unofficial mirror of guix-devel@gnu.org 
 help / color / mirror / code / Atom feed
blob 0a58b40dba33de96338a90888f2f6b281e70b49e 7633 bytes (raw)
name: gnu/packages/patches/unrtf-CVE-2016-10091.patch 	 # note: path name is non-authoritative(*)

  1
  2
  3
  4
  5
  6
  7
  8
  9
 10
 11
 12
 13
 14
 15
 16
 17
 18
 19
 20
 21
 22
 23
 24
 25
 26
 27
 28
 29
 30
 31
 32
 33
 34
 35
 36
 37
 38
 39
 40
 41
 42
 43
 44
 45
 46
 47
 48
 49
 50
 51
 52
 53
 54
 55
 56
 57
 58
 59
 60
 61
 62
 63
 64
 65
 66
 67
 68
 69
 70
 71
 72
 73
 74
 75
 76
 77
 78
 79
 80
 81
 82
 83
 84
 85
 86
 87
 88
 89
 90
 91
 92
 93
 94
 95
 96
 97
 98
 99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
 
Fix CVE-2016-10091 (stack-based buffer overflows in cmd_* functions):

https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-10091
https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=849705
http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2016/q4/787

Patch copied from Debian:

https://anonscm.debian.org/cgit/collab-maint/unrtf.git/commit/?h=jessie&id=7500a48fb0fbad3ab963fb17560b2f90a8a485c8

The Debian patch adapts this upstream commit so that it can be applied
to the 0.21.9 release tarball:

http://hg.savannah.gnu.org/hgweb/unrtf/rev/3b16893a6406

From 7dd568ed8a6a5acb6c04f2b40f457d63a00435f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Willi Mann <willi@debian.org>
Date: Sat, 31 Dec 2016 20:31:38 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Add patch from upstream to fix CVE-2016-10091 (buffer
 overflow in various cmd_ functions)

closes: 849705
---
 ...-instances-of-sprintf-with-snprintf-and-a.patch | 179 +++++++++++++++++++++
 debian/patches/series                              |   1 +
 2 files changed, 180 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 debian/patches/0001-Replace-all-instances-of-sprintf-with-snprintf-and-a.patch
 create mode 100644 debian/patches/series

diff --git a/debian/patches/0001-Replace-all-instances-of-sprintf-with-snprintf-and-a.patch b/debian/patches/0001-Replace-all-instances-of-sprintf-with-snprintf-and-a.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2f3825a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0001-Replace-all-instances-of-sprintf-with-snprintf-and-a.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+From: Jean-Francois Dockes <jf@dockes.org>
+Date: Sat, 31 Dec 2016 20:25:19 +0100
+Subject: Replace all instances of sprintf with snprintf and adjust size of
+ integer field in some cases
+
+This fixes CVE-2016-10091
+
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/849705
+---
+ src/attr.c    |  4 ++--
+ src/convert.c | 28 ++++++++++++++--------------
+ src/output.c  |  4 ++--
+ 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/attr.c b/src/attr.c
+index 02b5c81..e2951ea 100644
+--- a/src/attr.c
++++ b/src/attr.c
+@@ -746,7 +746,7 @@ char *
+ assemble_string(char *string, int nr)
+ {
+ 
+-	char *s, tmp[12];/* Number of characters that can be in int type (including '\0') - AF */
++	char *s, tmp[20];
+ 	int i = 0, j = 0;
+ 
+ 	if (string == NULL)
+@@ -762,7 +762,7 @@ assemble_string(char *string, int nr)
+ 		}
+ 
+ 		if (string[i] != '\0') {
+-			sprintf(tmp, "%d", nr);
++			snprintf(tmp, 20, "%d", nr);
+ 			strcpy(&s[j], tmp);
+ 			j = j + strlen(tmp);
+ 		}
+diff --git a/src/convert.c b/src/convert.c
+index c76d7d6..8eacdcb 100644
+--- a/src/convert.c
++++ b/src/convert.c
+@@ -472,7 +472,7 @@ static const int fcharsetparmtocp(int parm)
+ }
+ 
+ // Translate code page to encoding name hopefully suitable as iconv input
+-static char *cptoencoding(parm)
++static char *cptoencoding(int parm)
+ {
+     // Note that CP0 is supposed to mean current system default, which does
+     // not make any sense as a stored value, we don't handle it.
+@@ -964,7 +964,7 @@ cmd_cf (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int num)
+ 	}
+ 	else
+ 	{
+-		sprintf(str,"#%02x%02x%02x",
++		snprintf(str, 40, "#%02x%02x%02x",
+ 			color_table[num].r,
+ 			color_table[num].g,
+ 			color_table[num].b);
+@@ -993,7 +993,7 @@ cmd_cb (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int num)
+ 	}
+ 	else
+ 	{
+-		sprintf(str,"#%02x%02x%02x",
++		snprintf(str, 40, "#%02x%02x%02x",
+ 			color_table[num].r,
+ 			color_table[num].g,
+ 			color_table[num].b);
+@@ -1018,7 +1018,7 @@ cmd_fs (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int points) {
+ 	/* Note, fs20 means 10pt */
+ 	points /= 2;
+ 
+-	sprintf(str,"%d",points);
++	snprintf(str, 20, "%d", points);
+ 	attr_push(ATTR_FONTSIZE,str);
+ 
+ 	return FALSE;
+@@ -1166,7 +1166,7 @@ cmd_f (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int num)
+         {
+             // TOBEDONE: WHAT'S THIS ???
+             name = my_malloc(12);
+-            sprintf(name, "%d", num);
++			snprintf(name, 12, "%d", num);
+         }
+ 
+         /* we are going to output entities, so should not output font */
+@@ -1218,7 +1218,7 @@ cmd_highlight (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int num)
+ 	}
+ 	else
+ 	{
+-		sprintf(str,"#%02x%02x%02x",
++		snprintf(str, 40, "#%02x%02x%02x",
+ 			color_table[num].r,
+ 			color_table[num].g,
+ 			color_table[num].b);
+@@ -1373,9 +1373,9 @@ cmd_ftech (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int param) {
+ 
+ static int 
+ cmd_expand (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int param) {
+-	char str[10];
++	char str[20];
+ 	if (has_param) {
+-		sprintf(str, "%d", param/4);
++		snprintf(str, 20, "%d", param / 4);
+ 		if (!param) 
+ 			attr_pop(ATTR_EXPAND);
+ 		else 
+@@ -1394,7 +1394,7 @@ cmd_expand (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int param) {
+ 
+ static int 
+ cmd_emboss (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int param) {
+-	char str[10];
++	char str[20];
+ 	if (has_param && !param)
+ #ifdef SUPPORT_UNNESTED
+ 		attr_find_pop(ATTR_EMBOSS);
+@@ -1403,7 +1403,7 @@ cmd_emboss (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int param) {
+ #endif
+ 	else
+ 	{
+-		sprintf(str, "%d", param);
++		snprintf(str, 20, "%d", param);
+ 		attr_push(ATTR_EMBOSS, str);
+ 	}
+ 	return FALSE;
+@@ -1419,12 +1419,12 @@ cmd_emboss (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int param) {
+ 
+ static int 
+ cmd_engrave (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int param) {
+-	char str[10];
++	char str[20];
+ 	if (has_param && !param) 
+ 		attr_pop(ATTR_ENGRAVE);
+ 	else
+ 	{
+-		sprintf(str, "%d", param);
++		snprintf(str, 20, "%d", param);
+ 		attr_push(ATTR_ENGRAVE, str);
+ 	}
+ 	return FALSE;
+@@ -1976,7 +1976,7 @@ static int cmd_u (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int param) {
+ 
+ 	short	done=0;
+ 	long unicode_number = (long) param; /* On 16bit architectures int is too small to store unicode characters. - AF */
+-	char tmp[12]; /* Number of characters that can be in int type (including '\0'). If int size is greater than 4 bytes change this value. - AF */
++	char tmp[20]; /* Number of characters that can be in int type (including '\0'). If int size is greater than 4 bytes change this value. - AF */
+ 	const char *alias;
+ #define DEBUG 0
+ #if DEBUG
+@@ -2006,7 +2006,7 @@ static int cmd_u (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int param) {
+                             /* RTF spec: Unicode values beyond 32767 are represented by negative numbers */
+ 				unicode_number += 65536;
+ 			}
+-			sprintf(tmp, "%ld", unicode_number);
++			snprintf(tmp, 20, "%ld", unicode_number);
+ 
+ 			if (safe_printf(1, op->unisymbol_print, tmp)) fprintf(stderr, TOO_MANY_ARGS, "unisymbol_print");
+ 			done++;
+diff --git a/src/output.c b/src/output.c
+index 86d8b5c..4cdbfa6 100644
+--- a/src/output.c
++++ b/src/output.c
+@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ op_begin_std_fontsize (OutputPersonality *op, int size)
+ 	if (!found_std_expr) {
+ 		if (op->fontsize_begin) {
+ 			char expr[16];
+-			sprintf (expr, "%d", size);
++			snprintf(expr, 16, "%d", size);
+ 			if (safe_printf (1, op->fontsize_begin, expr)) fprintf(stderr, TOO_MANY_ARGS, "fontsize_begin");
+ 		} else {
+ 			/* If we cannot write out a change for the exact
+@@ -440,7 +440,7 @@ op_end_std_fontsize (OutputPersonality *op, int size)
+ 	if (!found_std_expr) {
+ 		if (op->fontsize_end) {
+ 			char expr[16];
+-			sprintf (expr, "%d", size);
++			snprintf(expr, 16, "%d", size);
+ 			if (safe_printf(1, op->fontsize_end, expr)) fprintf(stderr, TOO_MANY_ARGS, "fontsize_end");
+ 		} else {
+ 			/* If we cannot write out a change for the exact
diff --git a/debian/patches/series b/debian/patches/series
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7868249
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/series
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+0001-Replace-all-instances-of-sprintf-with-snprintf-and-a.patch
-- 
2.11.0


debug log:

solving 0a58b40db ...
found 0a58b40db in https://yhetil.org/guix-devel/049f6fc2d37899df14579e04092582e3382489d5.1483302566.git.leo@famulari.name/

applying [1/1] https://yhetil.org/guix-devel/049f6fc2d37899df14579e04092582e3382489d5.1483302566.git.leo@famulari.name/
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/unrtf-CVE-2016-10091.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/unrtf-CVE-2016-10091.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0a58b40db

1:63: trailing whitespace.
+ 
1:67: trailing whitespace.
+ 
1:71: trailing whitespace.
+ 
1:84: trailing whitespace.
+ 
1:112: trailing whitespace.
+ 
Checking patch gnu/packages/patches/unrtf-CVE-2016-10091.patch...
Applied patch gnu/packages/patches/unrtf-CVE-2016-10091.patch cleanly.
warning: squelched 15 whitespace errors
warning: 20 lines add whitespace errors.

index at:
100644 0a58b40dba33de96338a90888f2f6b281e70b49e	gnu/packages/patches/unrtf-CVE-2016-10091.patch

(*) Git path names are given by the tree(s) the blob belongs to.
    Blobs themselves have no identifier aside from the hash of its contents.^

Code repositories for project(s) associated with this public inbox

	https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/guix.git

This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for read-only IMAP folder(s) and NNTP newsgroup(s).