@
+     return RestrictKillTarget(current_pid, sysno);
+   }
+ 
++  // The fstatat syscalls are file system syscalls, which will be denied below
++  // with fs_denied_errno. However some allowed fstat syscalls are rewritten by
++  // libc implementations to fstatat syscalls, and we need to rewrite them back.
++  if (sysno == __NR_fstatat_default) {
++    return RewriteFstatatSIGSYS(fs_denied_errno);
++  }
++
+   if (SyscallSets::IsFileSystem(sysno) ||
+       SyscallSets::IsCurrentDirectory(sysno)) {
+     return Error(fs_denied_errno);
+diff --git a/chromium/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/baseline_policy_unittest.cc b/chromium/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/baseline_policy_unittest.cc
+index 64ec1ce..814b700 100644
+--- a/chromium/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/baseline_policy_unittest.cc
++++ b/chromium/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/baseline_policy_unittest.cc
+@@ -50,7 +50,8 @@
+ 
+ namespace {
+ 
+-// This also tests that read(), write() and fstat() are allowed.
++// This also tests that read(), write(), fstat(), and fstatat(.., "", ..,
++// AT_EMPTY_PATH) are allowed.
+ void TestPipeOrSocketPair(base::ScopedFD read_end, base::ScopedFD write_end) {
+   BPF_ASSERT_LE(0, read_end.get());
+   BPF_ASSERT_LE(0, write_end.get());
+@@ -59,6 +60,20 @@
+   BPF_ASSERT_EQ(0, sys_ret);
+   BPF_ASSERT(S_ISFIFO(stat_buf.st_mode) || S_ISSOCK(stat_buf.st_mode));
+ 
++  sys_ret = fstatat(read_end.get(), "", &stat_buf, AT_EMPTY_PATH);
++  BPF_ASSERT_EQ(0, sys_ret);
++  BPF_ASSERT(S_ISFIFO(stat_buf.st_mode) || S_ISSOCK(stat_buf.st_mode));
++
++  // Make sure fstatat with anything other than an empty string is denied.
++  sys_ret = fstatat(read_end.get(), "/", &stat_buf, AT_EMPTY_PATH);
++  BPF_ASSERT_EQ(sys_ret, -1);
++  BPF_ASSERT_EQ(EPERM, errno);
++
++  // Make sure fstatat without AT_EMPTY_PATH is denied.
++  sys_ret = fstatat(read_end.get(), "", &stat_buf, 0);
++  BPF_ASSERT_EQ(sys_ret, -1);
++  BPF_ASSERT_EQ(EPERM, errno);
++
+   const ssize_t kTestTransferSize = 4;
+   static const char kTestString[kTestTransferSize] = {'T', 'E', 'S', 'T'};
+   ssize_t transfered = 0;
+diff --git a/chromium/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/sigsys_handlers.cc b/chromium/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/sigsys_handlers.cc
+index 76eb324..13e7180 100644
+--- a/chromium/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/sigsys_handlers.cc
++++ b/chromium/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/sigsys_handlers.cc
+@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
+ 
+ #include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/sigsys_handlers.h"
+ 
++#include <fcntl.h>
+ #include <stddef.h>
+ #include <stdint.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+@@ -22,6 +23,7 @@
+ #include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/syscall.h"
+ #include "sandbox/linux/services/syscall_wrappers.h"
+ #include "sandbox/linux/system_headers/linux_seccomp.h"
++#include "sandbox/linux/system_headers/linux_stat.h"
+ #include "sandbox/linux/system_headers/linux_syscalls.h"
+ 
+ #if defined(__mips__)
+@@ -355,6 +357,24 @@
+   return -ENOSYS;
+ }
+ 
++intptr_t SIGSYSFstatatHandler(const struct arch_seccomp_data& args,
++                              void* fs_denied_errno) {
++  if (args.nr == __NR_fstatat_default) {
++    if (*reinterpret_cast<const char*>(args.args[1]) == '\0' &&
++        args.args[3] == static_cast<uint64_t>(AT_EMPTY_PATH)) {
++      return syscall(__NR_fstat_default, static_cast<int>(args.args[0]),
++                     reinterpret_cast<default_stat_struct*>(args.args[2]));
++    }
++    return -reinterpret_cast<intptr_t>(fs_denied_errno);
++  }
++
++  CrashSIGSYS_Handler(args, fs_denied_errno);
++
++  // Should never be reached.
++  RAW_CHECK(false);
++  return -ENOSYS;
++}
++
+ bpf_dsl::ResultExpr CrashSIGSYS() {
+   return bpf_dsl::Trap(CrashSIGSYS_Handler, NULL);
+ }
+@@ -387,6 +407,11 @@
+   return bpf_dsl::Trap(SIGSYSSchedHandler, NULL);
+ }
+ 
++bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RewriteFstatatSIGSYS(int fs_denied_errno) {
++  return bpf_dsl::Trap(SIGSYSFstatatHandler,
++                       reinterpret_cast<void*>(fs_denied_errno));
++}
++
+ void AllocateCrashKeys() {
+ #if !defined(OS_NACL_NONSFI)
+   if (seccomp_crash_key)
+diff --git a/chromium/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/sigsys_handlers.h b/chromium/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/sigsys_handlers.h
+index 7a958b9..8cd735c 100644
+--- a/chromium/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/sigsys_handlers.h
++++ b/chromium/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/sigsys_handlers.h
+@@ -62,6 +62,19 @@
+ // sched_setparam(), sched_setscheduler()
+ SANDBOX_EXPORT intptr_t SIGSYSSchedHandler(const arch_seccomp_data& args,
+                                            void* aux);
++// If the fstatat() syscall is functionally equivalent to an fstat() syscall,
++// then rewrite the syscall to the equivalent fstat() syscall which can be
++// adequately sandboxed.
++// If the fstatat() is not functionally equivalent to an fstat() syscall, we
++// fail with -fs_denied_errno.
++// If the syscall is not an fstatat() at all, crash in the same way as
++// CrashSIGSYS_Handler.
++// This is necessary because glibc and musl have started rewriting fstat(fd,
++// stat_buf) as fstatat(fd, "", stat_buf, AT_EMPTY_PATH). We rewrite the latter
++// back to the former, which is actually sandboxable.
++SANDBOX_EXPORT intptr_t
++SIGSYSFstatatHandler(const struct arch_seccomp_data& args,
++                     void* fs_denied_errno);
+ 
+ // Variants of the above functions for use with bpf_dsl.
+ SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr CrashSIGSYS();
+@@ -72,6 +85,7 @@
+ SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr CrashSIGSYSFutex();
+ SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr CrashSIGSYSPtrace();
+ SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RewriteSchedSIGSYS();
++SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RewriteFstatatSIGSYS(int fs_denied_errno);
+ 
+ // Allocates a crash key so that Seccomp information can be recorded.
+ void AllocateCrashKeys();
+diff --git a/chromium/sandbox/linux/syscall_broker/broker_process.cc b/chromium/sandbox/linux/syscall_broker/broker_process.cc
+index d72c9d2..36df5e4 100644
+--- a/chromium/sandbox/linux/syscall_broker/broker_process.cc
++++ b/chromium/sandbox/linux/syscall_broker/broker_process.cc
+@@ -122,44 +122,49 @@
+ }
+ 
+ bool BrokerProcess::IsSyscallBrokerable(int sysno, bool fast_check) const {
++  // The syscalls unavailable on aarch64 are all blocked by Android's default
++  // seccomp policy, even on non-aarch64 architectures. I.e., the syscalls XX()
++  // with a corresponding XXat() versions are typically unavailable in aarch64
++  // and are default disabled in Android. So, we should refuse to broker them
++  // to be consistent with the platform's restrictions.
+   switch (sysno) {
+-#if !defined(__aarch64__)
++#if !defined(__aarch64__) && !defined(OS_ANDROID)
+     case __NR_access:
+ #endif
+     case __NR_faccessat:
+       return !fast_check || allowed_command_set_.test(COMMAND_ACCESS);
+ 
+-#if !defined(__aarch64__)
++#if !defined(__aarch64__) && !defined(OS_ANDROID)
+     case __NR_mkdir:
+ #endif
+     case __NR_mkdirat:
+       return !fast_check || allowed_command_set_.test(COMMAND_MKDIR);
+ 
+-#if !defined(__aarch64__)
++#if !defined(__aarch64__) && !defined(OS_ANDROID)
+     case __NR_open:
+ #endif
+     case __NR_openat:
+       return !fast_check || allowed_command_set_.test(COMMAND_OPEN);
+ 
+-#if !defined(__aarch64__)
++#if !defined(__aarch64__) && !defined(OS_ANDROID)
+     case __NR_readlink:
+ #endif
+     case __NR_readlinkat:
+       return !fast_check || allowed_command_set_.test(COMMAND_READLINK);
+ 
+-#if !defined(__aarch64__)
++#if !defined(__aarch64__) && !defined(OS_ANDROID)
+     case __NR_rename:
+ #endif
+     case __NR_renameat:
+     case __NR_renameat2:
+       return !fast_check || allowed_command_set_.test(COMMAND_RENAME);
+ 
+-#if !defined(__aarch64__)
++#if !defined(__aarch64__) && !defined(OS_ANDROID)
+     case __NR_rmdir:
+       return !fast_check || allowed_command_set_.test(COMMAND_RMDIR);
+ #endif
+ 
+-#if !defined(__aarch64__)
++#if !defined(__aarch64__) && !defined(OS_ANDROID)
+     case __NR_stat:
+     case __NR_lstat:
+ #endif
+@@ -184,7 +189,7 @@
+       return !fast_check || allowed_command_set_.test(COMMAND_STAT);
+ #endif
+ 
+-#if !defined(__aarch64__)
++#if !defined(__aarch64__) && !defined(OS_ANDROID)
+     case __NR_unlink:
+       return !fast_check || allowed_command_set_.test(COMMAND_UNLINK);
+ #endif
+diff --git a/chromium/sandbox/linux/syscall_broker/broker_process_unittest.cc b/chromium/sandbox/linux/syscall_broker/broker_process_unittest.cc
+index b1d7106..15e00d5 100644
+--- a/chromium/sandbox/linux/syscall_broker/broker_process_unittest.cc
++++ b/chromium/sandbox/linux/syscall_broker/broker_process_unittest.cc
+@@ -1596,52 +1596,52 @@
+   const base::flat_map<BrokerCommand, base::flat_set<int>> kSysnosForCommand = {
+       {COMMAND_ACCESS,
+        {__NR_faccessat,
+-#if defined(__NR_access)
++#if defined(__NR_access) && !defined(OS_ANDROID)
+         __NR_access
+ #endif
+        }},
+       {COMMAND_MKDIR,
+        {__NR_mkdirat,
+-#if defined(__NR_mkdir)
++#if defined(__NR_mkdir) && !defined(OS_ANDROID)
+         __NR_mkdir
+ #endif
+        }},
+       {COMMAND_OPEN,
+        {__NR_openat,
+-#if defined(__NR_open)
++#if defined(__NR_open) && !defined(OS_ANDROID)
+         __NR_open
+ #endif
+        }},
+       {COMMAND_READLINK,
+        {__NR_readlinkat,
+-#if defined(__NR_readlink)
++#if defined(__NR_readlink) && !defined(OS_ANDROID)
+         __NR_readlink
+ #endif
+        }},
+       {COMMAND_RENAME,
+        {__NR_renameat,
+-#if defined(__NR_rename)
++#if defined(__NR_rename) && !defined(OS_ANDROID)
+         __NR_rename
+ #endif
+        }},
+       {COMMAND_UNLINK,
+        {__NR_unlinkat,
+-#if defined(__NR_unlink)
++#if defined(__NR_unlink) && !defined(OS_ANDROID)
+         __NR_unlink
+ #endif
+        }},
+       {COMMAND_RMDIR,
+        {__NR_unlinkat,
+-#if defined(__NR_rmdir)
++#if defined(__NR_rmdir) && !defined(OS_ANDROID)
+         __NR_rmdir
+ #endif
+        }},
+       {COMMAND_STAT,
+        {
+-#if defined(__NR_stat)
++#if defined(__NR_stat) && !defined(OS_ANDROID)
+            __NR_stat,
+ #endif
+-#if defined(__NR_lstat)
++#if defined(__NR_lstat) && !defined(OS_ANDROID)
+            __NR_lstat,
+ #endif
+ #if defined(__NR_fstatat)
+diff --git a/chromium/sandbox/linux/system_headers/linux_stat.h b/chromium/sandbox/linux/system_headers/linux_stat.h
+index 35788eb..83b89ef 100644
+--- a/chromium/sandbox/linux/system_headers/linux_stat.h
++++ b/chromium/sandbox/linux/system_headers/linux_stat.h
+@@ -157,6 +157,10 @@
+ };
+ #endif
+ 
++#if !defined(AT_EMPTY_PATH)
++#define AT_EMPTY_PATH 0x1000
++#endif
++
+ // On 32-bit systems, we default to the 64-bit stat struct like libc
+ // implementations do. Otherwise we default to the normal stat struct which is
+ // already 64-bit.
diff --git a/gnu/packages/qt.scm b/gnu/packages/qt.scm
index 01bf961bbf..55f141cd24 100644
--- a/gnu/packages/qt.scm
+++ b/gnu/packages/qt.scm
@@ -1549,6 +1549,7 @@ (define-public qtwebengine
        (sha256
         (base32
          "1q4idxdm81sx102xc12ixj0xpfx52d6vwvs3jpapnkyq8c7cmby8"))
+       (patches (search-patches "qtwebengine-fix-text-rendering.patch"))
        (modules '((ice-9 ftw)
                   (ice-9 match)
                   (srfi srfi-1)
-- 
2.34.0

bug#53011: Possible to Update qtbase-5 to v5.15.8?

[Jaft via Bug reports for GNU Guix]

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 I don't know if it's the best method to handle this but I tried just applying the patch manually with substitute*s.
Whatever point the codebase in the patch is, what's being pulled down by Guix doesn't seem to be there yet as one of the files was entirely missing but adding the file manually didn't seem to disturb anything and everything was able to build alright, for me.
I'm now typing this from Qutebrowser, built with my altered QTwebengine, and I've got proper text rendering (at least, for the sites I first noticed text rendering failing at and sites that had worked properly, to begin with).
    On Wednesday, January 5, 2022, 01:09:58 PM CST, Leo Famulari <leo@famulari.name> wrote:  
 
 On Wed, Jan 05, 2022 at 02:08:08PM -0500, Leo Famulari wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 04, 2022 at 07:04:57PM +0100, Florian Bruhin wrote:
> > Alternatively, to fix the issues with missing text, backporting this
> > patch should suffice:
> > https://codereview.qt-project.org/c/qt/qtwebengine-chromium/+/374232
> 
> I'm testing this now.

Oh, the patch does not apply to the source code of our qtwebengine
package. So, I hope that somebody else will take a look and try to fix
this bug.
  

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[-- Warning: decoded text below may be mangled, UTF-8 assumed --]
[-- Attachment #2: qtwebengine.patch --]
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* gnu/packages/qt.scm (qtwebengine): Backport fix for text rendering.
---
gnu/packages/qt.scm | 286 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 286 insertions(+)
diff --git a/gnu/packages/qt.scm b/gnu/packages/qt.scm
index ca97725052..111e068094 100644
--- a/gnu/packages/qt.scm
+++ b/gnu/packages/qt.scm
@@ -1878,6 +1878,292 @@ (define (delete-unwanted-files child stat flag base level)
                                       ;; Respect the '--cores' option of 'guix build'.
                                       " -j" (number->string (parallel-job-count))))
                #t))
+           ;; Backport
+           ;; https://codereview.qt-project.org/c/qt/qtwebengine-chromium/+/374232
+           ;; to fix broken text rendering.
+           ;; The patch couldn't be applied directly as it does not apply to
+           ;; the source code of our qtwebengine package
+           (add-before 'configure 'fix-text-rendering
+             (lambda _
+               (let ((output-port (open-file "src/3rdparty/chromium/sandbox/linux/system_headers/linux_stat.h" "a")))
+                 (display "// Copyright 2021 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+// found in the LICENSE file.
+
+#ifndef SANDBOX_LINUX_SYSTEM_HEADERS_LINUX_STAT_H_
+#define SANDBOX_LINUX_SYSTEM_HEADERS_LINUX_STAT_H_
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#include \"build/build_config.h\"
+#include \"sandbox/linux/system_headers/linux_syscalls.h\"
+
+#if defined(ARCH_CPU_MIPS_FAMILY)
+#if defined(ARCH_CPU_64_BITS)
+struct kernel_stat {
+#else
+struct kernel_stat64 {
+#endif
+  unsigned st_dev;
+  unsigned __pad0[3];
+  unsigned long long st_ino;
+  unsigned st_mode;
+  unsigned st_nlink;
+  unsigned st_uid;
+  unsigned st_gid;
+  unsigned st_rdev;
+  unsigned __pad1[3];
+  long long st_size;
+  unsigned st_atime_;
+  unsigned st_atime_nsec_;
+  unsigned st_mtime_;
+  unsigned st_mtime_nsec_;
+  unsigned st_ctime_;
+  unsigned st_ctime_nsec_;
+  unsigned st_blksize;
+  unsigned __pad2;
+  unsigned long long st_blocks;
+};
+#else
+struct kernel_stat64 {
+  unsigned long long st_dev;
+  unsigned char __pad0[4];
+  unsigned __st_ino;
+  unsigned st_mode;
+  unsigned st_nlink;
+  unsigned st_uid;
+  unsigned st_gid;
+  unsigned long long st_rdev;
+  unsigned char __pad3[4];
+  long long st_size;
+  unsigned st_blksize;
+  unsigned long long st_blocks;
+  unsigned st_atime_;
+  unsigned st_atime_nsec_;
+  unsigned st_mtime_;
+  unsigned st_mtime_nsec_;
+  unsigned st_ctime_;
+  unsigned st_ctime_nsec_;
+  unsigned long long st_ino;
+};
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__ARM_ARCH_3__) || defined(__ARM_EABI__)
+struct kernel_stat {
+  /* The kernel headers suggest that st_dev and st_rdev should be 32bit
+   * quantities encoding 12bit major and 20bit minor numbers in an interleaved
+   * format. In reality, we do not see useful data in the top bits. So,
+   * we'll leave the padding in here, until we find a better solution.
+   */
+  unsigned short st_dev;
+  short pad1;
+  unsigned st_ino;
+  unsigned short st_mode;
+  unsigned short st_nlink;
+  unsigned short st_uid;
+  unsigned short st_gid;
+  unsigned short st_rdev;
+  short pad2;
+  unsigned st_size;
+  unsigned st_blksize;
+  unsigned st_blocks;
+  unsigned st_atime_;
+  unsigned st_atime_nsec_;
+  unsigned st_mtime_;
+  unsigned st_mtime_nsec_;
+  unsigned st_ctime_;
+  unsigned st_ctime_nsec_;
+  unsigned __unused4;
+  unsigned __unused5;
+};
+#elif defined(__x86_64__)
+struct kernel_stat {
+  uint64_t st_dev;
+  uint64_t st_ino;
+  uint64_t st_nlink;
+  unsigned st_mode;
+  unsigned st_uid;
+  unsigned st_gid;
+  unsigned __pad0;
+  uint64_t st_rdev;
+  int64_t st_size;
+  int64_t st_blksize;
+  int64_t st_blocks;
+  uint64_t st_atime_;
+  uint64_t st_atime_nsec_;
+  uint64_t st_mtime_;
+  uint64_t st_mtime_nsec_;
+  uint64_t st_ctime_;
+  uint64_t st_ctime_nsec_;
+  int64_t __unused4[3];
+};
+#elif (defined(ARCH_CPU_MIPS_FAMILY) && defined(ARCH_CPU_32_BITS))
+struct kernel_stat {
+  unsigned st_dev;
+  int st_pad1[3];
+  unsigned st_ino;
+  unsigned st_mode;
+  unsigned st_nlink;
+  unsigned st_uid;
+  unsigned st_gid;
+  unsigned st_rdev;
+  int st_pad2[2];
+  long st_size;
+  int st_pad3;
+  long st_atime_;
+  long st_atime_nsec_;
+  long st_mtime_;
+  long st_mtime_nsec_;
+  long st_ctime_;
+  long st_ctime_nsec_;
+  int st_blksize;
+  int st_blocks;
+  int st_pad4[14];
+};
+#elif defined(__aarch64__)
+struct kernel_stat {
+  unsigned long st_dev;
+  unsigned long st_ino;
+  unsigned int st_mode;
+  unsigned int st_nlink;
+  unsigned int st_uid;
+  unsigned int st_gid;
+  unsigned long st_rdev;
+  unsigned long __pad1;
+  long st_size;
+  int st_blksize;
+  int __pad2;
+  long st_blocks;
+  long st_atime_;
+  unsigned long st_atime_nsec_;
+  long st_mtime_;
+  unsigned long st_mtime_nsec_;
+  long st_ctime_;
+  unsigned long st_ctime_nsec_;
+  unsigned int __unused4;
+  unsigned int __unused5;
+};
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(AT_EMPTY_PATH)
+#define AT_EMPTY_PATH 0x1000
+#endif
+
+// On 32-bit systems, we default to the 64-bit stat struct like libc
+// implementations do. Otherwise we default to the normal stat struct which is
+// already 64-bit.
+// These defines make it easy to call the right syscall to fill out a 64-bit
+// stat struct, which is the default in libc implementations but requires
+// different syscall names on 32 and 64-bit platforms.
+#if defined(__NR_fstatat64)
+
+namespace sandbox {
+using default_stat_struct = struct kernel_stat64;
+}  // namespace sandbox
+
+#define __NR_fstatat_default __NR_fstatat64
+#define __NR_fstat_default __NR_fstat64
+
+#elif defined(__NR_newfstatat)
+
+namespace sandbox {
+using default_stat_struct = struct kernel_stat;
+}  // namespace sandbox
+
+#define __NR_fstatat_default __NR_newfstatat
+#define __NR_fstat_default __NR_fstat
+
+#else
+#error \"one of fstatat64 and newfstatat must be defined\"
+#endif
+
+#endif  // SANDBOX_LINUX_SYSTEM_HEADERS_LINUX_STAT_H_
+" output-port)
+
+                 (close output-port))
+
+               (substitute* "src/3rdparty/chromium/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/baseline_policy.cc"
+                 (("#include \"sandbox/linux/services/syscall_wrappers\\.h\"")
+                  "#include \"sandbox/linux/services/syscall_wrappers.h\"
+#include \"sandbox/linux/system_headers/linux_stat.h\"")
+                 (("if [(]SyscallSets::IsFileSystem[(]sysno[)] [|][|]")
+                  "if (sysno == __NR_fstatat_default) {
+    return RewriteFstatatSIGSYS(fs_denied_errno);
+  }
+
+  if (SyscallSets::IsFileSystem(sysno) ||"))
+
+               (substitute* "src/3rdparty/chromium/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/baseline_policy_unittest.cc"
+                 (("BPF_ASSERT[(]S_ISFIFO[(]stat_buf\\.st_mode[)] [|][|] S_ISSOCK[(]stat_buf\\.st_mode[)][)];")
+                  "BPF_ASSERT(S_ISFIFO(stat_buf.st_mode) || S_ISSOCK(stat_buf.st_mode));
+
+  sys_ret = fstatat(read_end.get(), \"\", &stat_buf, AT_EMPTY_PATH);
+  BPF_ASSERT_EQ(0, sys_ret);
+  BPF_ASSERT(S_ISFIFO(stat_buf.st_mode) || S_ISSOCK(stat_buf.st_mode));
+
+  // Make sure fstatat with anything other than an empty string is denied.
+  sys_ret = fstatat(read_end.get(), \"/\", &stat_buf, AT_EMPTY_PATH);
+  BPF_ASSERT_EQ(sys_ret, -1);
+  BPF_ASSERT_EQ(EPERM, errno);
+
+  // Make sure fstatat without AT_EMPTY_PATH is denied.
+  sys_ret = fstatat(read_end.get(), \"\", &stat_buf, 0);
+  BPF_ASSERT_EQ(sys_ret, -1);
+  BPF_ASSERT_EQ(EPERM, errno);"))
+
+               (substitute* "src/3rdparty/chromium/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/sigsys_handlers.h"
+                 (("// Variants of the above functions for use with bpf_dsl\\.")
+                  "SANDBOX_EXPORT intptr_t
+SIGSYSFstatatHandler(const struct arch_seccomp_data& args,
+                     void* fs_denied_errno);
+
+// Variants of the above functions for use with bpf_dsl.")
+                 (("SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RewriteSchedSIGSYS[(][)];")
+                  "SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RewriteSchedSIGSYS();
+SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RewriteFstatatSIGSYS(int fs_denied_errno);"))
+
+               (substitute* "src/3rdparty/chromium/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/sigsys_handlers.cc"
+                 (("#include <stddef\\.h>")
+                  "#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stddef.h>")
+                 (("#include \"sandbox/linux/system_headers/linux_syscalls\\.h\"")
+                  "#include \"sandbox/linux/system_headers/linux_stat.h\"
+#include \"sandbox/linux/system_headers/linux_syscalls.h\"")
+                 (("bpf_dsl::ResultExpr CrashSIGSYS[(][)] [{]")
+                  "intptr_t SIGSYSFstatatHandler(const struct arch_seccomp_data& args,
+                              void* fs_denied_errno) {
+  if (args.nr == __NR_fstatat_default) {
+    if (*reinterpret_cast<const char*>(args.args[1]) == '\0' &&
+        args.args[3] == static_cast<uint64_t>(AT_EMPTY_PATH)) {
+      return syscall(__NR_fstat_default, static_cast<int>(args.args[0]),
+                     reinterpret_cast<default_stat_struct*>(args.args[2]));
+    }
+    return -reinterpret_cast<intptr_t>(fs_denied_errno);
+  }
+
+  CrashSIGSYS_Handler(args, fs_denied_errno);
+
+  // Should never be reached.
+  RAW_CHECK(false);
+  return -ENOSYS;
+}
+
+bpf_dsl::ResultExpr CrashSIGSYS() {")
+                 (("void AllocateCrashKeys[(][)] [{]")
+                  "bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RewriteFstatatSIGSYS(int fs_denied_errno) {
+  return bpf_dsl::Trap(SIGSYSFstatatHandler,
+                       reinterpret_cast<void*>(fs_denied_errno));
+}
+
+void AllocateCrashKeys() {"))
+
+               (substitute* "src/3rdparty/chromium/sandbox/linux/syscall_broker/broker_process.cc"
+                 (("#if !defined[(]__aarch64__[)]")
+                  "#if !defined(__aarch64__) && !defined(OS_ANDROID)"))
+
+               (substitute* "src/3rdparty/chromium/sandbox/linux/syscall_broker/broker_process_unittest.cc"
+                 (("#if !defined[(]__aarch64__[)]")
+                  "#if !defined(__aarch64__) && !defined(OS_ANDROID)"))))
            (replace 'configure
              (lambda _
                ;; Valid QT_BUILD_PARTS variables are:

bug#53011: Qt patches for 5.15.5

[phodina via Bug reports for GNU Guix]

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 256 bytes --]

Hi,

I'm attempting to update the Qt packages to 5.15.5 in this ticket https://issues.guix.gnu.org/56293.

Could somebody check the QtWebengine? It's the only thing that does not build even when I try to build it based on the Linux from scratch.

----
Petr

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bug#53011: Possible to Update qtbase-5 to v5.15.8?

[Maxim Cournoyer]

Hi,

Jaft <wamm_kd_schmelingski@yahoo.com> writes:

> Partially because it's the latest version but primarily because there's a bug in the current version for QTwebengine.
> As detailed at r/qutebrowser - Comment by u/The-Compiler on ”WebGL
> blacklisted on Guix”, most text gets broken
> (https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1164975); I
> haven't tried other browsers but I've experienced this with
> Qutebrowser, currently.
> It seems the issue was addressed in QT v5.15.7 so an update to, at least, that would, theoretically, solve the problem.

I've updated the Qt 5 packages to 5.15.8 on staging; feel free to give
it a shot in the next week or so, after which I'll consider merging the
staging branch to master if there are no blockers.

-- 
Thanks,
Maxim