bug#47584: Race condition in ‘copy-account-skeletons’: possible privilege escalation.

[Maxime Devos <maximedevos@telenet.be>]

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On Mon, 2021-04-05 at 21:54 +0200, Ludovic Courtès wrote:
> [...]
> 
> OK.  It does mean that the bug is hardly exploitable in practice: you
> have to be able to log in at all,
Yes.

>  and if you’re able to log in, you have
> to log in precisely within the 1s (or less) that follows account
> creation, which sounds challenging (TCP + SSH connection establishment
> is likely to take as much time or more,

Is logging in possible when the home directory doesn't exist?
It isn't possible from the console.  I guess it isn't possible from SSH
either.

If it is possible,
then the window would be somewhat larger I think.  Account creation is done
at activation time, while creating home directories is done as a shepherd
service (see account-service-type in gnu/system/shadow.scm).

>  likewise for typing in your password.)
An attacker could copy and paste, or have used a single-character password,
to save some time.

>   It’s also one-time chance.

Yes.

> Do I get it right?

I think so, except the window might be larger (but still a one-time chance).

> Does it warrant as strong messaging as for the recent daemon
> ‘--keep-failed’ vulnerability?

As it is a one-time chance, with a limited window, and only under specific
circumstances (creating a new user account), I don't think so.  But I would
still recommend to upgrade.  Does the blog post have ‘too strong messaging’? 

Greetings,
Maxime

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