unofficial mirror of guix-devel@gnu.org 
 help / color / mirror / code / Atom feed
From: Maxim Cournoyer <maxim.cournoyer@gmail.com>
To: Attila Lendvai <attila@lendvai.name>
Cc: guix-devel@gnu.org
Subject: Re: policy for packaging insecure apps
Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2024 22:16:51 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87bk66m6zw.fsf@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2bUjC_hEOSbsBdNlw5md-0Co6ZgqAYc4LLOfo01-HAhYkCNehW-8lXhBt8TN769ZDd68CMtzSvK2vrZH1gIf30pmrDArmCbQhD2e7sK98Kk=@lendvai.name> (Attila Lendvai's message of "Wed, 10 Apr 2024 08:51:02 +0000")

Hi Attila,

Attila Lendvai <attila@lendvai.name> writes:

> the context:
> ------------
>
> there's an app currently packaged in guix, namely gnome-shell-extension-clipboard-indicator, that has a rather questionable practice: by default it saves the clipboard history (passwords included) in clear text, and the preferences for it is called something obscure. its author actively defends this situation for several years now, rejecting patches and bug reports.

Are there no forks yet?

[...]

> my question:
> ------------
>
> how shall we deal with a situation like this?
>
>  1) shall i create a guix patch that makes the necessary changes in
>     this app, and submit it to guix? this would be a non-trivial, and
>     a rather hidden divergence from upstream, potentially leading to
>     confusion.

Perhaps enough people are interested in getting this in order to have
created a fork already?  We could use it.

>  2) is there a way to attach a warning message to a package to explain
>     such situations to anyone who installs them? should there be a
>     feature like that? should there be a need for a --force switch, or
>     an interactive y/n, to force installing such apps?

For now, I think a simple mention of the issue in the description could
be enough.

>  3) is there a point where packages refusing to address security
>     issues should be unpackaged? and also added to a blacklist until the
>     security issue is resolved? where is that point? would this one
>     qualify?

Is the issue is severe enough (I don't think it is the case here -- it
seems a note to its description would be sufficient -- but I haven't
looked closely into it), I think the package could be dropped, discussed
as a patch.

>  4) is this the responsibility of a project like guix to address
>     situations like this?

When the security risks introduced are severe, I'd say so (by excluding
such package from our collection) -- but it would need to be something
truly problematic.

-- 
Thanks,
Maxim


      reply	other threads:[~2024-04-19  2:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-04-10  8:51 policy for packaging insecure apps Attila Lendvai
2024-04-19  2:16 ` Maxim Cournoyer [this message]

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

  List information: https://guix.gnu.org/

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=87bk66m6zw.fsf@gmail.com \
    --to=maxim.cournoyer@gmail.com \
    --cc=attila@lendvai.name \
    --cc=guix-devel@gnu.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
Code repositories for project(s) associated with this public inbox

	https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/guix.git

This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for read-only IMAP folder(s) and NNTP newsgroup(s).