From: Maxime Devos <maximedevos@telenet.be>
To: "Julien Lepiller" <julien@lepiller.eu>,
guix-devel@gnu.org, "Ludovic Courtès" <ludo@gnu.org>,
"Leo Famulari" <leo@famulari.name>
Subject: Re: Potential security weakness in Guix services
Date: Mon, 01 Feb 2021 17:19:45 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <c7e82df3921fb0eaefb9db798d634f63f6eb0142.camel@telenet.be> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <08F0CD76-DDCF-4CFA-AE8D-5FB165A62B25@lepiller.eu>
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> > I’m not sure I understand the threat model. If Knot has a RCE
> > vulnerability, it can be exploited to run anything on behalf of the
> > ‘knot’ user.
> >
> > At that point, all the state associated with Knot in /var/lib should be
> > considered tainted; new keys should be generated, and so on.
> >
> > Why focus on the permissions on /var/lib/knot?
>
> My understanding is that, in case of an RCE in knot, the attacker can
> replace /var/lib/knot/* with symlinks to arbitrary files in the FS. When
> the activation procedure is run afterwards, the files being linked to
> are chowned to the knot user, and the attacker can access them.
That's exactly what I had in mind! Though I would like to stress that
‘access’ here is both reading and writing.
Maxime.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-02-01 16:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-01-28 21:53 Potential security weakness in Guix services Leo Famulari
2021-01-29 13:33 ` Maxime Devos
2021-01-29 15:25 ` Maxime Devos
2021-02-01 15:35 ` Ludovic Courtès
2021-02-01 15:47 ` Julien Lepiller
2021-02-01 16:19 ` Maxime Devos [this message]
2021-02-02 13:07 ` Ludovic Courtès
2021-02-02 13:38 ` Maxime Devos
2021-02-02 15:30 ` Maxime Devos
2021-02-05 9:57 ` Ludovic Courtès
2021-02-05 12:20 ` Maxime Devos
2021-02-05 14:16 ` Maxime Devos
2021-02-06 21:28 ` Ludovic Courtès
2021-02-06 22:01 ` Maxime Devos
2021-02-10 20:45 ` Ludovic Courtès
2021-02-06 21:26 ` Ludovic Courtès
2021-02-14 12:29 ` TOCTTOU race (was: Potential security weakness in Guix services) Maxime Devos
2021-02-14 17:19 ` Bengt Richter
2021-02-18 17:54 ` TOCTTOU race Ludovic Courtès
2021-02-19 18:01 ` Maxime Devos
2021-02-22 8:54 ` Ludovic Courtès
2021-02-22 19:13 ` Maxime Devos
2021-02-23 15:30 ` Ludovic Courtès
2021-02-27 7:41 ` Maxime Devos
2021-03-10 10:07 ` Ludovic Courtès
2021-02-10 20:54 ` Potential security weakness in Guix services Christopher Lemmer Webber
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