From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Path: news.gmane.org!not-for-mail From: Ted Zlatanov Newsgroups: gmane.emacs.devel Subject: Re: NaCl support for Emacs Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2012 08:49:29 -0500 Organization: =?utf-8?B?0KLQtdC+0LTQvtGAINCX0LvQsNGC0LDQvdC+0LI=?= @ Cienfuegos Message-ID: <877h0zfz12.fsf@lifelogs.com> References: <87boqh20ha.fsf@lifelogs.com> <871urc46c9.fsf@uwakimon.sk.tsukuba.ac.jp> <739bsoysp.fsf@news.eternal-september.org> <87ty47r5yt.fsf@lifelogs.com> <87k452p5u3.fsf@lifelogs.com> <87liphne9e.fsf_-_@lifelogs.com> <87fwfon7gl.fsf@lifelogs.com> <87hb04icxl.fsf@lifelogs.com> <87pqesgwnj.fsf@lifelogs.com> <87pqerg4df.fsf@lifelogs.com> Reply-To: emacs-devel@gnu.org NNTP-Posting-Host: lo.gmane.org Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain X-Trace: dough.gmane.org 1326203400 21287 80.91.229.12 (10 Jan 2012 13:50:00 GMT) X-Complaints-To: usenet@dough.gmane.org NNTP-Posting-Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2012 13:50:00 +0000 (UTC) To: emacs-devel@gnu.org Original-X-From: emacs-devel-bounces+ged-emacs-devel=m.gmane.org@gnu.org Tue Jan 10 14:49:56 2012 Return-path: Envelope-to: ged-emacs-devel@m.gmane.org Original-Received: from lists.gnu.org ([140.186.70.17]) by lo.gmane.org with esmtp (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from ) id 1Rkc5M-0001Ud-Fo for ged-emacs-devel@m.gmane.org; Tue, 10 Jan 2012 14:49:56 +0100 Original-Received: from localhost ([::1]:39291 helo=lists.gnu.org) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1Rkc5M-0004HD-1E for ged-emacs-devel@m.gmane.org; Tue, 10 Jan 2012 08:49:56 -0500 Original-Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([140.186.70.92]:60964) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1Rkc5I-0004H2-Up for emacs-devel@gnu.org; Tue, 10 Jan 2012 08:49:54 -0500 Original-Received: from Debian-exim by eggs.gnu.org with spam-scanned (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1Rkc59-0006wi-I7 for emacs-devel@gnu.org; Tue, 10 Jan 2012 08:49:52 -0500 Original-Received: from lo.gmane.org ([80.91.229.12]:36886) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1Rkc59-0006wc-5R for emacs-devel@gnu.org; Tue, 10 Jan 2012 08:49:43 -0500 Original-Received: from list by lo.gmane.org with local (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from ) id 1Rkc57-0001NC-SY for emacs-devel@gnu.org; Tue, 10 Jan 2012 14:49:41 +0100 Original-Received: from c-76-28-40-19.hsd1.vt.comcast.net ([76.28.40.19]) by main.gmane.org with esmtp (Gmexim 0.1 (Debian)) id 1AlnuQ-0007hv-00 for ; Tue, 10 Jan 2012 14:49:41 +0100 Original-Received: from tzz by c-76-28-40-19.hsd1.vt.comcast.net with local (Gmexim 0.1 (Debian)) id 1AlnuQ-0007hv-00 for ; Tue, 10 Jan 2012 14:49:41 +0100 X-Injected-Via-Gmane: http://gmane.org/ Mail-Followup-To: emacs-devel@gnu.org Original-Lines: 39 Original-X-Complaints-To: usenet@dough.gmane.org X-Gmane-NNTP-Posting-Host: c-76-28-40-19.hsd1.vt.comcast.net X-Face: bd.DQ~'29fIs`T_%O%C\g%6jW)yi[zuz6; d4V0`@y-~$#3P_Ng{@m+e4o<4P'#(_GJQ%TT= D}[Ep*b!\e,fBZ'j_+#"Ps?s2!4H2-Y"sx" Mail-Copies-To: never User-Agent: Gnus/5.110018 (No Gnus v0.18) Emacs/24.0.90 (gnu/linux) Cancel-Lock: sha1:bmyRSP4YdVdKiGFWBFlgVJ8tfM8= X-detected-operating-system: by eggs.gnu.org: GNU/Linux 2.6 (newer, 3) X-Received-From: 80.91.229.12 X-BeenThere: emacs-devel@gnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.14 Precedence: list List-Id: "Emacs development discussions." List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: emacs-devel-bounces+ged-emacs-devel=m.gmane.org@gnu.org Original-Sender: emacs-devel-bounces+ged-emacs-devel=m.gmane.org@gnu.org Xref: news.gmane.org gmane.emacs.devel:147567 Archived-At: On Tue, 10 Jan 2012 13:51:13 +0100 Carsten Mattner wrote: CM> isn't the secret to decrypt it available in emacs process space for CM> ready retrieval? Not necessarily. But even if it is, the attacker has to know where to find the private key and run non-trivial code to use it. The risk is smaller than plopping the secret data in plain view. CM> usually you also overwrite that memory to prevent leakage as CM> soon as possible. Yes, and we've discussed how ELisp makes that hard, so this will require work at the C level. It's not trivial, absolutely. CM> unlocking a keychain and keeping that "safe" open for the time CM> a user is using the environment is common practice. CM> aren't you going to implement something like gnome's or kde's CM> locked keychain? That's a possibility but not my target currently. CM> there will be at least a couple users demanding integration with CM> existing keychain systems (kde, osx, gnome, ...). We have KDE+GNOME in auth-source already, through the Secrets API. We also had an attempt to provide an interface to the Mac OS X keychain last year, but I don't think it was fruitful. CM> git has recently implemented support for various systems with an CM> abstraction layer and a caching "daemon". Yes, I've followed Jeff King's patches with great interest, although I was absolutely swamped last year and could not test them as I wanted to. I intend to work on integrating VC and Magit with Git's credentials, probably with auth-source support. Ted