From: lux <lx@shellcodes.org>
To: Eli Zaretskii <eliz@gnu.org>, Max Nikulin <manikulin@gmail.com>
Cc: 66390@debbugs.gnu.org, michael.albinus@gmx.de
Subject: bug#66390: `man' allows to inject arbitrary shell code
Date: Tue, 10 Oct 2023 00:30:06 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <tencent_2EBCD42CDD9DC80B87AB06BB70EACCF8D60A@qq.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <831qe5znrz.fsf@gnu.org>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2722 bytes --]
On Sun, 2023-10-08 at 08:28 +0300, Eli Zaretskii wrote:
> > Date: Sun, 8 Oct 2023 10:37:33 +0700
> > Cc: 66390@debbugs.gnu.org
> > From: Max Nikulin <manikulin@gmail.com>
> >
> > On 08/10/2023 01:26, Eli Zaretskii wrote:
> > >
> > > So the problem _is_ with the shell? If so, the best way of avoiding
> > > these problems is not invoke 'man' via the shell, but via call-process
> > > and its ilk instead.
> >
> > It will be great if it is possible to avoid shell in the middle. However
> > - man.el uses pipes with sed and awk to post-process output of man
> > executable.
> > - if support of remote man files is considered then it is even more hard
> > to avoid shell. SSH assumes shell commands.
>
> Even if sometimes the shell cannot be avoided (which has yet to be
> established, AFAIU), it's not an argument against avoiding it where
> possible, because that solves any security issues, definitely those
> you brought up.
>
> > I had in mind using at least `shell-quote-argument'.
>
> That doesn't work with 'man', which has its own ideas about quoting,
> besides shell-related quoting.
>
> > The issues of sanitizing outputs in callers
> > - If there was a safe function in man.el then callers code would be more
> > simple, so it would be less probable to introduce bugs in such code.
> > - behavior of the `man' emacs command is *underspecified*, so it is hard
> > to provide safe argument for it. Some parenthesis are allowed as in
> > "man(1)" others may be interpreted by shell.
> > - `shell-quote-argument' in callers would rely on man.el implementation
> > details at best or may even lead to undefined behavior since I see have
> > no way to bypass some processing of the argument of the `man' emacs command.
>
> Reiterating what you already said doesn't help to have a productive
> discussion.
>
> > Execution a part of `man' emacs command argument by shell is a surprise
> > to the user any case. Ideally elisp code should prevent it and man.el
> > should emit an error.
>
> IMO, this ideal cannot be reached in practice, let alone kept for any
> length of time. Systems are adding strangely-named man pages all the
> time. We had quite a few bug reports about that during the recent
> years.
>
> > Attempts to call of `man' from other packages is an open door for
> > security vulnerabilities.
>
> Then perhaps those other packages shouldn't call 'man'.
>
>
>
Hi,
There is indeed an code injection vulnerability issue here, for example:
(man ";ls") <-- The `ls' command will be executed.
I think the fix can start with the `Man-translate-references' function.
Here's my patch and the test cases.
[-- Attachment #2: 0001-Fix-man.el-code-injection-vulnerability.patch --]
[-- Type: text/x-patch, Size: 1760 bytes --]
From 1c2905d93d3cba966a7d244f4c278c720ceff378 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Xi Lu <lx@shellcodes.org>
Date: Tue, 10 Oct 2023 00:21:31 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] Fix man.el code injection vulnerability.
* lisp/man.el (Man-translate-references): Fix code injection.
* test/lisp/man-tests.el (man-tests-Man-translate-references): New.
---
lisp/man.el | 2 +-
test/lisp/man-tests.el | 10 ++++++++++
2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/lisp/man.el b/lisp/man.el
index 286edf9314e..43839959622 100644
--- a/lisp/man.el
+++ b/lisp/man.el
@@ -684,7 +684,7 @@ Man-translate-references
(setq name (match-string 2 ref)
section (match-string 1 ref))))
(if (string= name "")
- ref ; Return the reference as is
+ (shell-quote-argument ref) ; Return the reference as is
(if Man-downcase-section-letters-flag
(setq section (downcase section)))
(while slist
diff --git a/test/lisp/man-tests.el b/test/lisp/man-tests.el
index e3657d7df8a..48570967a09 100644
--- a/test/lisp/man-tests.el
+++ b/test/lisp/man-tests.el
@@ -161,6 +161,16 @@ man-bgproc-filter-buttonize-includes
(let ((button (button-at (match-beginning 0))))
(should (and button (eq 'Man-xref-header-file (button-type button))))))))))
+(ert-deftest man-tests-Man-translate-references ()
+ (should (equal (Man-translate-references "basename")
+ "basename"))
+ (should (equal (Man-translate-references "basename(3)")
+ "3 basename"))
+ (should (equal (Man-translate-references "basename(3v)")
+ "3v basename"))
+ (should (equal (Man-translate-references ";id")
+ "\\;id")))
+
(provide 'man-tests)
;;; man-tests.el ends here
--
2.42.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-10-09 16:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-10-07 12:47 bug#66390: `man' allows to inject arbitrary shell code Maxim Nikulin
2023-10-07 13:04 ` Eli Zaretskii
2023-10-07 14:12 ` Max Nikulin
2023-10-07 14:19 ` Eli Zaretskii
2023-10-07 14:29 ` Max Nikulin
2023-10-07 15:10 ` Eli Zaretskii
2023-10-07 15:37 ` Michael Albinus
2023-10-07 15:58 ` Eli Zaretskii
2023-10-07 16:55 ` Michael Albinus
2023-10-07 17:24 ` Eli Zaretskii
2023-10-07 17:45 ` Michael Albinus
2023-10-07 18:26 ` Eli Zaretskii
2023-10-08 3:37 ` Max Nikulin
2023-10-08 5:28 ` Eli Zaretskii
2023-10-09 15:12 ` Max Nikulin
2023-10-09 15:52 ` Eli Zaretskii
2023-10-09 16:30 ` lux [this message]
2023-10-09 16:48 ` Eli Zaretskii
2023-10-09 17:07 ` Ihor Radchenko
2023-10-09 17:20 ` Andreas Schwab
2023-10-10 2:47 ` lux
2023-10-10 7:43 ` Stefan Kangas
2023-10-10 12:11 ` Eli Zaretskii
2023-10-10 12:25 ` Stefan Kangas
2023-10-10 11:09 ` Max Nikulin
2023-10-10 10:54 ` Max Nikulin
2023-10-10 14:30 ` lux
2023-10-10 16:21 ` Andreas Schwab
2023-10-11 3:08 ` lux
2023-10-11 10:46 ` Max Nikulin
2023-10-20 21:00 ` Stefan Kangas
2023-10-21 7:19 ` Eli Zaretskii
2023-10-21 7:35 ` Andreas Schwab
2023-10-21 7:45 ` Eli Zaretskii
2023-10-21 9:19 ` Stefan Kangas
2024-01-10 21:21 ` Stefan Kangas
2024-01-11 12:07 ` Ihor Radchenko
2024-01-11 14:34 ` Max Nikulin
2024-01-11 15:07 ` Ihor Radchenko
2024-01-11 15:28 ` Eli Zaretskii
2024-01-11 15:37 ` Ihor Radchenko
2023-10-09 2:36 ` Richard Stallman
2023-10-09 11:04 ` Eli Zaretskii
2023-10-10 11:56 ` Richard Stallman
2023-10-11 10:56 ` Max Nikulin
2023-10-08 3:42 ` Maxim Nikulin
2023-10-08 5:20 ` Eli Zaretskii
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