Am Mo., 14. Dez. 2020 um 12:05 Uhr schrieb Philipp Stephani : > > > >> - This will need someone else doing the implementation. > > > Looks like we already have a volunteer for macOS. > > > For Linux, this shouldn't be that difficult either. The sandbox needs > > > to install a mount namespace that only allows read access to Emacs's > > > installation directory plus any input file and write access to known > > > output files, and enable syscall filters that forbid everything except > > > a list of known-safe syscalls (especially exec). I can take a stab at > > > that, but I can't promise anything ;-) > > > > Looking forward to it. > > > > I've looked into this, and what I'd suggest for now is: > 1. Add a --seccomp=FILE command-line option that loads seccomp filters > from FILE and applies them directly after startup (first thing in > main). Why do this in Emacs? Because that's the easiest way to prevent > execve. When installing a seccomp filter in a separate process, execve > needs to be allowed because otherwise there'd be no way to execute the > Emacs binary. While there are workarounds (ptrace, LD_PRELOAD), it's > easiest to install the seccomp filter directly in the Emacs process. I've attached a patch for this.