On Sat, 2021-03-27 at 06:37 +0000, raid5atemyhomework wrote: > > > If you reconfigure your OS without restarting the tor service, > > > the directory permissions are reset due to the activation code being > > > re-run and resetting the directory permissions. > > > This change simply does not chmod if the directory already exists. > > > > I believe it would be more transparent to introduce a > > (data-directory-group-readable? #t/#f), with #f as default, > > to tor-configuration (adjusting tor-configuration->torrc) > > and change the permission bits passed to chmod appropriately. > > > > (Documentation & reproducible system configuration & one integrated > > system (in the software sense) and all that) > > But really though, the primary reason for this is to use the "cookie" > authentication scheme with a control port on 9051. This is supported > by most daemons, as the "control unix socket" (that is currently supported > by `control-socket?` option) seems to be relatively new (Tor 0.2.7.1). > > This requires adding: > > ControlPort 9051 > CookieAuthentication 1 > CookieAuthFileGroupReadable 1 > DataDirectoryGroupReadable 1 > > In https://issues.guix.gnu.org/46549 which implements `control-socket?` the > author expressed doubt as to the safety of this mechanism. Looking at the Tor > manpage regarding `ControlPort`: > > ``` > Note: unless you also specify one or more of HashedControlPassword or CookieAuthentication, > setting this option will cause Tor to allow any process on the local > host to control it. (Setting both authentication methods means either method is sufficient > to authenticate to Tor.) This option is required for many Tor controllers; most use > the value of 9051. > ``` > > Basically, this is safe as long as you use *either* `HashedControlPassword` *or* > `CookieAuthentication` *or* both; in the case of `CookieAuthentication` only users > with read access to the cookie file can access it. Nearly every daemon that needs > control access over Tor (usually to set up their own hidden service using their own > privkey) expects `CookieAuthentication` and reads from `/var/lib/tor/control_auth-_cookie`, > which requires that `/var/lib/tor` be readable (else it can't look up the filename). It > becomes just as safe as the control-unix-socket option, as that is similarly gated by > file permissions. I believe this addresses the security concerns Christopher Lemmer Webber had. > Note in particular that Bitcoin Core supports `ControlPort` and not `ControlSocket`, so > this is needed for Bitcoin Core support. From what I can see more daemons support > `ControlPort` than `ControlSocket`. Ok, but take a look at . Maybe its out of date though: This patch looks good to me, except for some minor aesthetic issues in the commit message. I ran "make system-check TESTS=tor" with this patch, which succeeded. > Thanks > raid5atemyhomework > > > From d9bea7635594654e1e631e4db55422c511f0220a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > From: raid5atemyhomework > Date: Sat, 27 Mar 2021 14:29:31 +0800 > Subject: [PATCH] gnu: Add 'control-port?' setting to Tor. > > * gnu/services/networking.scm (tor-configuration): Add `control-port?` field. > (tor-configuration->torrc): Support `control-port?` field. > (tor-activation): Allow group access to data directory if `control-port?`. > * doc/guix.texi (Networking Services)[Tor]: Describe new `control-port?` field. Usually we `quote', 'quote', "quote" or ‘quote’, but never `quote`. I recommend 'quote', as in commit 43937666ba6975b6c847be8e67cecd781ce27049 Author: Ludovic Courtès Date: Fri Mar 19 14:23:57 2021 +0100 download: 'tls-wrap' treats premature TLS termination as EOF. This is a backport of Guile commit 076276c4f580368b4106316a77752d69c8f1494a. * guix/build/download.scm (tls-wrap)[read!]: Wrap 'get-bytevector-n!' call in 'catch' and handle 'error/premature-termination' GnuTLS errors. Greetings, Maxime.