From: Maxime Devos <maximedevos@telenet.be>
To: 47584@debbugs.gnu.org
Subject: bug#47584: Race condition in ‘copy-account-skeletons’: possible privilege escalation.
Date: Sat, 03 Apr 2021 18:22:12 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <63fbd9e37cc3582daf265277e64f0a99b20e05ec.camel@telenet.be> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1a6ed722dfdd96dc8d53f939aa8e440ca7c29213.camel@telenet.be>
[-- Attachment #1.1: Type: text/plain, Size: 84 bytes --]
Patch is attached.
The committer will need to change the commit id appropriately.
[-- Attachment #1.2: 0001-activation-Do-not-dereference-symlinks-in-home-direc.patch --]
[-- Type: text/x-patch, Size: 2549 bytes --]
From 9672bd37bf50db1e0989d0b84035c4788422bd31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Maxime Devos <maximedevos@telenet.be>
Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2021 22:36:14 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] activation: Do not dereference symlinks in home directory
creation.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Fixes <https://bugs.gnu.org/47584>.
* gnu/build/activation.scm
(copy-account-skeletons): Do not chown the home directory; leave this
to 'activate-user-home'.
(activate-user-home): Only chown the home directory after the account
skeletons have been copied.
Co-authored-by: Ludovic Courtès <ludo@gnu.org>.
---
gnu/build/activation.scm | 12 ++++++++----
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/gnu/build/activation.scm b/gnu/build/activation.scm
index 6cb6f8819b..43d973d3da 100644
--- a/gnu/build/activation.scm
+++ b/gnu/build/activation.scm
@@ -107,7 +107,8 @@ Warning: this is currently suspect to a TOCTTOU race!"
(directory %skeleton-directory)
uid gid)
"Copy the account skeletons from DIRECTORY to HOME. When UID is an integer,
-make it the owner of all the files created; likewise for GID."
+make it the owner of all the files created except the home directory; likewise
+for GID."
(define (set-owner file)
(when (or uid gid)
(chown file (or uid -1) (or gid -1))))
@@ -115,7 +116,6 @@ make it the owner of all the files created; likewise for GID."
(let ((files (scandir directory (negate dot-or-dot-dot?)
string<?)))
(mkdir-p home)
- (set-owner home)
(for-each (lambda (file)
(let ((target (string-append home "/" file)))
(copy-recursively (string-append directory "/" file)
@@ -215,10 +215,14 @@ they already exist."
(uid (passwd:uid pw))
(gid (passwd:gid pw)))
(mkdir-p home)
- (chown home uid gid)
(chmod home #o700)
(copy-account-skeletons home
- #:uid uid #:gid gid))))))
+ #:uid uid #:gid gid)
+ ;; It is important 'chown' is called after 'copy-account-skeletons'
+ ;; Otherwise, a malicious user with good timing could
+ ;; create a symlink in HOME that would be dereferenced by
+ ;; 'copy-account-skeletons'.
+ (chown home uid gid))))))
(for-each ensure-user-home users))
--
2.31.1
[-- Attachment #1.3: 0002-news-Add-entry-for-user-account-activation-vulnerabi.patch --]
[-- Type: text/x-patch, Size: 2045 bytes --]
From d071ee3aff5be1a6d7876d7411e70f7283dce1fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Maxime Devos <maximedevos@telenet.be>
Date: Sat, 3 Apr 2021 12:19:10 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] news: Add entry for user account activation
vulnerability.
TODO for guix committer: correct the commit id appropriately.
* etc/news.scm: Add entry.
---
etc/news.scm | 17 +++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
diff --git a/etc/news.scm b/etc/news.scm
index deedc69f6e..0cc9c183a0 100644
--- a/etc/news.scm
+++ b/etc/news.scm
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
;; Copyright © 2020, 2021 Maxim Cournoyer <maxim.cournoyer@gmail.com>
;; Copyright © 2021 Leo Famulari <leo@famulari.name>
;; Copyright © 2021 Zhu Zihao <all_but_last@163.com>
+;; Copyright © 2021 Maxime Devos <maximedevos@telenet.be>
;;
;; Copying and distribution of this file, with or without modification, are
;; permitted in any medium without royalty provided the copyright notice and
@@ -20,6 +21,22 @@
(channel-news
(version 0)
+ ;; XXX to guix committers: this commit likely needs to be changed.
+ (entry (commit "9672bd37bf50db1e0989d0b84035c4788422bd31")
+ (title
+ (en "Risk of local privilege escalation by creation of new user accounts"))
+ (body
+ (en "A security vulnerability that can lead to local privilege
+escalation has been found in the activation code of user accounts. The
+system is only vulnerable during the activation of user accounts (including
+system accounts) that do not already exist.
+
+The attack consists of the user logging in after the user's home directory
+has been created, but before the activation of the user has been completed,
+by creating an appropriately named symbolic link in the home directory
+pointing to a sensitive file, such as @file{/etc/shadow}.
+
+See @uref{https://issues.guix.gnu.org/47584} for more information on this bug.")))
(entry (commit "9ade2b720af91acecf76278b4d9b99ace406781e")
(title
(en "Update on previous @command{guix-daemon} local privilege escalation")
--
2.31.1
[-- Attachment #2: This is a digitally signed message part --]
[-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 260 bytes --]
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-04-03 16:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-04-03 16:09 bug#47584: Race condition in ‘copy-account-skeletons’: possible privilege escalation Maxime Devos
2021-04-03 16:22 ` Maxime Devos [this message]
2021-04-03 16:32 ` Maxime Devos
2021-04-03 20:15 ` Ludovic Courtès
2021-04-03 16:26 ` Maxime Devos
2021-04-03 20:45 ` Ludovic Courtès
2021-04-03 20:49 ` Ludovic Courtès
2021-04-04 13:29 ` Maxime Devos
2021-04-03 20:27 ` Ludovic Courtès
2021-04-03 20:33 ` Ludovic Courtès
2021-04-04 7:36 ` Maxime Devos
2021-04-05 19:54 ` Ludovic Courtès
2021-04-06 9:56 ` Maxime Devos
2021-04-06 11:57 ` Ludovic Courtès
2021-04-07 18:28 ` Maxime Devos
2022-10-21 9:31 ` Maxime Devos
2022-10-28 16:03 ` bug#47584: [DRAFT PATCH v2 0/4] Fix race condition in mkdir-p/perms Maxime Devos
2022-10-28 16:04 ` bug#47584: [PATCH 1/3] guile-next: Update to 3.0.8-793fb46 Maxime Devos
2022-10-28 16:04 ` bug#47584: [PATCH 2/3] WIP gnu: Change the Guile used for activation to one that has 'openat' Maxime Devos
2022-10-28 16:04 ` bug#47584: [PATCH 3/3] activation: Fix TOCTTOU in mkdir-p/perms Maxime Devos
2024-09-06 9:49 ` bug#47584: Race condition in ‘copy-account-skeletons’: possible privilege escalation Ludovic Courtès
2022-10-28 16:05 ` bug#47584: [PATCH 1/3] guile-next: Update to 3.0.8-793fb46 Maxime Devos
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
List information: https://guix.gnu.org/
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=63fbd9e37cc3582daf265277e64f0a99b20e05ec.camel@telenet.be \
--to=maximedevos@telenet.be \
--cc=47584@debbugs.gnu.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
Code repositories for project(s) associated with this public inbox
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/guix.git
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for read-only IMAP folder(s) and NNTP newsgroup(s).