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From: "João Távora" <joaotavora@gmail.com>
To: Stefan Monnier <monnier@IRO.UMontreal.CA>
Cc: Glenn Morris <rgm@gnu.org>, emacs-devel <emacs-devel@gnu.org>
Subject: Re: Safety of elisp-flymake-byte-compile (Was Re: [Emacs-diffs] scratch/allow-custom-load-paths)
Date: Mon, 10 Dec 2018 00:20:39 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87mupe9qqw.fsf@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <jwvsgz859cf.fsf-monnier+emacsdiffs@gnu.org> (Stefan Monnier's message of "Sat, 08 Dec 2018 10:36:05 -0500")

Stefan Monnier <monnier@IRO.UMontreal.CA> writes:

>> 1. Create a elisp-flymake-maybe-enable function that checks the buffer
>>    for top-level forms that _could_ make it unsafe for byte-compiling on
>>    the fly.  This would include, but not limited to, eval-and-compile,
>>    eval-when-compile, defmacro, cl-defmacro, any "unknown" top-level
>>    form.  This will generate a lot of false positives (positive meaning
>>    "unsafe") but perhaps it could be made to generate 0 false negatives
>>    and still successfully vet a good number of elisp files.
>
> I was thinking that we can probably do it without a separate check:

You mean do it directly in elisp-flymake--batch-compile-for-flymake?
Yeah, that's definitely a good idea.

> In bytecomp.el, when working in "flymake" mode (a mode in which the
> output bytecode is not actually needed) we'd treat eval-when/and-compile
> just like `progn`, and we'd mark some other macros as "unsafe"
> (in which case we'd treat the corresponding calls as if they expanded
> to nil) and when we see a defmacro, we use `unsafep` to decide whether
> that macro should be treated as unsafe

Trying to parse this... You mean when we see a call to a macro, not when
we see a `defmacro' top-level form, right?

> (so we could still macro expand
> locally defined macros as long as they're simple enough).

> Also, in that mode, we'd likely skip byte-opt altogether as well as
> compiler macros.

OK. What's byte-opt BTW? Optimization?  

> The most obvious remaining holes there would be macros defined by
> installed packages and whose expansion includes execution of some of its
> arguments (cl-eval-when being the most obvious one, but there are many
> more subtle ones).

So basically, in your proposal, package authors would use sth. like
(declare (flymake-safe t)) in their defmacros?  But then we would have
to prompt the user to accept or reject these marks right?

I don't think I completely understood your idea: what about, for
example, eglot.el's macrology that checks LSP interface destructuring at
compile-time?  There are some eval-when-compile's there right now:

  (eval-and-compile
    (defvar eglot--lsp-interface-alist
      `(
        (CodeAction (:title) (:kind :diagnostics :edit :command))
        (Command (:title :command) (:arguments))
        ...)
        "Alist of (INTERFACE REQUIRED-KEYS OPTIONAL-KEYS)"))

And then

   (eglot--dbind ((Command) title not-really-a-key) some-lsp-object
     (do-something-with title not-really-a-key))

gives me a nice warning that not-really-a-key isn't in the "Command"
interface.  How would that work in your new elisp-flymake-byte-compile?

Also, what do you think of my option 2 to disable most of the system
interface when flymaking?

João



  reply	other threads:[~2018-12-10  0:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <20181204233600.7907.75252@vcs0.savannah.gnu.org>
     [not found] ` <20181204233601.273DD209DC@vcs0.savannah.gnu.org>
2018-12-05  4:34   ` [Emacs-diffs] scratch/allow-custom-load-paths-in-elisp-flymake 4ef9711: Allow custom load paths in elisp's byte-compilation Flymake Stefan Monnier
2018-12-05 15:14     ` João Távora
2018-12-05 20:00     ` Glenn Morris
2018-12-05 20:40       ` João Távora
2018-12-08 13:23         ` Safety of elisp-flymake-byte-compile (Was Re: [Emacs-diffs] scratch/allow-custom-load-paths) João Távora
2018-12-08 15:36           ` Stefan Monnier
2018-12-10  0:20             ` João Távora [this message]
2018-12-10  2:22               ` Stefan Monnier
2018-12-10 23:17                 ` João Távora
2018-12-11 14:03                   ` Stefan Monnier
2018-12-14 12:00                     ` João Távora
2018-12-14 12:15                       ` Stefan Monnier
2018-12-14 13:09                         ` João Távora
2018-12-14 13:27                           ` Stefan Monnier
2018-12-14 13:38                             ` João Távora
2018-12-14 14:13                               ` Stefan Monnier
2018-12-11 19:30                   ` Sandboxing (was: Safety of elisp-flymake-byte-compile) Stefan Monnier
2018-12-14  1:35                     ` Sandboxing João Távora

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