From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mp10.migadu.com ([2001:41d0:2:bcc0::]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits)) by ms5.migadu.com with LMTPS id CIwaARLxAWNq/gAAbAwnHQ (envelope-from ) for ; Sun, 21 Aug 2022 10:47:14 +0200 Received: from aspmx1.migadu.com ([2001:41d0:2:bcc0::]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits)) by mp10.migadu.com with LMTPS id SdImABLxAWNhSgAAG6o9tA (envelope-from ) for ; Sun, 21 Aug 2022 10:47:14 +0200 Received: from lists.gnu.org (lists.gnu.org [209.51.188.17]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by aspmx1.migadu.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B28D132579 for ; Sun, 21 Aug 2022 10:47:13 +0200 (CEST) Received: from localhost ([::1]:50866 helo=lists1p.gnu.org) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1oPgbw-0001py-UD for larch@yhetil.org; Sun, 21 Aug 2022 04:47:12 -0400 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::10]:48136) by lists.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1oPgbh-0001pq-1t for guix-devel@gnu.org; Sun, 21 Aug 2022 04:46:57 -0400 Received: from jpoiret.xyz ([206.189.101.64]:35020) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1oPgbf-00089U-Ie for guix-devel@gnu.org; Sun, 21 Aug 2022 04:46:56 -0400 Received: from authenticated-user (jpoiret.xyz [206.189.101.64]) by jpoiret.xyz (Postfix) with ESMTPA id 80E77184C99; Sun, 21 Aug 2022 08:46:52 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=jpoiret.xyz; s=dkim; t=1661071612; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=QgMdJtMIyNRCS97stGOfTF44RWrIJMFSQ5g/KvA9ZNM=; b=mN24GV1RdqVp0iLMifIxdKeHgUNDQdMVAkS0Mgi612OFusnoh7ei+/FaWP4ZNEDWJ7IhCj 6mJLWQ0Puxw9pCewQ5bCSAkD3gxgK4vJ/+TI1+Irz6n56GrBhFOX1kZAPPj0ZOUzrfNP+6 hX63yza5hB32zgoDg6oQAbuMSVQtBQGG7Dh9bX+e+4EnqCV4loKPu2whEX1SaCL1dcv0B8 e++DFiO9v94sVYOOsDUbiYu6CMrEhpF9u11MWPcgiLeMjqetvo554XgpaQzbxOgpg+pYF7 H5PJ2w7CoqE40k6oij+gxU+OcRPKNC8w/QDtxRn0LJnt/D1N60c3GVmfLIixLQ== From: Josselin Poiret To: Antonio Carlos Padoan Junior , guix-devel@gnu.org Subject: Re: secure boot In-Reply-To: <87h727tazd.fsf@yahoo.com.br> References: <87h727tazd.fsf.ref@yahoo.com.br> <87h727tazd.fsf@yahoo.com.br> Date: Sun, 21 Aug 2022 10:46:51 +0200 Message-ID: <87pmguugp0.fsf@jpoiret.xyz> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain X-Spamd-Bar: / Received-SPF: pass client-ip=206.189.101.64; envelope-from=dev@jpoiret.xyz; helo=jpoiret.xyz X-Spam_score_int: 4 X-Spam_score: 0.4 X-Spam_bar: / X-Spam_report: (0.4 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, FROM_SUSPICIOUS_NTLD=0.499, PDS_OTHER_BAD_TLD=1.997, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE=-0.01 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no X-Spam_action: no action X-BeenThere: guix-devel@gnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: "Development of GNU Guix and the GNU System distribution." List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: guix-devel-bounces+larch=yhetil.org@gnu.org Sender: "Guix-devel" X-Migadu-Flow: FLOW_IN X-Migadu-To: larch@yhetil.org X-Migadu-Country: US ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=yhetil.org; s=key1; t=1661071633; h=from:from:sender:sender:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date: message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-type:content-type:in-reply-to:in-reply-to: references:references:list-id:list-help:list-unsubscribe: list-subscribe:list-post:dkim-signature; bh=QgMdJtMIyNRCS97stGOfTF44RWrIJMFSQ5g/KvA9ZNM=; b=m6T3f1bhbagFNCDL3WbIdl5uBk2y0jwSofrQv0Xp/k+LPHPxmEH3t7oQpPU+bm3Wto3vJj 1myEx5t5I0UAzNVScXDC8QrBKEQwZaZJy35SVa3fCQg/92K0BAGbIWk/ZnAywWfPuLwMj9 hvEEY/ShBw/5LmkkFhqknLsqgbcMpxjsIrDFVcpYTa/db7SHdeEVcwQNn5d1I3c8tnrfv6 fA1yDK4Ioquf5KaSsalkZlgjG7V4CAl60Xucw+/KmdIRyWeACIOx7mfXRDWr7HATxMLoFW c8q5SS4KgeZ0ni6ySJw2o0CrkCB5Hjm3z7MbLQe6aHPHFz3TxPtwkDR9RwqNdw== ARC-Seal: i=1; s=key1; d=yhetil.org; t=1661071633; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; b=ZWL2MoMJivI3K48JEw3IEHnieiYX6cGeNkvkiuMiN3hIyXX2HfFjGQOomLbrVo6GmTLENS /M/YH5CXvXyTxTTbc3hPbv4FbS0uzhqa19XmJDNlonoD2z9dj3h5dpbz3ZIqU8xaEnA9DW 0/MMKLcpkZjwJvwwCwNwth6xv+dpsjXwdKVuYsYPg9ocxodTyidYg1bIEqUbGvr21le8c2 /WjiQKnpRaZNuIW6LoRzJiBN6sWTYOKhRLcj7GINhiB1clI9yemeCNzncqS3fWflpH7zXd jlgJef85V7XFOK7JioUHGbz2KMDk5OFHQYFgbyuNWVygjuiXoCrexR9z7xrSKg== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; aspmx1.migadu.com; dkim=pass header.d=jpoiret.xyz header.s=dkim header.b=mN24GV1R; dmarc=pass (policy=reject) header.from=jpoiret.xyz; spf=pass (aspmx1.migadu.com: domain of "guix-devel-bounces+larch=yhetil.org@gnu.org" designates 209.51.188.17 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom="guix-devel-bounces+larch=yhetil.org@gnu.org" X-Migadu-Spam-Score: -7.43 Authentication-Results: aspmx1.migadu.com; dkim=pass header.d=jpoiret.xyz header.s=dkim header.b=mN24GV1R; dmarc=pass (policy=reject) header.from=jpoiret.xyz; spf=pass (aspmx1.migadu.com: domain of "guix-devel-bounces+larch=yhetil.org@gnu.org" designates 209.51.188.17 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom="guix-devel-bounces+larch=yhetil.org@gnu.org" X-Migadu-Queue-Id: B28D132579 X-Spam-Score: -7.43 X-Migadu-Scanner: scn0.migadu.com X-TUID: fuH8R4CVnSmr Hi Antonio, Antonio Carlos Padoan Junior writes: > As far as I understand, Guix doesn't provide means to automatically sign > bootloaders and kernels in order to use UEFI secure boot after each system > reconfigure (assuming a PKI is properly implemented). Hence, using > secure boot with Guix is currently not viable (am i correct?). You're right, we don't really have any means to do that. It would have to be done outside of the store, again, so that the private key doesn't leak into it. > In this context, can I assume that the risk of not having secure boot is > minimized by the fact that in each system reconfiguration, the early > boot chain is overwritten is such a way that, if a malicious is > introduced somehow, it will be also overwritten? Am I correct? A reconfigure would overwrite the bootloader, and most likely create a new system generation with bootloader configuration. > In addition, how much more difficult it is to introduce such malicious > code in a Guix system giving its functional approach and store system? > (in comparison with others Linux distributions). Nothing is stopping an attacker from overwriting your bootloader with their own, which could load a kernel of their choosing. They would need to be able to boot off something though. And once you're compromised that way, I don't think you could consider running `guix system reconfigure` an option. Best, -- Josselin Poiret