From: Bengt Richter <bokr@bokr.com>
To: Maxime Devos <maximedevos@telenet.be>
Cc: guix-devel@gnu.org
Subject: Re: TOCTTOU race (was: Potential security weakness in Guix services)
Date: Sun, 14 Feb 2021 18:19:05 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210214171905.GA2887@LionPure> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <53c60ce40d68cfc93a9ea2c4a8f865026e12c889.camel@telenet.be>
Hi,
On +2021-02-14 13:29:29 +0100, Maxime Devos wrote:
> On Sat, 2021-02-06 at 22:26 +0100, Ludovic Courtès wrote:
> >
> > [...]
> > I understand the TOCTTOU race. However, activation code runs in two
> > situations: when booting the system (before shepherd takes over), and
> > upon ‘guix system reconfigure’ completion.
> >
Until we have a guix jargon file and a
guix gloss SEARCHARGS ...
convenience command, it is nice towards noobs to spell out
an abbreviation or acronym on first use ;-)
--8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8---
Time-of-check to time-of-use
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
(Redirected from TOCTTOU)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
In software development, time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU, TOCTTOU
or TOC/TOU) is a class of software bugs caused by a race condition
involving the checking of the state of a part of a system (such as a
security credential) and the use of the results of that check.
TOCTOU race conditions are common in Unix between operations on the
file system,^[1] but can occur in other contexts, including local
sockets and improper use of database transactions. In the early 1990s,
the mail utility of BSD 4.3 UNIX had an exploitable race condition for
temporary files because it used the mktemp()^[2] function.^[3] Early
versions of OpenSSH had an exploitable race condition for Unix domain
sockets.^[4] They remain a problem in modern systems; as of 2019, a
TOCTOU race condition in Docker allows root access to the filesystem of
the host platform.^[5]
[ ]
--8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8---
[...snip...]
--
Regards,
Bengt Richter
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-02-14 17:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-01-28 21:53 Potential security weakness in Guix services Leo Famulari
2021-01-29 13:33 ` Maxime Devos
2021-01-29 15:25 ` Maxime Devos
2021-02-01 15:35 ` Ludovic Courtès
2021-02-01 15:47 ` Julien Lepiller
2021-02-01 16:19 ` Maxime Devos
2021-02-02 13:07 ` Ludovic Courtès
2021-02-02 13:38 ` Maxime Devos
2021-02-02 15:30 ` Maxime Devos
2021-02-05 9:57 ` Ludovic Courtès
2021-02-05 12:20 ` Maxime Devos
2021-02-05 14:16 ` Maxime Devos
2021-02-06 21:28 ` Ludovic Courtès
2021-02-06 22:01 ` Maxime Devos
2021-02-10 20:45 ` Ludovic Courtès
2021-02-06 21:26 ` Ludovic Courtès
2021-02-14 12:29 ` TOCTTOU race (was: Potential security weakness in Guix services) Maxime Devos
2021-02-14 17:19 ` Bengt Richter [this message]
2021-02-18 17:54 ` TOCTTOU race Ludovic Courtès
2021-02-19 18:01 ` Maxime Devos
2021-02-22 8:54 ` Ludovic Courtès
2021-02-22 19:13 ` Maxime Devos
2021-02-23 15:30 ` Ludovic Courtès
2021-02-27 7:41 ` Maxime Devos
2021-03-10 10:07 ` Ludovic Courtès
2021-02-10 20:54 ` Potential security weakness in Guix services Christopher Lemmer Webber
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
List information: https://guix.gnu.org/
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20210214171905.GA2887@LionPure \
--to=bokr@bokr.com \
--cc=guix-devel@gnu.org \
--cc=maximedevos@telenet.be \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
Code repositories for project(s) associated with this public inbox
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/guix.git
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for read-only IMAP folder(s) and NNTP newsgroup(s).