From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Path: news.gmane.org!not-for-mail From: "Perry E. Metzger" Newsgroups: gmane.emacs.devel Subject: Re: Bug#766395: emacs/gnus: Uses s_client to for SSL. Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 13:11:55 -0400 Message-ID: <20141028131155.07cb1f95@jabberwock.cb.piermont.com> References: <20141022193441.GA11872@roeckx.be> <87zjcnj2k6.fsf@trouble.defaultvalue.org> <87mw8mzmxj.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> <20141023143702.3897e618@jabberwock.cb.piermont.com> <8761fazkx7.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> <20141023145721.12ed0820@jabberwock.cb.piermont.com> <87vbnay5lf.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> <20141023154223.45f2c9eb@jabberwock.cb.piermont.com> <874muuihjh.fsf@uwakimon.sk.tsukuba.ac.jp> <20141023230048.13f8234a@jabberwock.cb.piermont.com> <87wq7pgpif.fsf@uwakimon.sk.tsukuba.ac.jp> <20141024171421.78720abe@jabberwock.cb.piermont.com> <87r3xxgmx2.fsf@uwakimon.sk.tsukuba.ac.jp> <20141024204202.276dbb1f@jabberwock.cb.piermont.com> <8738a95t6b.fsf@uwakimon.sk.tsukuba.ac.jp> <20141027153954.08930677@jabberwock.cb.piermont.com> <87lho04qvn.fsf@uwakimon.sk.tsukuba.ac.jp> <20141028111903.199d44ab@jabberwock.cb.piermont.com> NNTP-Posting-Host: plane.gmane.org Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Trace: ger.gmane.org 1414516347 9081 80.91.229.3 (28 Oct 2014 17:12:27 GMT) X-Complaints-To: usenet@ger.gmane.org NNTP-Posting-Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 17:12:27 +0000 (UTC) Cc: rms@gnu.org, kurt@roeckx.be, emacs-devel@gnu.org, Florian Weimer , "Stephen J. Turnbull" , Rob Browning To: Stefan Monnier Original-X-From: emacs-devel-bounces+ged-emacs-devel=m.gmane.org@gnu.org Tue Oct 28 18:12:19 2014 Return-path: Envelope-to: ged-emacs-devel@m.gmane.org Original-Received: from lists.gnu.org ([208.118.235.17]) by plane.gmane.org with esmtp (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from ) id 1XjAJc-0000l3-LA for ged-emacs-devel@m.gmane.org; Tue, 28 Oct 2014 18:12:16 +0100 Original-Received: from localhost ([::1]:40515 helo=lists.gnu.org) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1XjAJc-0007pq-75 for ged-emacs-devel@m.gmane.org; Tue, 28 Oct 2014 13:12:16 -0400 Original-Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:4830:134:3::10]:41860) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1XjAJV-0007p9-61 for emacs-devel@gnu.org; Tue, 28 Oct 2014 13:12:13 -0400 Original-Received: from Debian-exim by eggs.gnu.org with spam-scanned (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1XjAJL-0003Rv-BW for emacs-devel@gnu.org; Tue, 28 Oct 2014 13:12:09 -0400 Original-Received: from hacklheber.piermont.com ([166.84.7.14]:47136) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1XjAJL-0003Rr-90; Tue, 28 Oct 2014 13:11:59 -0400 Original-Received: from snark.cb.piermont.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by hacklheber.piermont.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 44BA71432; Tue, 28 Oct 2014 13:11:56 -0400 (EDT) Original-Received: from jabberwock.cb.piermont.com (jabberwock.cb.piermont.com [10.160.2.107]) by snark.cb.piermont.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2FA4E2DE546; Tue, 28 Oct 2014 13:11:56 -0400 (EDT) In-Reply-To: X-Mailer: Claws Mail 3.10.1 (GTK+ 2.24.25; x86_64-apple-darwin14.0.0) X-detected-operating-system: by eggs.gnu.org: GNU/Linux 3.x X-Received-From: 166.84.7.14 X-BeenThere: emacs-devel@gnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.14 Precedence: list List-Id: "Emacs development discussions." List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: emacs-devel-bounces+ged-emacs-devel=m.gmane.org@gnu.org Original-Sender: emacs-devel-bounces+ged-emacs-devel=m.gmane.org@gnu.org Xref: news.gmane.org gmane.emacs.devel:175933 Archived-At: On Tue, 28 Oct 2014 12:52:55 -0400 Stefan Monnier wrote: > > (I'll point out that given that the NSA "Ant Catalog" includes a > > bunch of BIOS-inserted malware and other load-time infection > > techniques. Secure booting is actually a priority for ordinary > > people. > > How would secure-booting protect the user against BIOS-inserted > malware? A Free BIOS would seem to be much more useful/effective > for that purpose. It is necessary but not sufficient to have a free software BIOS. You also need to make it difficult to modify the BIOS without physical access to the machine (unless the user has put in a particular jumper and the new BIOS is signed by a key the user trusts or some such. There are legitimate applications for remote BIOS upgrades, but not for normal users.) Note that there are interesting ways to exploit BIOS code even without replacing it unless one takes great care -- see, for example, the recent round of UEFI exploits. However, as you note, we have gotten far afield from the topic. Perry -- Perry E. Metzger perry@piermont.com