From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Path: news.gmane.org!not-for-mail From: Ian Grant Newsgroups: gmane.comp.gnu.lightning.general,gmane.lisp.guile.devel Subject: Re: GNU Thunder Date: Wed, 3 Sep 2014 21:53:28 -0400 Message-ID: References: NNTP-Posting-Host: plane.gmane.org Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="===============3504894313547801154==" X-Trace: ger.gmane.org 1409795627 19298 80.91.229.3 (4 Sep 2014 01:53:47 GMT) X-Complaints-To: usenet@ger.gmane.org NNTP-Posting-Date: Thu, 4 Sep 2014 01:53:47 +0000 (UTC) Cc: lightning , guile-devel-mXXj517/zsQ@public.gmane.org To: Richard Stallman Original-X-From: lightning-bounces+gcglg-lightning=m.gmane.org-mXXj517/zsQ@public.gmane.org Thu Sep 04 03:53:40 2014 Return-path: Envelope-to: gcglg-lightning@m.gmane.org Original-Received: from lists.gnu.org ([208.118.235.17]) by plane.gmane.org with esmtp (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from ) id 1XPMF1-0000xa-CN for gcglg-lightning@m.gmane.org; Thu, 04 Sep 2014 03:53:39 +0200 Original-Received: from localhost ([::1]:48364 helo=lists.gnu.org) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1XPMF0-0001wV-Qa for gcglg-lightning@m.gmane.org; Wed, 03 Sep 2014 21:53:38 -0400 Original-Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:4830:134:3::10]:34918) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1XPMEv-0001wE-V3 for lightning-mXXj517/zsQ@public.gmane.org; Wed, 03 Sep 2014 21:53:35 -0400 Original-Received: from Debian-exim by eggs.gnu.org with spam-scanned (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1XPMEu-0003A7-5o for lightning-mXXj517/zsQ@public.gmane.org; Wed, 03 Sep 2014 21:53:33 -0400 Original-Received: from mail-wi0-x22f.google.com ([2a00:1450:400c:c05::22f]:65479) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1XPMEt-00037q-NB; Wed, 03 Sep 2014 21:53:32 -0400 Original-Received: by mail-wi0-f175.google.com with SMTP id ho1so207761wib.14 for ; Wed, 03 Sep 2014 18:53:28 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=googlemail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=ExDBRUyHgDvIGvuVSDJotU5s1bdzfsVeUKRp35extkY=; b=qi8lwOs2CzKd4qUZhscSkuK7WUcJMe6LO4WjK7CV6hyuGGeiq2/ROJxkw2YOibHrAH E5KCbhZKs8Ur79pUtO+PrMy107cEfHCI3lhzirzF9HD594I/7f/wZ/zzASi922YdiZGL yd/P3D8AtSZzpn64VI9voyM5KcZ3hCGpt+zpBwVyzW+Q+n0YXsVtf157sGvPT42s0LpQ POUO4r5lU3vOj26u9IheYC2vqAXJkKpOvfag1bZCMaUZi/17QANhhXZzmPO2P6m4koe5 /iSziDLcDJDN/xltHdD6cux98AUJVPb0vCBqzlL6uTFfGXYYntPoldTAo9Msk2USzOcP ciNw== X-Received: by 10.180.223.4 with SMTP id qq4mr1386479wic.47.1409795608688; Wed, 03 Sep 2014 18:53:28 -0700 (PDT) Original-Received: by 10.194.219.234 with HTTP; Wed, 3 Sep 2014 18:53:28 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: X-detected-operating-system: by eggs.gnu.org: Error: Malformed IPv6 address (bad octet value). X-Received-From: 2a00:1450:400c:c05::22f X-BeenThere: lightning-mXXj517/zsQ@public.gmane.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.14 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: lightning-bounces+gcglg-lightning=m.gmane.org-mXXj517/zsQ@public.gmane.org Original-Sender: lightning-bounces+gcglg-lightning=m.gmane.org-mXXj517/zsQ@public.gmane.org Xref: news.gmane.org gmane.comp.gnu.lightning.general:558 gmane.lisp.guile.devel:17394 Archived-At: --===============3504894313547801154== Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a11361c06763ff20502339ed7 --001a11361c06763ff20502339ed7 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > That hack recognized specific syntax. Any change in the wrong > place would break it. Which hack was that? The one Thompson is reported to have actually implemented in Unix? You are assuming what you are trying to prove: you are assuming there has only ever been one instance of this class of attack, and you are trying to prove that this class of attack is unlikely. That used to be called "Begging the Question" but nowadays the general level of understanding of logic is so poor that most uses of that phrase are not in this sense. It may *seem* unlikely, but to anyone who has given serious thought to the possibilities of such an attack it seems more than wildly probable. I suppose everyone knows that Roger Schell spent several years in the office of deputy director of the NSA's National Computer Security Centre? If he did not alert the NSA to the possibility of this sort of attack then he was not doing his job properly. Having read some of the Computer Security History Project interview with him, I do not think Roger Schell is the sort of person who doesn't do his job properly. Thompson wrote that paper in 1984, and I don't think that was a coincidence. What he shows is that if you control the semantics of a language, that is if you control the meaning of what people say, then you control what they *see,* and so you also control what they think. And that was a theme in Orwell's book "1984." By controlling the meaning of what people say, Big Brother controlled their thought. In programming terms, if you control the semantics of the compiler, then you can control what people see. For example, you can insert code into libc.so and ld.so that looks for certain signatures and then changes the data that system calls like read and stat return to certain programs, such as sha256sum and objdump for example, according to some predicate. You can also monitor the behaviour of other programs. If you see that there is a program that reads mainly C source and writes mainly a.out executables, then you know those executables should contain a certain signature, and if they don't then you know you have a C compiler on the system which is not bugged, at least, one which has not got *your* bug (it may have any number of other such bugs however, because this semantics generalises.) So you can call for help, or you can even insert code to call for help into the binaries that program creates. Basically, your power over the system appears to be total. Of course it's not, because there are any number of other such bugs in there with you. In the end the only person who is guaranteed not to have control over what the system does is the program source code. Now it may seem unlikely to some that this has been done. But it is surely obvious to *everyone* that this is *possible,* and since the advantage an attacker accrues if he can pull this off effectively is incalculable, it should also be obvious to *everyone* that if this has not yet been done, then it will soon be done. Perhaps as a direct result of people reading what I am writing right now. So I hope people will focus on this problem, in spite of what Richard says. He will change his mind in due course, quite shortly I think :-) Focussing on free source code is pointless, we need to focus on free semantics. Of course this negates certain fairly fundamental principles of the Free Software Foundation. One of these is the idea of "Copyleft." By taking concrete representation of algorithms as the stock-in-trade of computer programmers, it is able to use the copyright laws to effect a kind of viral copyright status which automatically infects any program which uses that particular source code representation. The problem is that once one concentrates on free semantics rather than free source code, there is no longer any recourse to the copyright laws: the copyright laws protect only one particular concrete representation of an idea. The only legal protection sematics have is through patent law. So the Free Software Foundation, if it's to 'own' anything at all anymore, will have to register and defend its assets as patents. Ian On Wed, Sep 3, 2014 at 8:50 AM, Richard Stallman wrote: > [[[ To any NSA and FBI agents reading my email: please consider ]]] > [[[ whether defending the US Constitution against all enemies, ]]] > [[[ foreign or domestic, requires you to follow Snowden's example. ]]] > > It's surprisingly hard to fundamentally change a program that big. > Most changes are fairly minor and leave the basic structure unchanged. > > That hack recognized specific syntax. Any change in the wrong place > would break it. > > So a trap door could look at the large-scale structure using > unification to do pattern matching, Then it would be able to adapt > automatically to many localised changes. > > Who knows. It is an imponderable. > > The reason I am not interested in focusing on this problem, which is > conceivable, is that (1) it seems unlikely and (2) we face other > problems that are just as bad and that are real for certain. > > -- > Dr Richard Stallman > President, Free Software Foundation > 51 Franklin St > Boston MA 02110 > USA > www.fsf.org www.gnu.org > Skype: No way! That's nonfree (freedom-denying) software. > Use Ekiga or an ordinary phone call. > > --001a11361c06763ff20502339ed7 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
> That hack recognized specific syntax.=C2=A0 Any = change in the wrong
> place would break it.

Which hack was tha= t? The one Thompson is reported to have actually
implemented in Unix? Yo= u are assuming what you are trying to
prove: you are assuming there has only ever been one instance of this
cl= ass of attack, and you are trying to prove that this class of attack
is = unlikely. That used to be called "Begging the Question" but
nowadays the general level of understanding of logic is so poor that
mos= t uses of that phrase are not in this sense.

It may *seem* unlikely,= but to anyone who has given serious thought to
the possibilities of suc= h an attack it seems more than wildly probable.

I suppose everyone knows that Roger Schell spent several years in the o= ffice
of deputy director of the NSA's National Computer Security Cen= tre?=C2=A0 If
he did not alert the NSA to the possibility of this sort o= f attack
then he was not doing his job properly. Having read some of the
Computer= Security History Project interview with him, I do not think
Roger Schel= l is the sort of person who doesn't do his job properly.

Thompso= n wrote that paper in 1984, and I don't think that was a
coincidence. What he shows is that if you control the semantics of a
lan= guage, that is if you control the meaning of what people say, then
you c= ontrol what they *see,* and so you also control what they
think. And tha= t was a theme in Orwell's book "1984." By controlling
the meaning of what people say, Big Brother controlled their thought.
In programming terms, if you control the semantics of the compiler,
th= en you can control what people see. For example, you can insert code
into libc.so and ld.so that looks for certain signatures and then
change= s the data that system calls like read and stat return to
certain progra= ms, such as sha256sum and objdump for example,
according to some predica= te. You can also monitor the behaviour of
other programs. If you see that there is a program that reads mainly C
s= ource and writes mainly a.out executables, then you know those
executabl= es should contain a certain signature, and if they don't then
you kn= ow you have a C compiler on the system which is not bugged, at
least, one which has not got *your* bug (it may have any number of
other= such bugs however, because this semantics generalises.) So you
can call= for help, or you can even insert code to call for help into
the binarie= s that program creates. Basically, your power over the
system appears to be total. Of course it's not, because there are anynumber of other such bugs in there with you. In the end the only
perso= n who is guaranteed not to have control over what the system does
is the= program source code.

Now it may seem unlikely to some that this has been done. But it is
= surely obvious to *everyone* that this is *possible,* and since the
adva= ntage an attacker accrues if he can pull this off effectively is
incalcu= lable, it should also be obvious to *everyone* that if this has
not yet been done, then it will soon be done. Perhaps as a direct
result= of people reading what I am writing right now.

So I hope people wil= l focus on this problem, in spite of what Richard
says. He will change h= is mind in due course, quite shortly I think :-)

Focussing on free source code is pointless, we need to focus on freesemantics. Of course this negates certain fairly fundamental
principles= of the Free Software Foundation. One of these is the idea
of "Copy= left." By taking concrete representation of algorithms as the
stock-in-trade of computer programmers, it is able to use the
copyright = laws to effect a kind of viral copyright status which
automatically infe= cts any program which uses that particular source
code representation. T= he problem is that once one concentrates on free
semantics rather than free source code, there is no longer any
recourse = to the copyright laws: the copyright laws protect only one
particular co= ncrete representation of an idea. The only legal
protection sematics hav= e is through patent law. So the Free Software
Foundation, if it's to 'own' anything at all anymore, will have= to
register and defend its assets as patents.

Ian


On Wed, Sep = 3, 2014 at 8:50 AM, Richard Stallman <rms-mXXj517/zsQ@public.gmane.org> wrote:
[[[ To any NSA and FBI agent= s reading my email: please consider=C2=A0 =C2=A0 ]]]
[[[ whether defending the US Constitution against all enemies,=C2=A0 =C2=A0= =C2=A0]]]
[[[ foreign or domestic, requires you to follow Snowden's example. ]]]<= br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 It's surprisingly hard to fundament= ally change a program that big.
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Most changes are fairly minor and leave the basic structure u= nchanged.

That hack recognized specific syntax.=C2=A0 Any change in the wrong p= lace
would break it.

=C2=A0 =C2=A0 So a trap door could look at the large-scale structure using<= br> =C2=A0 =C2=A0 unification to do pattern matching, Then it would be able to = adapt
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 automatically to many localised changes.

Who knows.=C2=A0 It is an imponderable.

The reason I am not interested in focusing on this problem, which is
conceivable, is that (1) it seems unlikely and (2) we face other
problems that are just as bad and that are real for certain.

--
Dr Richard Stallman
President, Free Software Foundation
51 Franklin St
Boston MA 02110
USA
www.fsf.org=C2=A0 www.gnu.org
Skype: No way! That's nonfree (freedom-denying) software.
=C2=A0 Use Ekiga or an ordinary phone call.


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