From: Leo Famulari <leo@famulari.name>
To: 28751@debbugs.gnu.org
Subject: bug#28751: GuixSD setuid-programs handling creates setuid binaries in the store
Date: Fri, 29 Dec 2017 18:09:53 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171229230953.GA10185@jasmine.lan> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87lgklbekx.fsf@gnu.org>
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On Sun, Oct 08, 2017 at 09:54:22PM +0200, Ludovic Courtès wrote:
> ludo@gnu.org (Ludovic Courtès) skribis:
>
> > ludo@gnu.org (Ludovic Courtès) skribis:
> >
> >> On GuixSD, ‘activate-setuid-programs’ in (gnu build activation) would
> >> create setuid-root binaries under /gnu/store for all the programs listed
> >> under ‘setuid-programs’ in the ‘operating-system’ declaration.
> >
> > Fixed by
> > <https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/guix.git/commit/?id=5e66574a128937e7f2fcf146d146225703ccfd5d>.
>
> Detailed announcement at:
>
> https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/guix-devel/2017-10/msg00090.html
FYI, this was assigned CVE-2017-1000455.
I just received the attached JSON from the Distributed Weakness Filing
project (DWF) in response to my CVE application.
I assume it will show up in the regular places (MITRE etc) eventually.
Having thought about this bug for a while, I think it was not too bad in
practice. The setuid executable files could be copied or preserved
somehow by an attacker whether they were in the store or in
/run/setuid-programs.
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{"data_version": "4.0","references": {"reference_data": [{"url": "https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/guix-devel/2017-10/msg00090.html"}]},"description": {"description_data": [{"lang": "eng","value": "GuixSD prior to Git commit 5e66574a128937e7f2fcf146d146225703ccfd5d used POSIX hard links incorrectly, leading the creation of setuid executables in \"the store\", violating a fundamental security assumption of GNU Guix."}]},"data_type": "CVE","affects": {"vendor": {"vendor_data": [{"product": {"product_data": [{"version": {"version_data": [{"version_value": "All versions of GuixSD prior to Git commit 5e66574a128937e7f2fcf146d146225703ccfd5d"}]},"product_name": "GuixSD"}]},"vendor_name": "GNU Guix"}]}},"CVE_data_meta": {"DATE_ASSIGNED": "2017-12-29","ID": "CVE-2017-1000455","ASSIGNER": "kurt@s
eifried.org","REQUESTER": "leo@famulari.name"},"data_format": "MITRE","problemtype": {"problemtype_data": [{"description": [{"lang": "eng","value": "Insecure Permissions"}]}]}}
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-12-29 23:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-10-08 19:25 bug#28751: GuixSD setuid-programs handling creates setuid binaries in the store Ludovic Courtès
2017-10-08 19:32 ` Ludovic Courtès
2017-10-08 19:54 ` Ludovic Courtès
2017-12-29 23:09 ` Leo Famulari [this message]
[not found] ` <20171229223329.GA25194@jasmine.lan>
2017-12-30 0:28 ` Ludovic Courtès
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