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From: Leo Famulari <leo@famulari.name>
To: Giovanni Biscuolo <g@xelera.eu>
Cc: guix-devel@gnu.org
Subject: Re: "Trojan Source" (CVE-2021-42574 and CVE-2021-42694): can 'guix lint' help someway?
Date: Mon, 1 Nov 2021 09:38:28 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YX/t1J8Z9WNmpofs@jasmine.lan> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87fssgi04h.fsf@xelera.eu>

On Mon, Nov 01, 2021 at 12:30:38PM +0100, Giovanni Biscuolo wrote:
> as probably many of you have discovered, today was announced two new
> vulnerabilities that exploits the "bidirectional override" Unicode
> codepoints feature, making it possible to hide malicious source code in
> comments and literal strings /if/ the code review tool (e.g. editor)
> does not show this.
 
We need to check our own Git repository history for the tricky
codepoints.

> Is there a way for "guix lint" to check for the listed (other?)
> "dangerous" codepoints and warn code reviewers?

Yeah, we could implement this. It might be expensive but one has to
unpack the source code anyways.

However, I think that this attack is, in general, not within the scope
of Guix's security model, because:

1) Guix implicitly trusts the source code that it fetches from upstream.

2) Guix explicitly fetches the source code from upstream — Guix
committers do not provide a copy of the upstream code (of unprovable
provenance) as they do in other distros.

If an attacker can make malicious modifications to the code distributed
by an upstream project, it's not relevant to Guix if they use homoglyphs
or a buffer overflow. Guix developers do not inspect upstream source
code for vulnerabilities.

What do others think?


  reply	other threads:[~2021-11-01 13:38 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-11-01 11:30 "Trojan Source" (CVE-2021-42574 and CVE-2021-42694): can 'guix lint' help someway? Giovanni Biscuolo
2021-11-01 13:38 ` Leo Famulari [this message]
2021-11-01 15:04   ` Bengt Richter
2021-11-09 17:05 ` Ludovic Courtès
2021-11-15 17:20   ` zimoun
2021-11-16 10:06   ` Giovanni Biscuolo

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