From: "pelzflorian (Florian Pelz)" <pelzflorian@pelzflorian.de>
To: John Kehayias <john.kehayias@protonmail.com>
Cc: 70114@debbugs.gnu.org, 70113@debbugs.gnu.org,
Leo Famulari <leo@famulari.name>
Subject: [bug#70113] [PATCH 1/1] gnu: libarchive: Fix a potential security issue.
Date: Tue, 02 Apr 2024 15:45:51 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <871q7nev3k.fsf@pelzflorian.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87il10wipx.fsf@protonmail.com> (John Kehayias via Guix-patches via's message of "Tue, 02 Apr 2024 03:23:44 +0000")
Hello,
John Kehayias via Guix-patches via <guix-patches@gnu.org> writes:
>> +(define-public libarchive/fixed
>> + (package
>> + (inherit libarchive)
>> + (version "3.6.1")
>> + (source
>> + (origin
>> + (method url-fetch)
>> + (uri (list (string-append "https://libarchive.org/downloads/libarchive-"
>> + version ".tar.xz")
>> + (string-append "https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive"
>> + "/releases/download/v" version "/libarchive-"
>> + version ".tar.xz")))
>
> In light of the xz backdoor, perhaps we should just do a git checkout of
> the v3.6.1 tag rather than the tarballs? Assuming that works, of course.
Not having followed the details, I believe the git checkout contained an
incomplete part of the malicious code too, from what Joshua Branson (I
guess the sender is him?) cites from Phoronix
<https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/guix-devel/2024-04/msg00002.html>:
jbranso@dismail.de writes:
> The malicious injection present in the xz versions 5.6.0 and 5.6.1
> libraries is obfuscated and only included in full in the download package
> - the Git distribution lacks the M4 macro that triggers the build
> of the malicious code. The second-stage artifacts are present in
> the Git repository for the injection during the build time, in
> case the malicious M4 macro is present.
It doesn’t look like avoiding tarballs gives us more verified code.
Regards,
Florian
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-04-02 13:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-03-31 20:44 [bug#70114] [PATCH 0/1] Xz backdoor / JiaT75 cleanup for libarchive Leo Famulari
2024-03-31 20:44 ` [bug#70113] [PATCH 1/1] gnu: libarchive: Fix a potential security issue Leo Famulari
2024-03-31 20:51 ` [bug#70113] SECURITY: Xz backdoor / JiaT75 cleanup for libarchive Leo Famulari
2024-04-02 3:23 ` [bug#70114] [bug#70113] [PATCH 1/1] gnu: libarchive: Fix a potential security issue John Kehayias via Guix-patches via
2024-04-02 13:24 ` Efraim Flashner
2024-04-02 13:45 ` pelzflorian (Florian Pelz) [this message]
2024-04-04 2:38 ` John Kehayias via Guix-patches via
2024-04-03 22:08 ` bug#70113: " Leo Famulari
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
List information: https://guix.gnu.org/
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=871q7nev3k.fsf@pelzflorian.de \
--to=pelzflorian@pelzflorian.de \
--cc=70113@debbugs.gnu.org \
--cc=70114@debbugs.gnu.org \
--cc=john.kehayias@protonmail.com \
--cc=leo@famulari.name \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
Code repositories for project(s) associated with this public inbox
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/guix.git
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for read-only IMAP folder(s) and NNTP newsgroup(s).