bug#47143: pjproject package is vulnerable to CVE-2021-21375 and CVE-2020-15260

[Mark H Weaver <mhw@netris.org>]

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 346 bytes --]

I'm forwarding this to bug-guix@gnu.org so that it won't be forgotten.

      Mark

-------------------- Start of forwarded message --------------------
Subject: pjproject package is vulnerable to CVE-2021-21375 and CVE-2020-15260
From: Léo Le Bouter <lle-bout@zaclys.net>
To: guix-devel@gnu.org
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 2021 03:30:42 +0100


[-- Attachment #2.1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1571 bytes --]

CVE-2021-21375	00:15
PJSIP is a free and open source multimedia communication library
written in C language implementing standard based protocols such as
SIP, SDP, RTP, STUN, TURN, and ICE. In PJSIP version 2.10 and earlier,
after an initial INVITE has been sent, when two 183 responses are
received, with the first one causing negotiation failure, a crash will
occur. This results in a denial of service.

CVE-2020-15260	00:15
PJSIP is a free and open source multimedia communication library
written in C language implementing standard based protocols such as
SIP, SDP, RTP, STUN, TURN, and ICE. In version 2.10 and earlier, PJSIP
transport can be reused if they have the same IP address + port +
protocol. However, this is insufficient for secure transport since it
lacks remote hostname authentication. Suppose we have created a TLS
connection to `sip.foo.com`, which has an IP address `100.1.1.1`. If we
want to create a TLS connection to another hostname, say `sip.bar.com`,
which has the same IP address, then it will reuse that existing
connection, even though `100.1.1.1` does not have certificate to
authenticate as `sip.bar.com`. The vulnerability allows for an insecure
interaction without user awareness. It affects users who need access to
connections to different destinations that translate to the same
address, and allows man-in-the-middle attack if attacker can route a
connection to another destination such as in the case of DNS spoofing.

Upstream has not made a release yet, I advise we wait for a release on
their end then upgrade. To be monitored.

[-- Attachment #2.2: This is a digitally signed message part --]
[-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 833 bytes --]

[-- Attachment #3: Type: text/plain, Size: 67 bytes --]

-------------------- End of forwarded message --------------------