From: "João Távora" <joaotavora@gmail.com>
To: Stefan Monnier <monnier@IRO.UMontreal.CA>
Cc: Glenn Morris <rgm@gnu.org>, emacs-devel <emacs-devel@gnu.org>
Subject: Re: Safety of elisp-flymake-byte-compile (Was Re: [Emacs-diffs] scratch/allow-custom-load-paths)
Date: Mon, 10 Dec 2018 00:20:39 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87mupe9qqw.fsf@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <jwvsgz859cf.fsf-monnier+emacsdiffs@gnu.org> (Stefan Monnier's message of "Sat, 08 Dec 2018 10:36:05 -0500")
Stefan Monnier <monnier@IRO.UMontreal.CA> writes:
>> 1. Create a elisp-flymake-maybe-enable function that checks the buffer
>> for top-level forms that _could_ make it unsafe for byte-compiling on
>> the fly. This would include, but not limited to, eval-and-compile,
>> eval-when-compile, defmacro, cl-defmacro, any "unknown" top-level
>> form. This will generate a lot of false positives (positive meaning
>> "unsafe") but perhaps it could be made to generate 0 false negatives
>> and still successfully vet a good number of elisp files.
>
> I was thinking that we can probably do it without a separate check:
You mean do it directly in elisp-flymake--batch-compile-for-flymake?
Yeah, that's definitely a good idea.
> In bytecomp.el, when working in "flymake" mode (a mode in which the
> output bytecode is not actually needed) we'd treat eval-when/and-compile
> just like `progn`, and we'd mark some other macros as "unsafe"
> (in which case we'd treat the corresponding calls as if they expanded
> to nil) and when we see a defmacro, we use `unsafep` to decide whether
> that macro should be treated as unsafe
Trying to parse this... You mean when we see a call to a macro, not when
we see a `defmacro' top-level form, right?
> (so we could still macro expand
> locally defined macros as long as they're simple enough).
> Also, in that mode, we'd likely skip byte-opt altogether as well as
> compiler macros.
OK. What's byte-opt BTW? Optimization?
> The most obvious remaining holes there would be macros defined by
> installed packages and whose expansion includes execution of some of its
> arguments (cl-eval-when being the most obvious one, but there are many
> more subtle ones).
So basically, in your proposal, package authors would use sth. like
(declare (flymake-safe t)) in their defmacros? But then we would have
to prompt the user to accept or reject these marks right?
I don't think I completely understood your idea: what about, for
example, eglot.el's macrology that checks LSP interface destructuring at
compile-time? There are some eval-when-compile's there right now:
(eval-and-compile
(defvar eglot--lsp-interface-alist
`(
(CodeAction (:title) (:kind :diagnostics :edit :command))
(Command (:title :command) (:arguments))
...)
"Alist of (INTERFACE REQUIRED-KEYS OPTIONAL-KEYS)"))
And then
(eglot--dbind ((Command) title not-really-a-key) some-lsp-object
(do-something-with title not-really-a-key))
gives me a nice warning that not-really-a-key isn't in the "Command"
interface. How would that work in your new elisp-flymake-byte-compile?
Also, what do you think of my option 2 to disable most of the system
interface when flymaking?
João
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-12-10 0:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20181204233600.7907.75252@vcs0.savannah.gnu.org>
[not found] ` <20181204233601.273DD209DC@vcs0.savannah.gnu.org>
2018-12-05 4:34 ` [Emacs-diffs] scratch/allow-custom-load-paths-in-elisp-flymake 4ef9711: Allow custom load paths in elisp's byte-compilation Flymake Stefan Monnier
2018-12-05 15:14 ` João Távora
2018-12-05 20:00 ` Glenn Morris
2018-12-05 20:40 ` João Távora
2018-12-08 13:23 ` Safety of elisp-flymake-byte-compile (Was Re: [Emacs-diffs] scratch/allow-custom-load-paths) João Távora
2018-12-08 15:36 ` Stefan Monnier
2018-12-10 0:20 ` João Távora [this message]
2018-12-10 2:22 ` Stefan Monnier
2018-12-10 23:17 ` João Távora
2018-12-11 14:03 ` Stefan Monnier
2018-12-14 12:00 ` João Távora
2018-12-14 12:15 ` Stefan Monnier
2018-12-14 13:09 ` João Távora
2018-12-14 13:27 ` Stefan Monnier
2018-12-14 13:38 ` João Távora
2018-12-14 14:13 ` Stefan Monnier
2018-12-11 19:30 ` Sandboxing (was: Safety of elisp-flymake-byte-compile) Stefan Monnier
2018-12-14 1:35 ` Sandboxing João Távora
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