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From: Antonio Carlos Padoan Junior <acpadoanjr@yahoo.com.br>
To: guix-devel@gnu.org
Subject: secure boot
Date: Sat, 20 Aug 2022 13:23:18 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87h727tazd.fsf@yahoo.com.br> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 87h727tazd.fsf.ref@yahoo.com.br

Hello,

I hope my question makes sense. It concerns Guix grub UEFI bootloaders.

I would like to understand in which extent Guix functional approach
helps to secure the computer with regards to an early boot malicious
code/malware infection.

As far as I understand, Guix doesn't provide means to automatically sign
bootloaders and kernels in order to use UEFI secure boot after each system
reconfigure (assuming a PKI is properly implemented).  Hence, using
secure boot with Guix is currently not viable (am i correct?).

In this context, can I assume that the risk of not having secure boot is
minimized by the fact that in each system reconfiguration, the early
boot chain is overwritten is such a way that, if a malicious is
introduced somehow, it will be also overwritten? Am I correct?

In addition, how much more difficult it is to introduce such malicious
code in a Guix system giving its functional approach and store system?
(in comparison with others Linux distributions).

I know that Guix provides an amazing approach to secure software supply
chain, but I as wondering if not having secure boot can be considered
a major drawback for Guix.

Best regards
-- 
Antonio Carlos PADOAN JUNIOR
GPG fingerprint:
243F 237F 2DD3 4DCA 4EA3  1341 2481 90F9 B421 A6C9


       reply	other threads:[~2022-08-20 11:24 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <87h727tazd.fsf.ref@yahoo.com.br>
2022-08-20 11:23 ` Antonio Carlos Padoan Junior [this message]
2022-08-20 12:18   ` secure boot Tobias Platen
2022-08-21  8:46   ` Josselin Poiret
2022-08-22 20:13     ` Antonio Carlos Padoan Junior
2022-08-23  7:42       ` Josselin Poiret
2022-08-23 18:32         ` Antonio Carlos Padoan Junior
2022-08-24  3:07     ` Philip McGrath
2022-08-24 17:24       ` Maxime Devos
     [not found] <mailman.77.1661011233.4812.guix-devel@gnu.org>
2022-08-20 19:11 ` kiasoc5

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