From: Mike Gerwitz <mtg@gnu.org>
To: Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen <larsi@gnus.org>
Cc: emacs-devel@gnu.org
Subject: Re: The SHA1 sunset
Date: Tue, 05 Jan 2016 01:38:06 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87d1tg8rap.fsf@gnu.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <m3y4c5vvpt.fsf@gnus.org> (Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen's message of "Mon, 04 Jan 2016 23:14:06 +0100")
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2260 bytes --]
On Mon, Jan 04, 2016 at 23:14:06 +0100, Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen wrote:
>> https://sites.google.com/site/itstheshappening/
>
> I'm not sure why you're linking to that site?
This was the recent paper describing the only SHA-1 collision which was
directly addressed in Ballot 152 in determining whether to continue
issuing SHA-1 certs through 2016:
https://www.grc.com/sn/sn-529-notes.pdf
> The question isn't whether the NSA are able to do SHA-1 collisions
> (which I think everybody assumes that they can, albeit expensively), but
> whether they can create certificates. The jury is out on that one, and
> many people think that it's not a thing (yet) (with certificates with
> the recommended entropy in serial numbers and dates).
That's all good when those suggestions are actually implemented.
> https://blog.cloudflare.com/why-its-harder-to-forge-a-sha-1-certificate-than-it-is-to-find-a-sha-1-collision/
>
>> Such a warning will not be bogus, and it would be a service to warn
>> users even if others don't.
>
> It will almost certainly be bogus (now). Next year, perhaps not.
SHA-1 is broken, which we can agree on. The proposal by CloudFlare to
randomize serial numbers with at least 20 bits of entropy is a band aid
atop of a broken cryptosystem. It should work for the meantime---for
those CAs that actually implement it---but
this is not an alternative to issuing SHA-2 certificates, and it won't
help already issued certs. Personally, I prefer not to rely on bandages
for my crypto.
Since this mitigation attempt is dependent on CAs adopting it, that can
only get _better_ with time. Considering SHA-1 to be broken (period),
then presumably, a year from now, we'd only be in a better position if
new SHA-1 certs are issued with a randomized serial number, given the
relative increase in computing cost/power. We would be in a worse
position for SHA-1 certs that haven't expired a year from now, since
they'll be cheaper to exploit.
CloudFlare also wrote about browser support for SHA-2:
https://blog.cloudflare.com/sha-1-deprecation-no-browser-left-behind/
--
Mike Gerwitz
Free Software Hacker | GNU Maintainer
https://mikegerwitz.com
FSF Member #5804 | GPG Key ID: 0x8EE30EAB
[-- Attachment #2: signature.asc --]
[-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 818 bytes --]
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-01-05 6:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-01-03 9:55 The SHA1 sunset Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen
2016-01-03 15:37 ` Eli Zaretskii
2016-01-03 19:58 ` John Wiegley
2016-01-04 0:53 ` Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen
2016-01-04 1:05 ` John Wiegley
2016-01-04 22:15 ` Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen
2016-01-04 2:10 ` Mike Gerwitz
2016-01-04 22:14 ` Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen
2016-01-05 6:38 ` Mike Gerwitz [this message]
2016-01-05 7:07 ` Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen
2016-01-04 15:42 ` Eli Zaretskii
2016-01-04 23:04 ` James Cloos
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=87d1tg8rap.fsf@gnu.org \
--to=mtg@gnu.org \
--cc=emacs-devel@gnu.org \
--cc=larsi@gnus.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
Code repositories for project(s) associated with this external index
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/emacs.git
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/emacs/org-mode.git
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.