From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: ludo@gnu.org (Ludovic =?utf-8?Q?Court=C3=A8s?=) Subject: Re: `guix pull` over HTTPS Date: Sat, 11 Feb 2017 15:28:52 +0100 Message-ID: <871sv44x97.fsf@gnu.org> References: <20170209155512.GA11291@jasmine> <20170210003054.GA12412@jasmine> <87fujmcb6w.fsf@gnu.org> <87lgte10eu.fsf@kirby.i-did-not-set--mail-host-address--so-tickle-me> <87inoh660r.fsf@gnu.org> <874m011xb2.fsf@kirby.i-did-not-set--mail-host-address--so-tickle-me> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Return-path: Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:4830:134:3::10]:52715) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1ccYfb-0006FP-NI for guix-devel@gnu.org; Sat, 11 Feb 2017 09:29:01 -0500 Received: from Debian-exim by eggs.gnu.org with spam-scanned (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1ccYfX-0007mN-PM for guix-devel@gnu.org; Sat, 11 Feb 2017 09:28:59 -0500 In-Reply-To: <874m011xb2.fsf@kirby.i-did-not-set--mail-host-address--so-tickle-me> (Marius Bakke's message of "Fri, 10 Feb 2017 23:43:45 +0100") List-Id: "Development of GNU Guix and the GNU System distribution." List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: guix-devel-bounces+gcggd-guix-devel=m.gmane.org@gnu.org Sender: "Guix-devel" To: Marius Bakke Cc: guix-devel@gnu.org Marius Bakke skribis: > Ludovic Court=C3=A8s writes: > >> Marius Bakke skribis: [...] >>> If the private key used on https://git.savannah.gnu.org/ is static, one >>> option would be to "pin" the corresponding public key. However, some LE >>> clients also rotate the private key when renewing, so we'd need to ask >>> SV admins. And also receive notices in advance if the key ever changes. >>> >>> Pinning the intermediate CAs might work, but what to do when the >>> certificate is signed by a new intermediate (which may happen[0])? How >>> to deliver updates to users with old certs? >>> >>> See: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Pinning_Cheat_Sheet and >>> https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Certificate_and_Public_Key_Pinning >>> >>> ..for quick and long introductions, respectively. >>> >>> [0] https://community.letsencrypt.org/t/hpkp-best-practices-if-you-choo= se-to-implement/4625?source_topic_id=3D2450 >> >> All good points. Well, I guess there=E2=80=99s not much we can do? > > I think pinning the public key could work, if the Savannah > administrators are aware of it. But we'd need a reliable fallback > mechanism in case the private key needs to be updated. Yeah, sounds fragile. > I think having a separate 'le-certs' package that can verify the Lets > Encrypt chain sounds like the easiest option. Presumably new > intermediates etc will be known well in advance. That sounds more reasonable to me. Do you know what it would take to get the whole LE chain in such a package? Would you like to give it a try? Thanks, Ludo=E2=80=99.